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Abstract
In my dissertation, I study the interplay between innovation and economic growth with an emphasis on the
misallocation of ideas and talent.
The first chapter focuses on the allocation of the innovations themselves, considering the optimal allocation of
ideas across firms, and how it can be achieved via a market for ideas. This is done by first creating an
operational measure of technological propinquity between firms and inventions. Using this empirical
measure, new stylized facts are documented which suggest that ideas may indeed be initially misallocated
across firms, but the market for patents can alleviate the initial misallocation. A quantitative model is built to
perform some thought experiments which suggest that the economic growth rate can be increased by
reducing the frictions in this market.
The second chapter investigates why some organizations and societies are more prolific than others in coming
up with radical, path-breaking innovations, and marshals evidence showing that the cause might be the
"openness to disruption" in their culture. In order to investigate this hypothesis, it is posited that firms and
societies that are more open to disruption would allow the young to rise faster in the hierarchy. This theory
allows one to use the age of the top management in organizations as a proxy for the intangible concept. It is
documented that many measures of radical innovations are positively correlated with openness to disruption
as captured by manager age.
The third chapter analyzes the link between the misallocation of talent and innovation, asking the question
whether the talented people in the society are given the chance to create new innovations that enhance social
welfare. This is investigated empirically using a novel approach that utilizes the power of surnames in
capturing socioeconomic status persistence across time. The results show that the social allocation favors the
wealthy over the talented in determining who become inventors. The rest of the chapter develops a
quantitative model of allocation of talent that can replicate the observed correlation patterns, and shows that
progressive bequest taxation can reduce this misallocation.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON BUILDING GROWTH FROM IDEAS
Murat Alp Celik
Ufuk Akcigit
In my dissertation, I study the interplay between innovation and economic growth with
an emphasis on the misallocation of ideas and talent.
The first chapter focuses on the allocation of the innovations themselves, considering the
optimal allocation of ideas across firms, and how it can be achieved via a market for ideas.
This is done by first creating an operational measure of technological propinquity between
firms and inventions. Using this empirical measure, new stylized facts are documented
which suggest that ideas may indeed be initially misallocated across firms, but the market
for patents can alleviate the initial misallocation. A quantitative model is built to perform
some thought experiments which suggest that the economic growth rate can be increased
by reducing the frictions in this market.
The second chapter investigates why some organizations and societies are more prolific
than others in coming up with radical, path-breaking innovations, and marshals evidence
showing that the cause might be the “openness to disruption” in their culture. In order
to investigate this hypothesis, it is posited that firms and societies that are more open to
disruption would allow the young to rise faster in the hierarchy. This theory allows one to
use the age of the top management in organizations as a proxy for the intangible concept.
It is documented that many measures of radical innovations are positively correlated with
openness to disruption as captured by manager age.
The third chapter analyzes the link between the misallocation of talent and innovation,
asking the question whether the talented people in the society are given the chance to
iv
create new innovations that enhance social welfare. This is investigated empirically using
a novel approach that utilizes the power of surnames in capturing socioeconomic status
persistence across time. The results show that the social allocation favors the wealthy
over the talented in determining who become inventors. The rest of the chapter develops
a quantitative model of allocation of talent that can replicate the observed correlation
patterns, and shows that progressive bequest taxation can reduce this misallocation.
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Chapter 1
Buy, Keep, or Sell: Economic Growth
and the Market for Ideas
This chapter is co-authored with Ufuk Akcigit and Jeremy Greenwood.
Abstract
An endogenous growth model is developed where each period firms invest in re-
searching and developing new ideas. An idea increases a firm’s productivity. By how
much depends on the technological propinquity between an idea and the firm’s line of
business. Ideas can be bought and sold on a market for patents. A firm can sell an idea
that is not relevant to its business or buy one if it fails to innovate. The developed model
is matched up with stylized facts about the market for patents in the United States. The
analysis gauges how efficiency in the patent market affects growth.
1
1.1 Introduction
New ideas are the seeds for economic growth. Rising living standards depend on the
effectiveness of transforming new ideas into consumer products or production processes.
Incarnating an idea into a product or a production process is by no means immediate.
Someone must have a vision or an application for the idea and the know-how to imple-
ment it. These are often people who work in areas related to the end-use of an idea.
For example, in 1849 Walter Hunt was granted a patent for the safety pin. In the
abstract for the patent, Walter Hunt wrote “(t)he distinguishing feature of the invention
consist in the construction of a pin made of a piece of wire or metal combining a spring,
and a clasp or catch, in which catch the point of the said pin is forced and by its own
spring securely retained”–see Figure 1 for his patent application.1 Hunt was a mechanic
by trade and filed patents for various things, such as ice boats, machines for cutting nails,
and repeating guns. What is interesting about this innovation is that Hunt sold his patent
to W. R. Grace and Company for about $10,000 (in today’s dollars). W. R. Grace and
Company mass-produced the safety pin and made millions.
Walter Hunt by no means was an exception. Firms often develop patents that are
not close to their primary business activity. Recently released data on the U.S. market
for patents indicate that a large fraction of patents are sold by firms, which developed
the ideas, to other firms. Specifically, among all the patents registered between 1976
and 2006 in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 16% are traded
and this number goes up to 20% among domestic patents.2 For economic progress, not
only the possibility of exchange, but also the speed of that process is important. USPTO
data shows that new patents are sold among firms on average within 5.48 years (with a
1Patents are publicly disclosed and filed at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Each patent
application has a full description of the invention and drawings to illustrate the embodiments.
2These numbers do not include patent transfers due to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and licensing.
They include only firm-to-firm patent transfers and exclude within-firm patent transfers as well as patents
sold by individuals. See Appendix A.2 for data construction.
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Figure 1: Walter Hunt’s patent for the safety pin
standard deviation of 4.58 years).
An analysis of the patent data in Section 1.3 uncovers some important facts about the
nature of these exchanges. A notion of technological propinquity between a patent and a
firm is developed. The key findings are:
1. A patent contributes more to a firm’s stock market value if it is closer to the firm in
terms of technological distance.
2. A patent is more likely to be sold the more distant it is to the inventing firm.
3. A patent is technologically closer to the buying firm than to the selling firm.
The above observations raise important questions that have been left unanswered by
the existing literature: How sizeable is the misallocation of ideas across firms? How does
efficiency in the market for ideas affect economic growth? Do frictions in the market for
ideas lead to more in-house R&D or do they discourage innovation overall? This paper
attempts to answer these questions.
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1.1.1 The Analysis
To analyze the impact that a market for patents has on the macroeconomy, a search-
theoretic growth model is built. The framework is developed in Section 1.2. Each period
firms invest in research and development (R&D). Sometimes this process generates an
idea, other times it doesn’t. Each firm operates within a particular technology class,
which is fixed over time. An idea increases a firm’s productivity. In the current analysis,
the extent to which a firm uses an idea to push forward its productivity depends on the
propinquity of the idea to the firm’s technology class. A firm may wish to sell an idea
that isn’t close to its own class. It can do so by using a patent agent. Analogously, the
firm might want to purchase an idea through a patent agent if it fails to innovate. Due
to search frictions it may take time for a patent agent to find a buyer for a patent. Also,
a patent may not be the perfect match for a buyer. R&D by firms leads to growth in the
model. Additionally, there is a spillover effect from ideas. A balanced growth path for the
model is explicitly characterized. A unique invariant firm-size distribution exists despite
the fact that the distribution for productivity across firms is continually fanning out.
The model is calibrated in Section 1.4 so that it matches certain features of the U.S.
aggregate economy, such as the average rate of growth, the long-run interest rate, the
share of R&D in GDP, etc. It is also fit to match some facts, presented in Section 1.3, from
the micro data on patents for U.S. public firms. Three such facts are descriptive: the share
of patents that are sold, the empirical duration distribution, and the reduction in distance
between a patent and its owner’s line of business following a sale. Additionally, some
facts from panel-data regression analysis are assembled and targeted using an indirect
inference strategy. First, it is shown that a firm’s market value is positively related to its
stock of patents, controlling for size and other things. Presumably, patents are valuable
because they protect important ideas. Second, the closeness of the patents in a firm’s
portfolio to the firm’s line of business matters for market value. Third, the more distant
a patent is to a firm’s line of business the more likely it is to be sold.
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Clearly, a market for patents affects the incentive to do R&D. On the one hand, the
fact that an idea, which is not so useful for the innovator’s own production, can be sold
raises the return from engaging in R&D. On the other hand, the fact that a firm can buy
an idea reduces the reward from doing R&D. A goal of the analysis is to examine how a
patent market affects R&D and, hence, growth. This is done in Section 1.5.
To gauge the importance of the patent market for economic growth and welfare, a
sequence of structured thought experiments is undertaken in Section 1.5. First, the rate of
contact between buyers and sellers in the market is reduced to zero, which is equivalent
to shutting down the market. In the absence of the patent market, the equilibrium steady-
state growth rate goes from its benchmark value of 2.08% down to 2.02%, resulting in a
welfare reduction of 1.18% in consumption equivalent terms. Next, the efficiency of the
patent market is successively increased. It is shown that a faster rate of contact between
buyers and sellers, where a buyer can find a seller without any delay, increases the growth
rate up to 2.46% and leads to a welfare gain of 5.97% relative to the benchmark economy
(measured in terms of consumption). In addition, if each seller is matched with the
perfect buyer for their patent, then the growth rate increases to 3.05% and a welfare
improvement of 14.3% materializes. Last, if the ideas that firms produce are perfectly
suited for their own production process (this corresponds to a situation where there is no
mismatch between a firm and the idea that it generates) then the growth rate is 3.38%,
which results in a welfare gain of 17.8% compared with the baseline model. So, efficiency
in the market for patents matters.
Two concerns arise with the focus on patents. First, ideas may be transferred via other
means, in particular licensing. The empirical analysis conducted in Section 1.3 controls
for this, to the extent possible. Additionally, the model simulation is redone in Section
1.6 to allow for ideas to be transferred through licensing as well as patents. The results
are not affected in a significant way. Second, perhaps some patents are bought and sold
for reasons surrounding litigation. Such sales may have little to do with the transfer of
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knowledge or increasing productivity. A firm may buy an intrinsically worthless patent
to fend off potential litigation, or perhaps to earn profits by threatening litigation (patent
trolls). The empirical analysis in Section 1.3 also attempts to control for this. Additionally,
as a robustness check, the model is re-simulated in Section 1.6 using data from low-
litigation sectors. Again, the results appear to be immune to this.
The market for patents is often thought of as being inefficient and illiquid. Buying
and selling intellectual property is a difficult activity. Each patent is unique. It may not
be readily apparent who the potential buyers and competing sellers even are, especially
in situations where enterprises desire to keep their business strategies secret. Buyers and
sellers may have very different valuations about the worth of a patent. Patents are often
sold through intermediaries. This motivates the search-theoretic framework presented
here.
Historically patent agents were often lawyers. Dealing with both patent buyers and
sellers, they understood both sides of the market. Inventors used them to file patent
applications. So, the lawyers became acquainted with the new technologies that were
around. Buyers used them to vet the merits of new technologies. Hence, the lawyers were
familiar with the types of patents that were likely to be marketable. This led naturally to
lawyers acting as intermediaries in patent sales. Edward Van Winkle typifies the business.
He was a patent agent at the beginning of the 20th century. Van Winkle was a mechanical
engineer who acquired a law degree by correspondence course. He was well suited to
provide advice on the legal and technical merits of inventions for his clients on both sides
of the market. Van Winkle cultivated a network of businessmen, inventors, and other
lawyers. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2003) detail how he brokered various types of deals
with the buyers and sellers of patents. They also document for the period 1870 to 1910 an
increased tendency for inventors (especially the more productive ones) to use specialized
registered patent agents to handle transactions associated with their patents.
While today’s market for patents is sizeable it can be regarded as being thin due to
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the specialized nature of the knowledge that is embodied in each patent. Thus, the patent
market is highly specialized. To date, online intellectual property platforms have failed
to arbitrage the market. The sensitivity of intellectual property makes potential buyers
and sellers reluctant to reveal information online; they prefer face-to-face dealings with
the other party. Also, some buyers may perceive a lemons problem: if the patents were
truly valuable, then the sellers should be able to profit by developing the idea themselves
or by selling it directly to interested parties.
1.1.2 Relationship to the Literature
How does the current paper relate to the literature? This is discussed now. On
the theory side, the model developed here is in a class of its own, but like all work it
is inspired by some important predecessors. The paper contributes to the endogenous
growth literature. Ever since Romer (1986), economists have been concerned with how
knowledge affects economic growth. The cue for a spillover effect from ideas is in the
Romer (1986) growth model. The notion that a firm can push forward its productivity by
incorporating new ideas in its production process is in Aghion and Howitt (1992). Unlike
Aghion and Howitt (1992), this is done here in a competitive environment.
Recent attention has been directed to developing the micro-foundations of how new
ideas spread in an economy. Some work stresses technology diffusion via innovation
and imitation [e.g., Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), and Konig et al. (2012)]. Other re-
search emphasizes matching and other frictions in the transfer of ideas. [See for instance,
Benhabib et al. (2014), Chiu et al. (2011), Lucas and Moll (2014), and Perla and Tonetti
(2014)]. The work here emphasizes matching frictions. It differs from the above papers in
a number of significant ways. First, the focus is on an economy where growth is driven
by heterogeneous ideas that are invented by firms. A firm may not be able to make the
best use of the idea it discovers. Second, firms can trade their ideas in a market subject
to matching frictions. Third, while the growth literature has mainly been theoretical, the
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current research uses micro data on patent reassignments to motivate and discipline the
analysis.3
The present paper highlights the importance of complementarity (as measured by
distance) between the existing knowledge stock of the firm and new patents. These find-
ings naturally relate to work on diversification. In a classic study on diversification and
integration, Gort (1962) states “when faced with a choice among activities that would
be equally attractive if they were technologically equidistant from the primary one, a
firm will usually undertake those for which technical propinquity to the primary activ-
ity is greatest.” Gort (1962) provides some early evidence in support of this hypothesis.
Figueroa and Serrano (2013) examine the empirical significance of this idea for patenting
and licensing activities.
On the empirical side, the data employed here was first used by Serrano (2010) and
Serrano (2015). He uses the fraction of self-citations as a proxy for the fit of an idea to an
inventing firm and documents that patents that are not a good fit are more likely to be sold
on the market by the inventing firm. A new metric for measuring the distance between
ideas and firms is proposed here. Findings in Serrano (2010) and Serrano (2015) are
confirmed. Additionally, new facts on the relationship between a firm’s market value and
its distance-adjusted patent portfolio are presented. Also, it is shown how the distance
between an idea and its owner changes upon sale. The micro data facts that are obtained
from the U.S. data are then used here to discipline a search-based endogenous growth
model. The model is employed to quantify the misallocation of ideas in the U.S. economy
and the contribution of the patent market to economic growth.
The focus on mismatch in ideas connects with recent work on misallocation [see
3Perhaps the closest theoretical work to the current research is by Chiu et al. (2011). Ideas are homogeneous
in their framework, so there cannot be any misallocation. They are produced by inventors who cannot
commercialize them, so all ideas are sold. Firms cannot do R&D, hence they must purchase an idea to
produce. There are search frictions in their setup: an inventor must find a entrepreneur in order to sell his
idea. Their work emphasizes financial frictions. In particular, an entrepreneur must have cash on hand to
buy an idea. Last, no empirical or quantitative work is done.
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for instance, Acemoglu et al. (2013), Guner et al. (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)]. That literature has mainly focused on factor misalloca-
tions, particularly the allocation of capital and labor across establishments. The current
work complements this literature by focusing on differences in total factor productivity
that may arise due to a misallocation of ideas, which are a direct ingredient in productiv-
ity. Ideas are not necessarily born to their best users. The existence of a market for ideas
and its efficiency can have a major impact on mitigating any initial misallocation. Thus,
the presence of a market for ideas may contribute significantly to productivity growth.
Addressing this question is the focus of the current paper.
1.2 Model
The theoretical model with perfectly competitive firms is introduced now. The goal
is to focus on the potential misallocation of ideas and its consequences for growth and
welfare; therefore, the model abstracts from monopoly distortions. Another interesting
feature of this setting is that patents serve a new role in this economy: the possibility
for trading ideas. Some ideas are better than others for a firm. In the analysis there are
two types of ideas: to wit, d-type and n-type. The worth of a d-type idea depends on
the distance of the idea to a firm’s main line of business. The closer the idea, the more
valuable it is. The worth of an n-type idea is unrelated to the distance between the idea
and the firm’s line of business. To obtain a d-type idea a firm must invest resources, either
through R&D or by buying a patent on the market. By contrast, a firm may discover an
n-type idea through serendipity for free. The productivity of both types of ideas depends
upon the general pool of knowledge in the economy; that is, through osmosis some
component of ideas become part of the ether in technology space.
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1.2.1 Environment
Consider an economy, where time flows discretely, with a continuum of firms of unit
measure. The firms produce a homogeneous final good using capital and labor. Each firm
belongs permanently to some technology class j that resides on a circle with radius 1/π.
At each point on the technology circle there are firms of density 1/2. A firm enters the
period with a level of productivity z. At the beginning of a period each firm develops a
d-type idea with an endogenous probability i. The d-type innovation will be patented and
belongs to some technology class k on the circle. The distance between the firm’s own
technology class, j, and the innovation, k, is denoted by d(j, k). This represents the length
of the shortest arc between j and k. Transform this distance measure into a measure of
technological propinquity, x = 1 − d(j, k), defined on [0, 1]. A high value for x indicates
that the innovation is close to the firm’s technology class. The firm will keep or sell the
d-type patent depending on the value for x. The higher x is, the bigger will be the boost
to the z, if the firm decides to keep the idea. The value of x is drawn from the distribution
function X(x). The technology circle is illustrated in Figure 2. Just before production
begins, an n-type idea arrives with an exogenous probability p. The worth of an n-type
idea is unrelated to a firm’s technology class. The analysis will focus on a symmetric
equilibrium around the technology circle. In a symmetric equilibrium, at each point on
the circle the distribution of firms is the same. Analyzing one point on the circle is the
same as analyzing any other, so there is no need to carry around a location index.
Firms produce output, o, at the end of a period according to the production process
o = (e′z′)ζkκ lλ, with ζ + κ + λ = 1, (1.1)
where k and l are the amounts of capital and labor used in production and z′ is its end-
of-period productivity. The variable e′ is a firm-specific idiosyncratic production shock.
It is drawn at the end of each period from a log-normal distribution with E[e′] = 1 and a
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standard deviation represented by STD(ln e′).4 Labor is hired at the wage rate w. There
is one unit of labor available in the economy. Capital is hired at the rental rate r̃. Observe
that there are diminishing returns in capital and labor. Hence, there are profits from
producing. These rents are increasing in the firm’s productivity, z′. This provides an
incentive to do R&D to improve z′. The exponent ζ on e′z′ is an innocuous normalization
that results in profits being linear in e′z′, as is shown below.
A firm’s end-of-period productivity, z′, evolves according to the law of motion
z′ = L(z, x, b; z) = z + γdxz + γnbz. (1.2)
Here z is the firm’s initial productivity level. The second term gives the increment to
productivity from obtaining a d-type patent, where x is the technological propinquity of
the patent to the firm and z is mean of the productivity distribution in the economy at the
beginning of the period. The closer a d-type innovation is to a firm’s own technology class,
as represented by a larger x, the bigger will be the increase in productivity, γdxz. The third
term gives the gain in productivity from acquiring an n-type idea, where b ∈ {0, 1}. The
expected value of b is given by E[b] = p. Once an idea is blended into a firm’s production
process, within the firm’s permanent technology class, it loses its individual identity. This
assumption implies that there is no need to keep track of a firm’s portfolio of patents,
which would vary by technology class and age; doing so would be an insurmountable
task.
The higher is the economy-wide baseline level of productivity, z, the more valuable
a patent is for increasing productivity. This is true for both d-type and n-type patents.
Note that z introduces a knowledge externality in this economy. Although not modeled
formally, this could be because either some forms of knowledge can only be imperfectly
protected or because the patents protecting them have expired so that the knowledge
4The e′ shock implies that employment, l, will not be a perfect predicator of a firm’s market value. This
property is important for the quantitative analysis and is discussed in Section 1.4.
11
formerly embodied in the patents is now freely available for all. Since n-type patents
arrive with exogenous probability p the firm will benefit from spillovers in a probabilistic
sense, even if the firm does not invest any resources in R&D. This is not true for d-
type patents, as will be seen. Later, the notation L(z, 0, b; z) will be used to signify the
situation where the firm’s productivity is not incremented by a d-type innovation in the
current period, which is equivalent to setting x = 0. One might think that firm would
try to discover a d-type idea that is close to its line of business. As was mentioned, the
propinquity of a d-type idea to the firm, x, is drawn from the distribution X(x). In the
quantitative analysis this is taken to be the empirical distribution. Hence, the propinquity
of ideas to their inventors will be the same as in the data. It turns out that z is also the
aggregate state variable in this economy, a fact shown later. That is, only the mean of
the distribution for the z’s across firms and the evolution of this mean over time matter
for the analysis. Assume that z evolves according to the deterministic aggregate law of
motion
z′ = T(z). (1.3)
Now, at the beginning of a period, firms pick the probability of discovering a d-type
idea, i. They do this according to the convex cost function
C(i; z) = χzζ/(ζ+λ)i1+ρ/(1 + ρ). (1.4)
Cost rises in lock-step fashion with average productivity, z, in the economy. It will be
established later that wages, w, are proportional to z and grow along a balanced growth
path at the same rate as zζ/(ζ+λ). As will be seen, this ensures that along a balanced
growth path the ratio of aggregate R&D expenditures to GDP remains constant. Aggre-
gate productivity will be a function of the aggregate state of the world represented by z.
A firm that successfully innovates can either keep or sell its idea to a patent agent. A firm
that does not innovate can try to buy a patent from an agent. A patent on the market
survives over time with probability σ. In the analysis σ will be set so that patents have
12
the same expected life as in the U.S. data. But, by letting a patent die stochastically in
this fashion, instead of deterministically, there is no need to keep track of a patent’s age,
a huge simplification.
d-type ideas can be bought and sold on a patent market. A firm that fails to come up
with a d-type idea can try to buy one from a patent agent. Innovators are not allowed to
buy patents. A firm that draws a d-type idea may sell the associated patent to a patent
agent at the price q. This price is determined on a competitive market. Once a patent is
sold to an agent the seller cannot use it in the future. A patent agent can only handle one
d-type idea at a time. The introduction of patent agents simplifies the analysis. Without
this construct the analysis would have to keep track of the portfolio of patents that each
firm has for sale. This technical construct is imposed without apology, as in the real world
many patents are sold through agents, as was discussed.
Let na and nb represent the numbers of agents and buyers in the market for d-type
patents. The total number of matches in the market is given by the matching function
M(na, nb) = ηn
µ
a n
1−µ
b .
The matches are completely random. Thus, the odds that an agent will find a buyer are
given by
ma(
na
nb
) =
M(na, nb)
na
= η(
nb
na
)1−µ,
and similarly that a buyer will find an agent by
mb(
na
nb
) =
M(na, nb)
nb
= η(
na
nb
)µ.
This search friction could reflect many things: the hardship of matching buyers and sellers
in a thin market for a complicated product or the difficulty of a buyer assessing the quality
of a patent for his line of business, inter alia.
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Figure 2: The technology circle and the timing of events
The ratio of potential sellers to buyers, na/nb, reflects the slackness of the market.
Since agents and buyers are matched randomly, the propinquity between the buyer’s
technology class and the class of the d-type patent being sold is a random variable. A
buyer will incorporate a d-type patent that he purchases into his production process
in accordance with the above law of motion for z. The price of the d-type patent is
determined by Nash bargaining between the agent and buyer. Represent this price by
p = P(z, x; z). The negotiated price will depend on the propinquity of the patent, x, and
the state of the buyer’s technology, z. The bargaining power of the agent is given by ω. In
contrast, the price at which a firm sells its d-type patent to an agent is fixed at q, because
the agent doesn’t know who he will sell the patent to in the future. The timing of events
in the market for d-type patents is portrayed in the right panel of Figure 2. Last, after the
d-type patent market closes, an n-type idea may arrive to a firm. For the moment assume
that n-type ideas are not traded. A market for n-type ideas is appended onto the model
in Section 1.3.4.
1.2.2 The Representative Consumer/Worker
In the background of the analysis is a representative consumer/worker. This indi-
vidual supplies one unit of labor inelastically. The person owns all of the firms in the
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economy. He also rents out the capital used by firms. Thus, he will earn income from
wages, profits and rentals. Capital depreciates at the rate δ . The real return earned by
renting capital is 1/r. ( I.e., r is the reciprocal of the gross interest rate. It will play the
role of the discount factor in the Bellman equations formulated below.) The individual is
assumed to have a momentary utility function of the form U(c) = c1−ε/(1 − ε), where c
is his consumption in the current period and ε is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
He discounts the future at rate β. Last, the representative consumer/worker’s goal in life
is to maximize his discounted lifetime utility. Since this problem is entirely standard it is
not presented.
1.2.3 Firms: Buyers, Keepers and Sellers
A firm hires labor, l, at the wage rate w, and capital, k, at the rental rate, r̃ ≡ 1/r −
1 + δ, to maximize profits. It does this at the end of each period after seeing the realized
values for e′ and z′. Thus, its decision problem is
e′Π(z′; z) = max
k,l
[(e′z′)ζkκ lλ − r̃k − wl].
where e′Π(z′; z) is the profit function associated with the maximization problem; the
fact that this function is multiplicative in e′ is established momentarily. The first-order
conditions to this maximization problem imply that
k = κ
o
r̃
, (1.5)
and
l = λ
o
w
. (1.6)
Using (1.1), (1.5) and (1.6), it follows that profits are given by
e′Π(z′; z) = (1 − κ − λ)o = e′z′(1 − κ − λ)[(κ
r̃
)κ(
λ
w
)λ]1/ζ . (1.7)
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Again, in equilibrium the rental and wage rates, r̃ and w, will be functions of the aggregate
state of the world, z. Note that profits are increasing in z′ when there are diminishing
returns to scale (1 − κ − λ < 1). This provides an incentive to innovative.
The value function for a firm that desires to buy a patent will now be formulated.
To this end, let V(z; z) represent the expected present-value of a firm that currently has
productivity z and is about to learn whether or not it has come up with a d-type idea.
Due to the focus on symmetric equilibrium there is no need ever to record the firm’s
location on the technology circle. Now, suppose that the firm does not innovate. Then, it
will try to buy a d-type patent. With probability 1 − mb(na/nb) it will fail to find a patent
agent. In that circumstance, the firm’s productivity will remain at z; this is equivalent to
setting x = 0 in (1.2). It may still acquire an n-type patent before the start of production,
though, which would allow productivity to increase by γnz. The expected value of the
firm, before the n-type patent shock, is E[Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)] + rE[V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)]–recall
that b ∈ {0, 1} is a random variable connected with the n-type idea that takes the value
one with probability p and that E[e′] = 1.
With probability mb(na/nb) the firm will meet an agent selling a d-type patent with
propinquity x. Two things can happen here: either the firm buys a d-type patent from the
agent or it doesn’t. The d-type patent sells at the price p = P(z, x; z), which is a function
of the buyer’s type, z, as well the propinquity of the patent to the firm’s technology class,
x. The determination of the d-type patent price is discussed below. The firm will only
buy the patent if it yields a higher payoff than what it will obtain if it doesn’t buy it. If the
firm buys a patent, its productivity will rise to z + γdxz. Again, before production begins
the firm may also obtain an n-type patent, which would result in a further increase in
productivity. The firm’s expected value (before the n-type patent shock) will then move
up to E[Π(L(z, x, b; z); z)] − P(z, x; z) + rE[V(L(z, x, b; z); z′)]. If it doesn’t buy a d-type
patent then its productivity will remain at z. The expected value of the firm will then be
E[Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)] + rE[V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)]. Denote the distribution over propinquity for
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buying a patent from a patent agent by D(x).
The expected discounted present value of the buyer, B(z; z), is easily seen to be
B(z; z) = mb
(
na
nb
) ∫
{Ia(z, x; z){E[Π(L(z, x, b; z); z)]
− P(z, x; z) + rE[V(L(z, x, b; z); z′)]}
+ [1 − Ia(z, x; z)]
{
E [Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)] + rE
[
V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)
]}
}dD(x)
+ [1 − mb(
na
nb
)]
{
E [Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)] + rE
[
V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)
]}
, (1.8)
where z evolves according to (1.3) and
Ia(z, x; z) =
 1 (sale), if the buyer purchases a patent,0 (no sale), otherwise. (1.9)
The indicator function Ia(z, x; z), defined above, specifies whether or not the non-
innovating firm will buy a d-type patent. The determination of this function is discussed
below.
Turn now to the situation where the firm successfully innovates. If it decides to keep
the d-type patent then the firm’s productivity will be z + γdxz as in (1.2). Productivity
may still increase if the firm draws an n-type idea. Before the realization of the n-type
patent shock, the firm will have the expected value K(z + γdxz; z), as given by
K(z + γdxz; z) = E [Π(L(z, x, b; z); z)] + rE
[
V(L(z, x, b; z); z′)
]
, (1.10)
where again z evolves according to (1.3) and b ∈ {0, 1} is a random variable. Alternatively,
it can sell the d-type patent to an agent. Then, its productivity will remain at z (unless it
subsequently draws an n-type idea). The value of a seller, S(z; z), is
S(z; z) = E [Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)] + σq + rE
[
V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)
]
. (1.11)
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Once the seller puts a d-type patent up for sale at the beginning of the period it expires
with probability 1 − σ. A firm that innovates will either keep or sell its d-type patent
depending on which option yields the highest value. Given this, it is easy to see that the
decision to keep or to sell a patent can be formulates as
Ik(z, x; z) =
 1 (keep), if K(z + γdxz; z) > S(z; z),0 (sell), otherwise. (1.12)
The Decision to Innovate
The firm’s decision to innovate is now cast. With probability i the firm discovers
a d-type idea and with probability 1 − i it doesn’t. The firm chooses the probability of
discovering a d-type idea subject to the convex cost function C(i; z). Hence, write the
innovation decision as
V(z; z) = max
i
{i
∫
{Ik(z, x; z)K(z + γdxz; z) + [1 − Ik(z, x; z)]S(z; z)}dX(x)
+ (1 − i)B(z; z)− C(i; z)}. (1.13)
The first-order condition associated with this problem is
∫
{Ik(z, x; z)K(z + γdxz; z) + [1 − Ik(z, x; z)]S(z; z)}dX(x)− B(z; z) = C1(i; z),
(where C1 is the derivative of C with respect to i) so that
i = R(z; z) (1.14)
= C−11
(∫
{Ik(z, x; z)K(z + γdxz; z) + [1 − Ik(z, x; z)]S(z; z)}dX(x)− B(z; z); z
)
.
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1.2.4 Patent Agents
Turn now to the problem of a patent agent. It buys a d-type idea at the competitively
determined price q. With probability ma(na/nb) it will meet a potential buyer on the
market and with probability 1 − ma(na/nb) it won’t. Denote the distribution of buyers by
G(z). The value for an agent, A, with a patent is thus given by
A(z) = ma
(
na
nb
) ∫ ∫ {
Ia(z, x; z)P(z, x; z) + [1 − Ia(z, x; z)]rσA(z′)
}
dG(z)dD(x)
+ [1 − ma
(
na
nb
)
]rσA(z′), (1.15)
where Ia(z, x; z) is specified by (1.9) and is defined formally shortly below. The price
of a d-type patent is determined via Nash bargaining. Specifically, p is determined in
accordance with
max
p
{E [Π(L(z, x, b; z); z)]− p + rE
[
V(L(z, x, b; z); z′)
]
− E [Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)]− rE
[
V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)
]
}1−ω
× [p − rσA(z′)]ω.
The first term in braces gives the buyer’s surplus. This gives the difference between the
value of the firm when it secures a d-type patent and the value when it does not. The
second term details the seller’s surplus. In standard fashion,
p = P(z, x; z) = ω{E [Π(L(z, x, b; z); z)] + rE
[
V(L(z, x, b; z); z′)
]
− E [Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)]
− rE
[
V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)
]
}+ (1 − ω)rσA(z′), (1.16)
whenever both the buyer’s and seller’s surpluses are positive. The price lies between
rσA(z′) and E [Π(L(z, x, b; z); z)] + rE [V(L(z, x, b; z); z′)] −E [Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)]
−rE [V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)]; if the former is above the latter then no solution exists. Now,
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define Ia(z, x; z) in the following manner:
Ia(z, x; z) =

1, if rσA(z′) ≤ p ≤ E [Π(L(z, x, b; z); z)]
+rE [V(L(z, x, b; z); z′)]
−E [Π(L(z, 0, b; z); z)]− rE [V(L(z, 0, b; z); z′)] ,
0, otherwise.
(1.17)
1.2.5 Symmetric Equilibrium Along a Balanced Growth Path
The focus of the analysis is solely on a symmetric equilibrium along a balanced
growth path. A formal analysis of the model’s balanced growth path is contained in
Theory Appendix A.1. Before starting, define the aggregate level of productivity, z, its
gross rate of growth, g, and the aggregate level of innovation, i, by
z ≡
∫
zdZ(z), g ≡
∫
z′dZ′(z′)∫
zdZ(z)
, and i ≡
∫
R(z; z)dZ(z). (1.18)
In equilibrium the demand for labor must equal the supply of labor. Recall that there
is one unit of labor in the economy. Let Z′(z′) represent the end-of-period distribution
of z′ across firms. Now, using (1.1), (1.5) and (1.6), it is easy to deduce that the labor, l,
demanded by a firm is given by
l =
(κ
r̃
)κ/ζ ( λ
w
)(ζ+λ)/ζ
e′z′. (1.19)
Equilibrium in the labor market then implies that
∫ (κ
r̃
)κ/ζ ( λ
w
)(ζ+λ)/ζ
z′dZ′(z′) = 1,
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where the fact that E[e′] = 1 has been used. This implies that the aggregate wage rate, w,
is given by
w = λ
(κ
r̃
)κ/(ζ+λ) [∫
z′dZ′(z′)
]ζ/(ζ+λ)
= λ
(κ
r̃
)κ/(ζ+λ)
z′ζ/(ζ+λ). (1.20)
The wage rate, w, depends on the mean of the end-of-period productivity distribution
across firms, z′ ≡
∫
z′dZ′(z′).
Next, suppose that there is free entry by agents into the market for d-type patents.
This dictates that the price q will be determined by
q = A(z). (1.21)
To complete the description of a symmetric balanced growth equilibrium, the distribu-
tion over propinquity for patent agents, or D(x), must be specified. It is uniform in a
symmetric equilibrium. Recall that a firm’s permanent location in the technology space is
represented by a point on the circle. Think about a buyer located at the top of the circle.
Suppose that a set of firms on some tiny arc jk to the left of top are selling patents of mass
λ that are of distance between 0 and ε away from the top. Now take any other arc lm of
equal length even further to the left of top. The start of this second arc has distance d(j, l)
from the start of the first one. In a symmetric equilibrium there will be on the second arc,
for all practical purposes, an identical set of firms selling patents of mass λ that are of
distance between d(j, l) and d(j, l) + ε away from the top.
Some Features of a Balanced Growth Path
Along a balanced growth path, consumption, investment, output, profits, wages, and
the selling and buying prices for d-type patents will all grow at a constant rate. Also,
the interest factor and rental rate on capital are constant. Assuming that this is the case,
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then it is easy to deduce from (1.20) that wages must grow at the gross rate gζ/(ζ+λ).
Aggregate output and profits will grow at this rate too, as can be inferred from (1.7).
Given the assumption that tastes are isoelastic, the interest factor and rental rate on capital
are given in standard fashion by
r = β/gεζ/(ζ+λ), (1.22)
and
r̃ = gεζ/(ζ+λ)/β − 1 + δ, (1.23)
where again ε is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. By substituting the solution for
wages, as given by (1.20), into the demand for labor, (1.19), it can be seen that a firm’s
employment is proportional to z′/z′. Since on average one would expect that z′ will be
growing at the same rate as z′, this suggests that a stationary firm-size distribution exists.
It turns out that along a balanced growth path the indicator functions Ik(z, x; z) and
Ia(z, x; z) can represented by simple threshold rules for x that do not depend on either z
or z. In particular,
Ik(z, x; z) =
 1 (keep), x > xk,0 (sell), otherwise, and Ia(z, x; z) =
 1 (sale), x > xa,0 (no sale), otherwise.
That is, an innovating firm keeps its d-type idea when x > xk and sells otherwise. Anal-
ogously, a sale between a buyer and a patent agents occurs if and only if x > xa.
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1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Data Sources
This section details data sources and variable constructions. For further information,
please see Empirical Appendix A.2.
NBER-USPTO Utility Patents Grant Data (PDP). The core of the empirical analysis
draws from the NBER-USPTO Patent Grant Database (PDP). Patents are exclusionary
rights, granted by national patent offices, to protect a patent holder for a certain amount of
time, conditional on sharing the details of the invention. The PDP data contains detailed
information on 3,210,361 utility patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
between the years 1976 and 2006. A patent has to cite another patent when the former
has content related to the latter. When patent A cites patent B, this particular citation
becomes both a backward citation made by A to B and a forward citation received by B
from A. Moreover, the PDP contains an International Patent Classification (IPC) code for
each patent that helps identify where it lies in the technology space.5 Extensive use of
the forward and backward citations are made, as well as the IPC codes assigned to each
patent, to determine a patent’s location in the technology space, its distance to a firm’s
location in the technology spectrum, and also to proxy for a patent’s quality. The exact
methodology followed to construct these measures is detailed below.
Patent Reassignment Data (PRD). The second source of data comes from the recently-
released USPTO patent assignment files retrieved from Google Patents Beta. This dataset
provides detailed information on the changes in patent ownership for the years 1980
to 2011. The records include 966,427 patent reassignments not only due to sales, but
also due to mergers, license grants, splits, mortgages, collaterals, conversions, internal transfers,
5The USPTO originally assigns each patent to a particular U.S. Patent Classification (USPC), which is a
system used by the USPTO to organize all patents according to their common technological relevances. The
PDP also assigns an IPC code to each patent using the original USPC and a USPC-IPC concordance based
on the International Patent Classification Eighth Edition.
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etc. Reassignment records are classified according to a search algorithm that looks for
keywords, such as “assignment”, “purchase”, “sale”, and “merger”, and assigns them
to their respective categories. Through this process, 99% of the transaction records are
classified into their respective groups–see Empirical Appendix A.2 for more information.
Compustat North American Fundamentals (Annual). In order to assess the impact of
patents and their technological distance on firm moments, such as stock market valuation,
the PDP patent data is linked to Compustat firms. The focus is on the balance sheets of
Compustat firms between the years 1974-2006, retrieved from Wharton Research Data
Services. The Compustat database and the NBER PDP database are connected using the
matching procedure provided in the PDP data.
Lex Machina Database on Patent Litigations. The information on litigated patents is
obtained from Lex Machina. It is the most comprehensive database on patent litigations
since 2000. Lex Machina obtains its data on a daily basis from (i) the administrative
database of the United States federal courts, (ii) all United States District Courts’ websites,
(iii) the International Trade Commission’s (EDIS) website, and (iv) the USPTO’s websites.
Derwent Litalert Database on Patent Litigations. For litigation information before 2000,
the Derwent Litalert Database is used. Further description about this dataset can be found
in Galasso et al. (2013).
Carnegie-Mellon Survey (CMS) on Industrial R&D. The sector-level licensing informa-
tion is drawn from the CMS. This dataset is one of the rare R&D surveys in the United
States that contains information on the licensing activities of firms. The CMS contains
1,478 randomly selected R&D labs of manufacturing firms, stratified by three-digit SIC
industry codes. All labs are located in the United States. In the survey the firms are
asked to report the most important reason for applying for their product patent, where
one of the answers is “to obtain revenue through licensing.” The percentage of firms pick-
ing this answer is aggregated to two-digit SIC industry classifications, which results in a
24
sector-level licensing intensity measure. More information can be found in Cohen et al.
(2000).
The empirical analysis requires the construction of a notion of distance in the tech-
nology space. For that purpose, the citation patterns across IPC technology fields are
utilized. The PDP contains the full list of citations with the identity of citing and cited
patents. Since the data also contains the IPC code of each patent, the percentage of outgo-
ing citations from one technology class to another are observable. Using this information,
a metric, discussed below, is constructed to gauge the distance between a new patent and
a firm’s location in the technology spectrum.
In what follows, for each empirical fact the best and largest possible sample is used.
For instance, for the firm value regressions all patents that are matched to the Compustat
sample are utilized. Similarly, to describe the change from seller to buyer, all patents for
which the buyer and seller could be uniquely identified are used. Therefore, even though
the samples vary across different empirical facts, this approach delivers the most reliable
results.
1.3.2 Technological Propinquity
The notion of technological propinquity between a patent and a firm is now formal-
ized. Think about a patent as lying within some technological class. Call this technology
class X. Empirically this can be represented by the first two digits of its International
Patent Classification (IPC) code. Now, one can measure how close two patents classes, X
and Y, are to each other. To do this, let #(X ∩ Y) denote the number of all patents that
cite patents from technology classes X and Y simultaneously. Let #(X ∪ Y) denote the
number of all patents that cite either technology class X and/or Y. Then, the following
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symmetric distance metric can be constructed:
d(X, Y) ≡ 1 − #(X ∩ Y)
#(X ∪ Y) ,
with 0 ≤ d(X, Y) ≤ 1. This distance metric is intuitive. If each patent that cites X also
cites Y, this metric delivers a distance of d (X, Y) = 0. [Also note that d(X, X) = 0.]
If there is no patent that cites both classes, then the distance becomes d (X, Y) = 1. The
distance between two technology classes increases, as the fraction of patents that cite both
decreases. Given this metric between technology classes, a distance measure between a
patent and a firm can now be constructed.
In order to measure how close a patent is to a firm in the technology spectrum, a
metric needs to be devised. For this purpose, a firm’s past patent portfolio is used to
identify the firm’s existing location in the technology space.6 In particular, the distance
of a particular patent p to a firm f is computed by calculating the average distance of p
to each patent in firm f ’s patent portfolio as follows:
dι (p, f ) ≡
 1∥∥P f∥∥ ∑p′∈P f d
(
Xp, Yp′
)ι1/ι , (1.24)
with 0 < ι ≤ 1, and where 0 ≤ dι(p, f ) ≤ 1. In this expression, P f denotes the set of all
patents that were ever invented by firm f prior to patent p,
∥∥P f∥∥ stands for its cardinality,
and d
(
Xp, Yp′
)
measures the distance between the technology classes of patents p and p′.
Note that d
(
Xp, Yp′
)
= 0 when the firm has another patent, p′, in the same class as p.
Therefore, this metric is defined only for ι > 0. Finally, when ι = 1 the above metric
returns the average distance of p to each patent in firm f ’s patent portfolio: d1 (p, f ) ≡∥∥P f∥∥−1 ∑p′∈P f d (Xp, Yp′) , with 0 ≤ d1(p, f ) ≤ 1.
The empirical distribution for this notion of distance is displayed in Figure 3 for three
values of ι. As can be seen, patents have heterogeneous technological distances to the
6The firm’s patent portfolio is defined as all inventions by the firm up to that point in time.
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Figure 3: Empirical distance distributions
inventing firms. The intermediate value, ι = 2/3, is chosen for the subsequent analysis.7
1.3.3 Stylized Facts
Next, the empirical findings highlighted in the introduction of the paper are pre-
sented. Table 1 provides the summary statistics. Panel A shows the summary statistics
of the variables computed using Compustat firms. The distance-adjusted patent stock is
constructed in a way such that each patent’s contribution to the portfolio is multiplied by
its distance to the firm prior to the aggregation. Specifically,
∑
p∈P f
dι (p, f )× quality(p)
where dι (p, f ) and quality(p) are the distance and quality terms for patent p. The quality
of a patent is measured by the citations it has received from other patents, corrected for
7The value chosen for ι does not appear to make much of a difference for the analysis. For example, both
the empirical and model simulation results in the paper are more or less the same when either ι = 1/3 or
ι = 1.
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Summary Statistics
Observation Mean St. Dev
Panel A. Compustat Facts
log market value 37,331 5.58 2.30
log employment 39,431 0.75 2.28
log patent stock 41,515 5.68 2.25
log distance-adjusted patent stock 42,269 3.38 4.23
Panel B. USPTO/NBER Patent Facts
patent quality 2,771,692 12.1 20.6
patent distance 2,548,998 0.48 0.30
litigation probability 2,772,895 0.01 0.10
Panel C. Patent Reassignment Facts
fraction of patents sold (at least once) 3,210,361 0.16 0.36
number of times a patent is sold 3,210,361 0.19 0.52
conditional duration of patent sale, yrs 421,936 5.48 4.58
litigation and sale probability 2,772,895 0.003 0.05
Panel D. Cumulative Density
0 times 1 time 2 times
number of times a patent is sold 85% 97% 99%
Table 1: Summary Statistics
truncation and technology class biases using the weights offered in Hall et al. (2001).
Panel B reports the summary statistics of the USPTO/NBER patent data. As seen,
the average distance between a new patent and its firm is 0.48. The so-called “garage
inventors” and firms that do not have any existing patents in their portfolio are dropped
when patent distance is computed. Panel C lists the summary statistics using patent
reassignment data. On average, 15.6% of patents in the sample were traded at least once.
The mean time to sell a patent after its grant date is 5.5 years. The average number of
trades per patent is 0.2. Panel D shows that 97% of patents are traded at most one time
and this number goes up to 99% when the fraction of patents that are traded at most two
times are considered. Only a paltry 1.0% of patents involve litigation. The following fact
summarizes this section.
Fact 1. About 15% of patents are sold and it takes about 5.5 years to sell them on average.
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Firm Market-Value Regressions
Dependent Variable: log market value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log patent stock 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.071***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
log dist-adj pat stock -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.032***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
log employment 0.728*** 0.728*** 0.736*** 0.763*** 0.763*** 0.692***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
firm litigation intensity no yes no no yes no
sector litigation intensity no no yes no yes no
sector licensing intensity no no no yes yes no
only renewed patents no no no no no yes
Obs 36,094 36,091 36,094 33,062 33,060 27,528
R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Table 2: Firm Market-Value Regressions
Firm Market Value and Patent-Firm Distance
Are patent-firm distances important when it comes to the relationship between a
firm’s patent portfolio and its value? In order to answer this question, Table 2 regresses
“log market value” in year t on a firm’s patent portfolio, its distance-adjusted patent
portfolio, and the firm’s size in the same year. The regressions also include year and firm
fixed effects to rule out firm-specific properties and time trends.
As expected, column 1 shows that the patent portfolio of a firm is positively related to
its stock market valuation. Presumably this is because patents are protecting knowledge
that is valuable for the firm. More interestingly, a firm’s patent portfolio, once adjusted
by patent distances, is negatively related to the firm’s market value. The coefficient for
the distance-adjusted patent stock quantifies the loss of correlation between the patent
portfolio and firm value due to the technological mismatch between the firm and its
patents. In short, while the non-distance component of the patent portfolio contributes
positively, the distance-related component contributes negatively to firm value. In order
to interpret the results correctly, consider the ratio of the (negative) coefficient of the
distance-adjusted patent stock to that of the unadjusted patent stock. The ratio of the two
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elasticities is 51.3%. This reflects the relative importance on market value of a shift in
the distance-adjusted patent portfolio versus a change in the non-adjusted one. This ratio
will be targeted in the simulation. It provides information on the importance of d-type
patents relative to n-type ones.
Two factors that have been receiving some attention in the literature recently are li-
censing and litigation. They could influence a firm’s incentives to do R&D, the value of
a firm’s patent stock, or a firm’s decision to buy, keep or sell patents. Licensing is an
alternative vehicle for technology transfer. Additionally, litigation might affect a firm’s
decision to acquire, retain or sell patents. Therefore, controls are introduced for litiga-
tion and licensing: Columns 2-4 introduce the fraction of a firm’s portfolio that is ever
litigated, sector-level litigation intensity (defined as the fraction of litigated patents over
total patents in that sector), and sector-level licensing intensity, respectively. Column 5
introduces all these controls at once. All of these alternative specifications show that
the benchmark estimates in column 1 are remarkably robust. Last, some patents have
little value. To control for this, the last column only includes those patents that were re-
newed at least once.8 (Patents must be renewed, at a small fee, in their 3rd, 7th and 11th
years.) As can be seen, a lot of patents aren’t renewed and purging these patents increases
somewhat the impact of the patent stock and distance-adjusted patent stock on the firm’s
market value. The story remains more or less the same, though, with the relative value
of the first two regression coefficients more or less staying fixed. The gist of this section
is summarized as follows:
Fact 2. A patent contributes more to a firm’s stock market value if it is closer to the firm in terms
of technological distance.
8Information on patent renewals is obtained from the USPTO’s U.S. Patent Grant Maintenance Fee Events.
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Patent Sale Decision and Patent-Firm Distance
Does the technological distance of a patent to the firm influence the decision to keep
or sell it? In order to conduct this analysis, the indicator variable for whether a patent
is sold or kept (=1 if a patent is sold, =0 if not) is regressed on a number of potentially
related regressors, including the patent’s distance to the initial owner. Table 3 reports the
OLS regression results.
Using the full sample, column of Table 3 indicates that a patent is more likely to be
sold if it is more distant to the firm. The regression includes controls for the size of the
patent portfolio of the firm, patent quality, year and firm fixed effects. The coefficient
on the distance variable is statistically significant and positive. Considering the average
number of patents sold (≃ 15%) in the time period, the coefficient suggests that a perfectly
mismatched patent is 13.1% (≃ 0.0197/0.15) more likely to be sold to another firm, rather
than being kept. Recall also that the definition employed for a sale is quite conservative,
in the sense that patent transfers due to mergers and acquisitions are not considered sales,
even though the primary motive for these events might be the acquisition of patents. The
results are in line with the intuition that a firm is more likely to sell patents that are not a
good fit, rather than keeping them, due to the potential gains from trading the patent to
a firm that might be better suited to exploit the embedded ideas commercially.
Column 2 controls for the litigation intensity of the technology class, while column
3 controls for the lifetime litigation status of the patent, and column 4 for both simul-
taneously. The association of distance to a patent sale is unaffected by the presence of
these additional controls. Column 5 redoes the first regression but purges those patents
that aren’t renewed at least once. The effect of distance is only slightly more pronounced.
The results are also robust to inclusion of the licensing intensity of a sector–see Section
A.2.6 in the Empirical Appendix for the results. The stark result is that adding additional
controls or restricting the sample do not weaken the link between distance and patent
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Patent Sale Decision
(Full Sample with Litigation Intensity)
Dependent Variable (=1, if sold, 0 otherwise)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
distance 1.972*** 1.982*** 1.980*** 1.991*** 2.398***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.091)
tech-class litigation intensity no yes no yes no
patent litigation dummy no no yes yes no
renewed patents only no no no no yes
Obs 2,547,881 2,547,881 2,547,881 2,547,881 1,976,964
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.44
Table 3: Patent Sale Decision
sale; to the contrary, they make it more pronounced. The implications of litigation and
licensing on the market for ideas will be explored in more detail in Section 1.6.
Fact 3. A patent is more likely to be sold the more distant it is to a firm.
The primary motivation behind considering patent distance as a likely determinant
of patent sale decisions is the potential gains from trade that arise if the patent can be sold
to a firm that can use it better, which in expectation yields more profits. If this intuition
is correct, the distance between the owner firm and the patent is expected to decrease
after a patent is sold. Let d (p, fb) denote the distance of the patent to the buyer firm, and
d (p, fs) to the seller firm. Next, the change in distance, d (p, fb)− d (p, fs), is computed.
This difference is −0.152 in 1980, the beginning of the sample, with a standard error of
0.049. What this shows is that conditional on a patent sale, the distance between a patent
and its owner is significantly decreased. In other words, the mismatch between the idea
and the firm owning it is reduced. The effect is economically large. Considering that the
average measure for distance is 0.481, the average reduction in distance is approximately
32% (≃ 0.152/0.481) of the average distance. The average distance reduction in the whole
sample is 16% and this number goes up to as high as 49% in 2006, which is the end year
of the sample.
Fact 4. A patent is technologically closer to the buying firm than to the selling firm.
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1.3.4 Tacking on a Market for n-type Patents
To append a market for n-type ideas onto the model, recall that a firm obtains an
n-type idea with probability p. This can arise in one of two ways: either the firm develops
an n-type idea or it purchases one. Let a firm that develops an n-type idea sell it with
probability ps. Likewise, assume that a firm that fails to come up with an n-type idea
will purchase one with probability pb. Suppose that the market for n-type ideas clears
instantaneously every period. This implies that pps = (1 − p)pb, so that pb = psp/(1 − p).
Adding a market for n-type patents onto the above structure does not alter the model’s
solution for a symmetric balanced growth path. This is discussed further in the Theory
Appendix, Section A.1.2.
In the U.S. data the distance between a patent and its owner’s line of business shrinks
on average upon a sale; i.e., a patent is closer to the buyer than the seller. This is not true
empirically for all patent sales. The presence of n-type patents helps the model better
capture Fact 4. It is easy to deduce that on average the distance between a d-type patent
and its owner would contract in the model by [1/(1− xa)]
∫ 1
xa
xdx− [1/X(xk)]
∫ xk
0 xdX(x),
since a non-innovating business buys if x > xa and an innovating firm sells when x < xk.
The average distance between an n-type patent and its owner would contract in the model
by
∫ 1
0 xdx −
∫ 1
0 xdX(x).
9 This is smaller than the number for d-type patents, because
[1/(1 − xa)]
∫ 1
xa
xdx >
∫ 1
0 xdx and [1/X(xk)]
∫ xk
0 xdX(x) <
∫ 1
0 xdX(x). Thus, the presence
of a market for n-type patents operates to reduce the average shrinkage in distance upon
sale between a patent and its owner.
9The distance between an n-type patent and its owner has no real effect; i.e., the technology class for an
n-type patent is just a label.
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1.4 Calibration
In order to simulate the model values must be assigned to the various parameters.
There are sixteen parameters to pick: β, ε, κ, λ, δ, σ, γd, χ, ρ, µ, η, ω, γn, p, ps, and std(e′).
A distribution for X(x) needs to be provided as well. As is standard in macroeconomics,
some of the parameter values are chosen on the basis of a priori information, while
others are determined internally using a minimum distance estimation routine. By se-
lecting some parameters using a priori information the size of the calibration/estimation
procedure is reduced. This is important because undertaking calibration/estimation is
problematic when there is a large number of parameter values. For the most part, there
is either a consensus about what the appropriate values for these parameters are, or the
U.S. data speaks directly to them. The selection of parameter values on the basis of a
priori information is now discussed.
1.4.1 The Use of A Priori Information
1. Capital’s and labor’s shares of income, κ and λ. In line with Corrado et al. (2009) esti-
mates from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, capital’s and labor’s
shares of incomes, κ and λ, are set to 25 and 60%. This implies that the profit pa-
rameter, as represented by ζ, accounts for the remaining 15%. This is a fairly typical
value used in the macroeconomics literature, as is discussed in Guner et al. (2008).
2. Depreciation rate for capital, δ. The depreciation rate of capital is chosen to be 6.9%.
This is consistent with the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
3. Survival rate for a patent, σ. In the United States a patent lasts for 17 years. Hence,
σ = 1 − 1/(1 + 17).
4. CRRA parameter, ε. This parameter is taken to be 2, the midpoint between the vari-
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ous estimates reported in Kaplow (2005). This is a common value used in macroe-
conomics.
5. Long-run interest rate. A reasonable value for the long-run interest rate in the United
States is 6%–see Cooley and Prescott (1995). Now, the long-run growth rate for
the United States is 2%. Given the value for the economy’s long-run growth rate,
gζ/(ζ+λ) = 1.02, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ε = 2, the discount
factor, β, is then uniquely pinned down using the equation β = rgεζ/(ζ+λ)– see
(1.22). This is standard procedure for a growth model.
6. The Empirical Distribution for the Proximity of Patent to a Firm’s Technology Class. The
empirical distance distribution for the United States displayed in Figure 3, for ι =
2/3, is used for the analysis. Define a measure of propinquity (or closeness) between
a patent p and a firm f by cι(p, f ) ≡ 1 − dι (p, f ), where dι (p, f ) is given by (1.24).
The density associated with cι(p, f ) is used for X(x). This amounts to just a simple
change in units on the horizontal axis in Figure 3. Assume that x is distributed
uniformly within each of the ten bins of the histogram. (There is an additional mass
point at one.) One might think that a firm will try to invent ideas that are close to
its line of business. The calibration strategy forces the propinquity of ideas to the
inventor’s line of business in the model to be congruent with the U.S. data.
7. R&D Cost Elasticity, ρ. In order to estimate the elasticity of the R&D cost func-
tion, the cost function in the model is inverted to obtain a production function.
Then, a regression is run using Compustat data to determine the parameter value,
ρ, where the output of the R&D production function is proxied for by citation-
weighted patents.
8. Bargaining power, ω. The bargaining powers of buyers and sellers are chosen to be
equal. This assumption is often imposed in macroeconomic models using Nash
bargaining. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a good way to identify a
35
value for this parameter, either using a priori information or through the calibra-
tion/estimation procedure discussed below. Due to the presence of a spillover exter-
nality in (1.2), the Hosios condition will not necessarily lead to an efficient matching
equilibrium.
Therefore, values for the parameters β, ε, κ, λ, δ, σ, ρ, and ω are imposed using a priori
information in line with (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7), and (8) without having to solve the
model. The distribution X(x) is constructed in line with point (6).
1.4.2 Minimum Distance Estimation
Values for the remaining parameters, χ, µ, γd, η , γn, p, ps, and STD(ln e′), must
be assigned. This is done by minimizing the sum of the squares between some data
targets, discussed below, and the model’s predictions for these targets. The model is
highly non-linear in nature. Computing the solution to the model essentially involves
solving a system of nonlinear equations, as is discussed in the Theory Appendix, Section
A.1.1. Therefore, it is not the case that a particular parameter is identified uniquely by
a particular data target. By computing the Jacobian of the system the influence of each
parameter on the data targets can be gauged. The presentation below uses this Jacobian
and other features of the framework to discuss, in a heuristic fashion, how the parameters
are identified. The Jacobian is presented in Section A.2.7 of the Empirical Appendix. The
data targets are listed in (1) to (2) below. Targets (1) to (5) are discussed now.
1. Long-run growth in output. In the United States output grew at about 2% per year
over the postwar period. Intuitively, one would expect the parameter γd, which
governs how d-type innovations enter the law of motion for a firm’s productivity
growth (1.2), should play an important role in determining this. The same is true for
the n-type patent parameters, γn and p. The Jacobian confirms that these parameters
have a positive impact on growth–see Appendix A.2.7 for more detail. The term for
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the d-type patents, or γd, dominates the others. The parameter governing the cost
of R&D, χ, has a negative and smaller effect on growth.
2. The ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP. U.S. expenditure on research and development
is about 2.91% of GDP. What parameters influence this ratio? Again, the parameter
γd governing the productivity of d-type patents is very important. It increases this
ratio because the payoff from R&D rises with γd. Not surprisingly, the R&D cost
parameter, χ, has a bearing here, because it directly governs the cost of innovation,
as can be seen from (1.4). Last, the n-type patent parameters, γn and p, are nega-
tively associated with this ratio. They increase GDP growth without the need to do
R&D.
3. Fraction of patents sold. About 16% of patents are sold in the United States, as cata-
logued in Table 1. The parameters governing the matching function, µ and η, control
how easy it is to sell a d-type patent. They are important in determining this ratio.
The parameters, p and ps, regulating the arrival and sales rates for n-type patents
are also important, although the dependence here is of a mechanical nature.
4. Duration until a sale. The entire empirical frequency distribution for the duration
of a sale is targeted–see Figure 4.10 In particular, the calibration procedure tries to
minimize the sum of the squared differences between the empirical distribution and
its analogue for the model. It takes about 5.34 years on average to sell a patent. The
coefficient of variation around this mean is 0.84. So, there is considerable variation
in sale duration. The parameters governing the matching function, µ and especially
η, are obviously central here. This can be seen from equation (A.3) in Section A.1.1
of the Theory Appendix, which specifies the odds that a patent agent will find a
10Different criteria can be used for dating when an idea is born. One could use the application date instead
of the grant date since some patents are sold before they are granted. An alternative would be to use the first
time that another inventor builds on this invention (as measured by the first citation that a patent receives).
This reflects the time it that took for others to learn about the idea. Last, it is possible that excluding more
recent observations might prevent the confounding effects of a potential truncation bias. This occurs because
patents toward the end of sample have less time to be sold. Repeating the analysis using these three new
sale duration distributions does not change the main findings.
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buyer. These parameters also influence the spread in duration.
5. Distance reduction upon sale–all patents. Section 1.3.3 presents an estimate (−0.152)
from the the micro data on the average difference between a buyer’s and seller’s
technological propinquity for a patent.11 This estimate is targeted and helps to
discipline the relative importance d- and n-type patents. As is discussed in Section
1.3.4, the arrival rate of n-type ideas and the probability of selling them, or p and ps,
are central here. They operate to reduce the observed amount of distance reduction
since the sale of these patents does not depend upon technological propinquity.
This is shown by the Jacobian of the system. Additionally, the parameters of the
matching function, µ and η, influence the model’s ability to hit this target. More
efficient matching implies a larger reduction in distance.
Indirect Inference
The indirect inference data targets (1) and (2) discussed below derive from the firm-
level panel-data regressions presented in Section 1.3. As was mentioned, computing the
equilibrium solution for the model essentially involves solving a system of nonlinear
equations, as the Theory Appendix, Section A.1.1, makes clear. Undertaking the indirect
inference involves an additional step. Here a Monte Carlo simulation is undertaken on a
panel of 30,000 firms for 30 periods (to replicate the number of periods in the data). This
is used to estimate the panel-data regressions analogues for the model that correspond
with the ones estimated from the U.S. data, which are presented in Table 2.
1. Relative strength of the patent stock versus the distance-adjusted patent stock on a firm’s
market value. This is estimated from the micro data–Table 2, column 1. It is measured
by the ratio of the coefficient on log distance-adjusted patent stock to log patent
stock. This target plays a significant role in identifying the size of the distance
11The quantitative results do not change in a material way when the mean of the averages over all years in
the sample is used instead.
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related term, γd, relative to the non-distance related ones, γn and p, in the law of
motion for productivity (1.2). The former has a positive impact on this ratio, while
the latter have negative ones. The matching function parameters, µ and η, also have
an influence on this target because they affect the value of a d-type patent. Similarly,
so does the cost of doing R&D, χ. Last, the probability of selling an n-type patent,
conditional upon its arrival, ps, affects this statistic. The higher the likelihood that an
n-type patents is sold, and therefore that it is not used production, the less impact
it will have a firm’s market value. This results in d-type patents mattering more for
market value relative to n-type ones–again, the detail is in the Jacobian presented in
Appendix A.2.7.
2. Relative strength of the patent stock versus employment on a firm’s market value. This, too,
is estimated from the micro data–Table 2, column 1. It is measured as the ratio of
the coefficient on log patent stock to the coefficient on log employment. The (inverse
of this) ratio can be thought of as measuring the impact of an increase in the patent
stock on employment, holding fixed the firm’s market value. In the model there
are two reasons a firm’s market value may rise relative to other firms. Its long-run
productivity, z′, may have increased relative to average long-run productivity, z′, or
it may have realized a favorable value for the temporary production shock, e′. This
ratio identifies the standard deviation of the firm-specific idiosyncratic production
shock, STD(ln e′). Without the e′ shock, employment would be a perfect predictor
of relative productivity, z′/ z′. Introducing the e′ shock breaks this one-to-one cor-
respondence. The parameter STD(ln e′) has no impact on the other data targets.
The parameter γn governing the productivity of n-type patents also affects this ra-
tio. As γn rises employment becomes a better predictor of a firm’s market value,
so it impinges on this ratio in a negative way. An increase in γd does not work the
same way as it results in more d-type ideas, which makes the patent stock a better
predictor of market value.
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Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description Identification
β = 0.98 Discount factor A priori information
ε = 2.00 CRRA parameter A priori information
κ = 0.25 Capital’s share A priori information
λ = 0.60 Labor’s share A priori information
δ = 0.07 Depreciation rate A priori information
σ = 0.94 Patent survival rate A priori information
γd = 0.25 Distance-related productivity Calibration/Estimation
χ = 0.83 Cost of R&D Calibration/Estimation
ρ = 3.00 R&D cost elasticity A priori information
µ = 0.50 Matching function, exp Calibration/Estimation
η = 0.09 Matching function, const Calibration/Estimation
ω = 0.50 Bargaining power Imposed
X(x) Proximity distribution A priori information
γn = 0.18 Non-distance related productivity Calibration/Estimation
p = 0.17 Pr(n-type idea) Calibration/Estimation
ps = 0.47 Pr( sell n-type patent |arrival) Calibration/Estimation
STD(ln e′) = 0.07 Production shock, std Calibration/Estimation
Table 4: Parameter Values
Calibration Targets
Target U.S. Data Model
Long-run growth in output 2.00% 2.08%
Ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP 2.91% 1.96%
Fraction of patents that are sold 15.6% 16.6%
Average duration until a sale (fit entire distribution) 5.48 yrs. 6.28 yrs.
Sale duration, c.v. (fit entire distribution) 0.84 0.71
coef(dist-adj pat stock)/coef(pat stock) -0.511 -0.590
coef(pat stock)/coef(empl) 0.054 0.054
d(p, fs)− d(p, fb), all sold 0.152 0.165
Table 5: Calibration Targets
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To highlight a central aspect of the calibration procedure, note that a key goal of
this research here is to quantify the importance of the patent market for eliminating
the misallocation of ideas across producers. Two considerations come into play: the
importance of technological propinquity between a patent and a producer (or γd) and
the efficiency of the market for ideas (or η). A low volume of patent sales could occur
either because technological propinquity is not very important (but the patent market is
still efficient) or because the patent market is inefficient (but technological propinquity is
important). The above micro data is used to identify both of these channels. At the risk
of sounding repetitive, the firm market-value regressions in Table 2 are used to speak to
the size of γd. Since firm fixed effects are included in these regressions, there is a strong
sense in which changes in the distance-adjusted patent stock are being tied to firm market
value. Therefore, reproducing similar regression results using the model-generated data
(in particular the relative size of the coefficients on the log distance-adjusted patent stock
to the log patent stock) helps identify γd. Matching up the model’s output with the micro
data on the fraction of patent sold, average sale duration, and the difference between the
buyer’s and seller’s technological propinquities pins down η. The efficiency of the market
for ideas plays a very important in the analysis and is analyzed in detail in Section 1.5.
It is well known that patents show big differences in terms of their qualities which
could also affect their sales. A reasonable belief might be that a small fraction of patents
are highly valuable while the median one is not. To take quality heterogeneity into ac-
count, all regressions control for patent citations as a proxy for patent quality. So, the
empirical analysis attempts to purge concerns about patent quality from the stylized
facts.12
12Alternatively, one could introduce quality into the model. In particular, every idea could have a quality
component drawn from some distribution. Now, the decisions to buy and sell patents would be a function
of distance and quality (in addition to the aggregate state variable). Perhaps the distribution governing
quality could be mapped into the empirical distribution for patent citations. Doing this would significantly
complicate the analysis, but could be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Figure 4: Sales duration distribution, data and model
The upshot of the calibration procedure is displayed in Tables 4 and 5. Figure 4
shows, for both the data and model, the frequency distribution over the duration for a
sale. As can be seen, it appears to be harder to affect a sale in data than in the model.
1.5 Findings
The importance of a market for patents will be gauged now. There are two sources of
inefficiencies in the model. The first one is the usual knowledge externality. Each single
innovation raises the aggregate knowledge stock in society, which benefits the future
generations that stand on the shoulders of former giants through z in (1.2). The second
source of inefficiency emerges due to matching frictions, which is of particular interest
here. To analyze the latter, various experiments that change the efficiency of the market
for d-type patents will be entertained. The efficiency of the market for d-type patents is
increased in stages. First, the market is shut-down by setting the meeting rate to zero.
Then, an experiment is performed where the meeting rate for matches is allowed to rise.
While it may be easier for buyers and sellers to meet now, a seller’s idea may still not be
well suited for the buyer. The next experiment considers a situation where patent agents
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can find buyers who are perfect matches for the ideas that they are selling. So, there is
no mismatch between buyers and sellers on the patent market. Still, innovating firms
produce d-type ideas that are not ideally suited for their own businesses and this injects a
friction into the analysis. A patent that is not incorporated into an innovator’s production
process will only have a finite life on the market. Additionally, it may take time to find
a buyer. The final experiment focuses on the case where innovating firms produce ideas
that are tailored toward their own production activity. Here ideas are perfectly matched
with the developer. The change in welfare from moving from one environment to another
is calculated. The metric for comparing welfare is discussed now.
1.5.1 Welfare Comparisons
Consider two economies, namely A and B, moving along their balanced growth
paths. Aggregate consumption, the gross growth rate, and aggregate productivity for
economy A are represented by cA, gA, and zA. Similar notation is used for country B.
To render things comparable, start each country off from the same initial position where
zA = zB = 1. Now, the levels of welfare for economies A and B are given by
WA =
∞
∑
t=1
βt−1
(cAt )
1−ε
1 − ε =
(cA1 )
1−ε
(1 − ε)[1 − β(gA)1−ε]
, and WB =
(cB1 )
1−ε
(1 − ε)[1 − β(gB)1−ε]
,
where cA1 and c
A
1 are the time-1 levels of consumption in economies A and B. How much
would initial consumption in economy A have to be raised or lowered to make people
have the same welfare level as in economy B? Denote the fractional amount in gross
terms by α (which may be less than one). Then, α must solve
(αcA1 )
1−ε
(1 − ε)[1 − β(gA)1−ε]
= WB,
so that
α = (WB/WA)1/(1−ε).
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Figure 5: The impact of an increase in the contact rate on duration, innovation, growth
and welfare
This welfare measure is used in all experiments.
1.5.2 Varying the Contact Rate for Matches, η
The patent market mitigates the initial misallocation of ideas. Still, it takes time to
sell a patent as the patent agent may not be able to find a buyer. To understand how this
friction in matching affects the economy, it is useful to examine the relationship between
the scale factor for the matching function, η, and several key variables. Figures 5 and 6
summarize the results.
The market for d-type patents is shut down when η = 0. When there is no mar-
ket, the equilibrium growth rate goes down to 2.02% from from its benchmark value of
2.08%. Shutting down the market results in a welfare reduction of 1.18% in consumption
equivalent terms, which is quite sizable. As the contact rate, η, rises it becomes easier
to find a buyer for a patent, ceteris paribus. This is reflected in a drop in the length of
time that it takes to find a buyer, as the right panel of Figure 5 illustrates. The price that
an innovating firm receives for a patent, q, rises accordingly–see the left panel of Figure
6. As the price moves up an innovating firm becomes choosier about the patents that it
will keep. Figure 6, right panel, illustrates how an innovator’s cutoff for selling, xk, rises
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Figure 6: The impact of an increase in the contact rate on the price for the innovator,
slackness and the cutoffs
with η. (Recall that better patents are associated with higher values for the propinquity
metric.) Similarly, buyers become pickier about the patents that will they purchase so that
xa moves up with η.
The rate of innovation, i, does not change much. It falls as η starts to rise since the
consequences of failing to innovate are now lessened, because it will be easier for a firm
to buy a patent. The high price for patents begins to spur innovation at higher levels of η.
Market slackness, na/nb, has an interesting ∩ shape, which is displayed in the left panel
of Figure 6. When η = 0 the patent market is essentially closed as no innovators will
want to sell their ideas. The number of prospective buyers is 1 − i. As η starts to rise
so does the number of innovators that want to sell their ideas. This increases the flow of
new patents into the patent market and results in na/nb moving upwards. As the rate of
innovation, i, declines the number of prospective buyers, 1 − i, rises. This force operates
to reduce na/nb. Additionally, as the contact rates increases the market becomes more
efficient. It is easier for a seller to find a buyer, ceteris paribus. This works to reduce the
stock of sellers.
Growth increases along with efficiency in matching, despite the reduction in the num-
ber of new ideas–see the left panel of Figure 5. So does welfare. If the efficiency of the
market was at its extreme (the minimum value for η that results in all buyers meeting
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a patent agent with probability 1), growth would go up to 2.46% and welfare would be
5.97% higher than the calibrated economy. The upshot is that the market for patents plays
an important role in the economy.
1.5.3 Perfectly Directed Search
A second source of inefficiency in the model is the random search technology used in
the d-type patent market. In the baseline model, conditional upon a meeting between a
buyer and a patent agent, the propinquity of the idea to the firm is drawn from a uniform
distribution. Instead imagine a perfectly directed search structure, where patent agents
are able to target the segment of the economy that exactly matches the patent they want
to sell. In such a case, whether or not a patent agent meets a buyer is still a probabilistic
event governed by the matching function. The propinquity between the patent and the
buying firm would be nonstochastic and equal to unity; in other words, a perfect match.
The level of welfare in this alternative economy is 1.94% higher than in the baseline one.
The output growth rate increases slightly from 2.08 to 2.19%, despite a small decline in
the innovation rate. The fraction of all patents sold increases from 16.6 to 19.9%. Last, a
decomposition of growth reveals that the fraction of growth due to all patents sold moves
up from 18.9 to 26.6%.13 Table 6 summarizes the results (where the baseline model is
labeled BM and PDS refers to the perfectly directed search structure).
13Appendix A.1.1 shows that g − 1 = γdi
∫ 1
xk
xdX(x) + γd(1 − i)mb( nanb )
∫ 1
xa
xdx + γnp, where i is the
aggregate rate of innovation. Note that there are three terms on the right side. The first term can be used
to measure the contribution to growth from the distance-related ideas that firms keep, the second from the
ones that they sell. The third term gives the growth arising from non-distance related ideas. This term
can be further decomposed as γnp = γn[p(1 − ps) + (1 − p)pb], where the first term in brackets gives the
contribution from non-distance-related patents kept and the second from the ones sold.
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Thought Experiments
BM PDS PDSwHC PI
Output growth rate, %, (gζ/(ζ+λ) − 1)× 100 2.08 2.19 3.05 3.38
Innovation rate, i 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.61
Welfare gain, α − 1 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.18
Fraction of all patents sold 0.17 0.20 0.68 0
Growth from all patents sold 0.19 0.27 0.73 0
Table 6: Thought Experiments
Perfectly Directed Search with a High Contact Rate
Now, redo the above experiment with perfect directly search while also using a high
contact rate for matches.14 The results are reported in Table 6 (under the column la-
beled PDSwHC). Output growth is now much higher at 3.05%, even though innovation
is slightly lower than in the baseline model. This reflects a reduction in misallocation. As
can be seen, now most patents are sold. Economic welfare is 14.3% higher.15
Figure 7 gives the upshot from the experiments that have been conducted so far.
It shows how the cumulative distribution function for the propinquity of new ideas to
firms, or for x, changes across the various experiments. First, firms in the U.S. data
produce ideas that are not well suited for their own lines of business, as can be seen from
the distribution labeled “Empirical”. (Recall that a higher value for x ∈ [0, 1] indicates
that an idea is better suited for the firm’s business activity.) In the baseline model, a
firm is free to sell such an idea. A firm that fails to innovate can try to buy one from
another firm. This leads to a better distribution of ideas, as is reflected in the distribution
function for the baseline model after transactions on the market for patents have been
consummated. The distribution function for the baseline model stochastically dominates,
in the first-order sense, the empirical distribution. When the contact rate for matching is
14The contact rate, η, is set high enough that all buyers meet a patent agent with probability 1.
15This large welfare gain derives solely from the large increase in growth, gζ/(ζ+λ), given the assumed
form of preferences over consumption, as can be gleaned from Section 1.5.1. That is, if there is a large
increase in growth then this form of preferences will always show a large increase in welfare (when ε = 2,
which is a standard value).
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Figure 7: Misallocation of ideas
high it is relatively easy to consummate a patent sale. The distribution for x improves–
see the histogram labeled “High Contact Rate”, which stochastically dominates the one
for the baseline model. Of course, if search could be perfectly directed things would be
better still–“High Contact w Directed Search”, which stochastically dominates all other
distributions.
Note that not all firms sell their patents, even though they are not perfectly matched
with their ideas. This occurs because are still some frictions left in the patent market. First,
there are more sellers than buyers on the market, so not all patents will be immediately
sold. Second, patents have a finite life on the market and hence suffer some depreciation.
Both these factors imply that the price at which a firm can sell a patent, q, will be less
than what it is worth to a perfectly matched firm.
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1.5.4 Removing the Misallocation of Ideas
The central inefficiency in the framework derives from the fact that firms develop
ideas that are imperfect matches for the own production processes. The presence of a
market for patents mitigates this problem. Suppose that an innovating firm comes up
with a d-type idea that is always a perfect match for its production process. That is, let
each innovating firm always draw x = 1. This case is summarized in Table 6 (under the
column labeled PI). In this situation, the economy could increase its growth rate from 2.08
to 3.38%, a big jump. Welfare would increase by 17.8%. This illustrates that the frictions
arising from mismatches in innovation are large.
1.6 Quantitative Extensions: Licensing and Litigation
When it comes to technology transfer and the market for ideas, two important con-
cerns about patenting and the market for ideas deserve additional attention, namely
licensing and litigation. Licensing provides an additional mechanism for transferring
ideas. By limiting attention to patent sales, a fear might be that the analysis overstates
the amount of misallocation in the market for ideas. A firm may buy or keep a patent to
prevent litigation. This does not increase the firm’s productivity in a technological sense.
Hence, the value of patents for a firm’s productivity may be overestimated.
1.6.1 Licensing
Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) report that licensing intensity in the United States is
around 5%. The goal here is to understand the quantitative implications of licensing in
the current setting. Zuniga and Guellec (2009) conduct a survey on firms that license
out their patents and analyze the obstacles to licensing. The most frequent problem
reported by firms was that “identifying (a) partner is difficult.” This shows that search
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Results with Licensing and Low-Ligation Sectors
Panel A: Calibration Targets
Licensing Low-Litigation
U.S. Data Model U.S. Data Model
Growth in Output, % 2.00 2.03 2.00 2.10
Ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP, % 2.91 1.81 2.91 1.98
Fraction of Ideas that are sold, % 20.6 20.5 16.4 17.6
Average duration until a sale, yrs. 5.48 6.05 5.94 6.35
Sale duration, c.v. 0.84 0.72 0.78 0.70
coef(dist-adj pat stock)/coef(pat stock) -0.511 -0.607 -0.568 -0.596
coef(pat stock)/coef(empl) 0.054 0.057 0.052 0.050
d(p, fs)− d(p, fb), all sold 0.152 0.161 0.136 0.143
Panel B: Impact of Shutting Down the Market for Ideas (η = 0)
Benchmark Licensing Low-Litigation
∆ in Growth (percentage pt.) -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
∆ in Welfare, % -1.18% -1.40% -1.12%
Table 7: Results with Licensing and Low-Ligation Sectors
frictions, which are highlighted in the model of the patent market developed here, seem
to apply to the licensing market as well. Licensing could have many other purposes than
pure technology transfer, such as deterring entry. To the extent that licensing is used as a
substitute arrangement for a patent sale, the previous analysis might have underestimated
the liquidity in the market for ideas and generated too much search frictions. In order
to take this substitutability into account, assume that all the licensing arrangements are
for the purpose of technology transfer. Hence in what follows, assume that the overall
turnover in the market for ideas is 20.6% = 15.6% + 5%. The model is recalibrated and
simulated using this number. Table 7 reports the results. The model matches the data
well when it is recalibrated to allow for a larger number of ideas to be transferred. Not
surprisingly, a shutdown in the market for ideas leads now to a bigger welfare loss (1.40
versus 1.18%). As before, the reduction in growth is still small, but slightly higher (a loss
of 0.07 versus 0.06 percentage points). Again, the small loss in growth is due to the fact
that the rate of innovation rises when the market for ideas is closed, as was shown earlier
in the right panel of Figure 5.
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1.6.2 Litigation
Patent litigation could also lead to patent sales for reasons not necessarily related
to technology transfer [Galasso et al. (2013)]. To begin with, it is useful to get a sense
of the share of patents that are ever litigated in the sample employed here. Using the
Derwent and Lex Machina databases, Table 1 shows that about 1.0% of patents involve
litigation. Furthermore, when patents that are both ever litigated and ever sold during
their lifetime are considered, the share drops down to 0.3%. Hence, among sold patents,
only 2% (=0.3/15.6) are ever litigated. Given these small shares, it may seem unlikely that
litigated patents could have a major impact on the quantitative results.
As Galasso et al. (2013) emphasize, however, the threat of litigation might be very
important in the sale decision, even if in practice, few litigations are actually observed.
In order to exclude this potential channel, the analysis is redone, focusing exclusively
on sectors with very low litigation intensity. All the micro data targets are recalculated
using patent and firm observations that have a litigation intensity below the mean of
the pertinent sample–the targets for the U.S. growth rate and R&D expenditures to GDP
remain the same. Indeed, sectors have a lot of heterogeneity in terms of the litigations
observed, and a sector’s litigation intensity might be a good indicator for the propensity
of a given patent to be litigated.
Table 7 presents the new estimates and the welfare gain from the market. Note that
the affected data targets change only slightly. These changes occur from restricting the
micro data to the low-litigation sectors. The model still fits very well. The welfare loss for
shutting down the market for ideas is now a bit smaller (1.12 versus 1.18%). The upshot
is that focusing on low-litigation sectors does not affect the analysis in a material way.
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1.7 Conclusions
A model of the market for patents is developed here. Each period a firm conducts
research and development. This R&D process may spawn new ideas. Some of the ideas
are useful for a firm’s line of business, others are not. A firm can patent and sell the
ideas that are not. The fact it can sell ideas provides an incentive to engage in R&D.
Likewise, firms that fail to innovate can attempt to buy ideas. This allows a firm to grow
its business. This reduces the incentive to do R&D. The efficiency of the patent market
for matching ideas with firms has implications for growth. These are examined here.
The empirical analysis, drawing on the NBER-USPTO patent grant database and
patent reassignment data available from Google Patents Beta, establishes five useful facts.
First, somewhere between 15 and 20% of patents are sold. Second, it takes on average 5.48
years to sell a patent. Third, a firm’s patent stock contributes more to its market value the
closer it is to the firm in terms of average technological distance. Fourth, a patent is more
likely to be sold the more distant it is to a firm’s line of business. Fifth, when a patent is
sold it is closer to the buyer’s line of business than to the seller’s. The empirical analysis
attempts to control for licensing and litigation. These five facts suggest that a market for
patents may play an important role in correcting the misallocation of ideas across firms.
It may also influence a firm’s R&D decision.
The developed model is calibrated to match several stylized facts characterizing the
U.S. data, such as the postwar rate of growth, the ratio of R&D spending to GDP, the
fraction of patents sold, the empirical sale duration distribution, and the reduction in
distance between a patent and its owner upon a sale. Additionally, some micro-level facts
from panel data regressions are targeted using an indirect inference strategy. Specifically,
the importance of distance in a firm’s patent portfolio for determining the firm’s market
value is zeroed in on. The value of a market for selling patents is then assessed. This is
done by conducting a series of thought experiments where the market is first shut down
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and then the efficiency of the patent market is increased successively. The efficiency of
this market is important for economic growth and welfare.
The new NBER patent reassignment data opens new and exciting directions for fu-
ture research on innovation and technological progress. One direction is the analysis of
optimal patent policy that not only considers the monopoly distortions and innovation
incentives, but also takes into account the possibility of trading ideas through patents.
Another direction is the analysis of firm dynamics when patents are not only produced
in-house, but also purchased from others. Finally, the role of financial frictions is also a
new and important channel that could impact the (mis)allocation of ideas. These are all
very exciting and important aspects of technological progress that await further research.
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Chapter 2
Young, Restless, and Creative: Open-
ness to Disruption and Creative Inno-
vations
This chapter is co-authored with Ufuk Akcigit and Daron Acemoglu.
Abstract
This paper argues that openness to new, unconventional and disruptive ideas has a
first-order impact on creative innovations—innovations that break new ground in terms of
knowledge creation. After presenting a motivating model focusing on the choice between
incremental and radical innovation, and on how managers of different ages and human
capital are sorted across different types of firms with different degrees of openness to dis-
ruption, we provide firm-level, patent-level and cross-country evidence consistent with
this pattern. Our measures of creative innovations proxy for innovation quality (average
number of citations per patent) and creativity (fraction of superstar innovators, the likeli-
hood of a very high number of citations, and generality of patents). Our main proxy for
openness to disruption is the age of the manager—based on the idea that only companies
or societies open to such disruption will allow the young to rise up within the hierarchy.
Using this proxy at the firm, patent and country level, we present robust evidence that
once the effect of the sorting of young managers to firms that are more open to disruption
are factored in, the (causal) impact of manager age on creative innovations is small.
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2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of economic and social incentives on “creative in-
novations,” which we identify with the most influential, innovative and original patents.
Though there are currently more than half a million patents granted by the US Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) per year, only a handful are truly transformative in terms
of their contribution to society’s knowledge and their impact on the organization of pro-
duction, and probably only a small fraction account for the bulk of the value created.16
For example, within the field of drugs and medical inventions, there were 223,452 patents
between 1975 and 2001, but the median number of citations of these patents within the
next five years was four. A few patents receive many more citations, however. One was
the patent for “systems and methods for selective electrosurgical treatment of body struc-
tures” by the ArthroCare Corporation (with 50 citations), which has also had a major im-
pact on the field by improving many existing surgical procedures and devices used, inter
alia, in arthroscopy, neurology, cosmetics, urology, gynecology and laparoscopy/general
surgery. Another example is Amazon’s patent for “method and system for placing a
purchase order via a communications network,” which received 263 citations within five
years (while the median number of citations within this class is five) and has fundamen-
tally altered online businesses.
An idea dating back to Schumpeter (1934) associates creative innovations and en-
trepreneurship not only with economic rewards to this type of transformative idea, but
also with the ability and desire of potential innovators and entrepreneurs to significantly
deviate from existing technologies, practices and rules of organization and society and
to engage in “disruptive innovations.” This is natural; as Schumpeter emphasizes, in-
novation is a deviation from existing, inertial ways of doing things, and thus relies on
“mental freedom” from, or even “rebellion” against, the status quo (pp. 86-94). Similarly,
16See, among others, Trajtenberg (1990), Harhoff et al. (1999) and Sampat and Ziedonis (2004) on the
relationship between citations and patent quality.
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technologies that will cause the most fundamental “creative destruction” naturally cor-
respond to, and perhaps are driven by, “deviant” and disruptive behavior. This notion
is pithily captured by an inscription prominently displayed on the walls of Facebook’s
headquarters in Silicon Valley:
“Move fast and break things.”
This perspective suggests that societies and organizations that impose a set of rigidly
specified rules, discourage initiative and deviations from established norms, shun or even
ostracize rebellious behavior, and do not tolerate those that “move fast and break things”
will significantly lag behind their more open, “individualistic” or “risk-taking” counter-
parts in creative innovations—even though they might still be able to function successfully
with existing technologies. In the rest of the paper, we thus refer to this constellation of
social and economic incentives as openness to disruption (short for openness to disruptive
innovations, ideas and practices).
We first provide a simple model of the interplay between “corporate culture” (firm
type capturing how open the firm is to disruption) and innovation strategies. Firms can
engage in an incremental innovation by building on their existing leading-edge products.
In addition, high-type firms (those that have a corporate culture open to disruption) can
attempt a radical innovation, which involves combining diverse ideas to generate a tech-
nological improvement in a new area. We also assume that the skills of young managers
who have more recently acquired general skills (or are less beholden to a particular type
of product or technology) can be fruitfully utilized in the process of radical innovation.
In the model, though incremental innovations also increase productivity, it is the radical
innovations that are the engine of growth. This is because incremental innovations in
a particular “technology cluster” run into diminishing returns (as in Akcigit and Kerr
(2010), or Abrams et al. (2013)), while radical innovations create new technology clus-
ters, which increase productivity directly, and also indirectly, by making another series of
incremental innovations possible.
56
Our model predicts a reduced-form cross-sectional relationship between manager age
and radical innovation. But this relationship does not correspond to the causal effect of
manager age on creative innovations. Rather, manager age is both an economically rele-
vant variable and more generally a proxy for openness to disruption, as highlighted by
our model where young managers tend to work in firms that are open to radical inno-
vation, but also contribute to the likelihood of radical innovations in such firms. These
forces can also be seen from the longitudinal predictions of the model: firms that hire
younger managers should subsequently have more creative innovations (because hiring
a young manager is associated either with a change in a firm’s type or a change in the
firm’s innovation strategy as it runs out of productive incremental innovation opportu-
nities). But because firms that are more open to disruption need not immediately hire a
young manager, the increase in creative innovations can precede the hiring of a younger
manager.
The model further clarifies that radical innovations will generate higher quality
patents that are more likely to receive a high number of citations and tend to be more
general in terms of the range of citations they receive (because they are expanding into
new areas), and this provides us with an empirical strategy to measure the creativity of
innovations (and present evidence about several aspects of the model’s implications).
Our theoretical framework also predicts another relationship we investigate empiri-
cally: products with higher sales will encourage even high-type firms and young man-
agers to pursue incremental innovations (because of Arrow’s replacement effect) (Arrow,
1962), and those with many patents will tilt things in favor of radical innovations (because
of diminishing returns and more generally because there is a substantial knowledge base
to build upon for such an expansion).
Finally, our model further suggests that institutions or attitudes that ban or discour-
age expansion into new areas or combinations that have not been previously experi-
mented with can be highly detrimental to radical innovations. Equally, those that prevent
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young managers from leading companies could slow down creative innovations by fail-
ing to use their more recent vintage skills in radical innovations. Such institutions and
attitudes typically vary across countries, and this reasoning suggests that similar relation-
ships might be found in the cross-country data.
The bulk of our paper comprises an empirical study of the ideas illustrated by our
theoretical model. We investigate whether companies with younger managers engage in
more radical and creative innovations. As already noted, manager age is a natural proxy
for openness to disruption, since companies with a corporate culture open to disruption
are more likely to allow young managers to rise up to the top of the corporate hierarchy.17
Our empirical work uses several different measures of creative innovations, all com-
puted from the USPTO data. These are the average number of citations per patent; the fraction
of superstar innovators, which corresponds to the fraction of patents accruing to an inno-
vator classified as a “superstar” on the basis of the number of citations; tail innovations,
which we measure as the fraction of patents (of a country or company) that are at the
pth percentile of the overall citations distribution (such as the 99th percentile) relative
to those that are at the median, thus capturing the likelihood of receiving a very high
number of citations normalized by the “median” number of citations; and generality in-
dex, constructed by Hall et al. (2001), which measures the dispersion of the citations that
a patent receives from different technology classes. We report several salient and robust
pattern using these data.
First, we establish a very robust cross-sectional correlation between CEO (or top man-
agement) age and all of our measures of firm-level creative innovation (with or without
a variety of firm-level controls). In summary, firms that tend to employ younger CEOs
receive a greater number of citations per patent, have a greater fraction of their patents
generated by superstar innovators, have more tail innovations, which are at the very high
17Interestingly, in the examples of major innovations mentioned above, these were produced by companies
with unusually young leadership. The average age of top managers at ArthroCare Corporation was 41 at the
time, and only 33 at Amazon (compared to an average age of 54.84 among Compustat companies).
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percentiles of the citations distribution, and have more general patents.
Second, we find similar (but somewhat smaller) results when we focus on “within-
firm” variation generated by CEO changes: when a younger CEO takes charge, inno-
vations (new patent applications) become more creative. Recall, however, that, as our
theoretical analysis highlights, these within-firm results are still a mixture of the sorting
effects and the causal effect of manager age on creative innovations.
Third, related to this last point and again consistent with our theoretical model, we
show that there is a significant increase in creative innovations before a firm switches to a
younger CEO, but once it does make the switch, there is a further increase in the creativity
of their innovations.
Fourth, we also use the structure of our model, in conjunction with the reduced-
form patterns in the data, to shed further light on the relative roles of sorting and the
causal effect of manager age on innovation. Namely, we utilize a simple indirect infer-
ence procedure to estimate from the reduced-form regression coefficients some of the key
parameters of our model, including those governing the causal effect of manager age on
creative innovations. This exercise implies that the causal effect of manager age on cre-
ative innovations is small and is dwarfed by the sorting effects resulting from the fact
that firms that are more open to disruption, and thus more creative, tend to hire younger
managers.
Fifth, we exploit the patent-level variation to estimate the separate impacts of CEO
and inventor age on the creativity of innovations. Our results indicate that both matter,
with roughly similar magnitudes. But we also find that younger CEOs tend to work
with younger inventors (though CEO age has a fairly precisely estimated impact even
after controlling for inventor age). These two findings, which suggest that firms typi-
cally undertake many associated changes while they are switching towards generating
more creative innovations, further corroborate our interpretation that much of the cross-
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sectional (and within-firm) evidence reflects sorting of younger managers to firms with
corporate cultures that are more open to disruption.
Finally, we also use the firm-level data to shed light on our model’s prediction that
firms with greater sales should be less willing to encourage new, potentially disruptive
ideas, practices and innovations, while firms that are technologically more advanced, and
thus not able to profitably function without engaging in major innovations, should be
more likely to encourage this type of disruptive innovation. Our firm-level data enable
us to investigate this idea by simultaneously including interactions of CEO age with (log)
sales and (log) number of patents of the firm. Though the results here are somewhat less
strong than our main findings, they are broadly consistent with the notion that CEO age
interacts negatively with sales and positively with the number of patents.
We conclude the paper by showing in Section 2.5 that the firm-level results aggregate
up to the country level, so that countries that employ younger managers appear to have
more creative innovations controlling for other factors. For this exercise, we use the
average age of (top) managers (e.g., CEO and CFO) in the 25 largest listed companies
in the country (when available), which we collected from publicly available sources. We
find a fairly stable relationship between manager age and creativity of innovations at the
country level as well, suggesting that the forces we emphasize might account for cross-
country differences in the type and quality of innovations.
The cross-country context is also useful for us because it provides a corroboration that
manager age is indeed capturing practices related to openness to disruption. We do this
by utilizing the individualism and uncertainty avoidance indices of “national cultures”
constructed by the Dutch social scientist Geert Hofstede.18 Our results using these indices
are similar to those based on average manager age, suggesting that, at least at the country
18The individualism index is based on the distinction between collectivism and individualism in Durkheim
(1933), and measures the extent to which a society functions by relying on loosely knit social ties and thus
permits and condones individual actions even when they conflict with collective goals and practices, partic-
ularly in a business context. The uncertainty avoidance index, on the other hand, is an inverse proxy for a
society’s tendency for risk-taking based in part on ideas from the seminal Cyert and March (1963) book.
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level, our manager age variable is likely to be capturing some aspects related to a society’s
openness to disruption.
Our paper is related to several literatures. First, we build on and extend the emerging
literature on the interplay between micro and macro aspects of innovation. In particular,
we build on the model of innovation dynamics developed in Klette and Kortum (2004) by
including a choice between radical and incremental innovations, and by incorporating the
dimension of matching between managers of different vintages of human capital (age)
and type of innovation.19 The burgeoning empirical literature in this area (e.g., Foster
et al. (2001), Lentz and Mortensen (2008), Akcigit and Kerr (2010), Hurst and Pugsley
(2011), Syverson (2011), Kogan et al. (2012), Acemoglu et al. (2013)) focuses on R&D,
patent and productivity dynamics. We depart from this literature both by focusing on
the choice between radical (creative) and incremental innovations, and by presenting a
detailed analysis of the relationship between creativity of innovations and manager age.
Second, three papers most closely related to our work are MacDonald and Weisbach
(2004), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012) and Fogli and Veldkamp (2013). MacDon-
ald and Weisbach construct an overlapping generations model in which each generation
makes technology-specific human capital investments. They show that younger agents
are the ones who invest in human capital complementary to new technologies. Their
framework does not incorporate innovations and thus has no distinction between cre-
ative, radical innovations vs. incremental innovations. Gorodnichenko and Roland draw
a link between innovation and individualism and provide evidence using Hofstede’s in-
dividualism data. Despite the similar motivating questions, the approaches of the two pa-
pers are very different. While Gorodnichenko and Roland look at aggregate measures of
productivity, such as TFP or labor productivity, we focus on creative innovations defined
using patent citations data from the USPTO. We therefore first start with a microeconomic
model of how firms choose their innovation strategies and how managers of different ages
19This matching aspect is common with theoretical analyses of the role of managers, in particular, Lucas Jr
(1978), Garicano (2000), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004).
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endogenously sort across different types of firms. Our main empirical work instead uses
the proxy for openness to disruption we have constructed ourselves based on the age
of managers across countries and, more centrally, focuses on firm-level and patent-level
analysis across US companies. Fogli and Veldkamp also use Hofstede’s individualism
index in their theoretical and empirical analysis of “individualistic” social networks and
the diffusion of new technologies, but their emphasis is on how new technologies diffuse
over different network structures and their empirical work exploits exposure to different
types of diseases to generate cross-country variation in societal network structures.
Third, our work is linked to the small literature on age and creativity. Galenson and
Weinberg (1999), Galenson and Weinberg (2001), Weinberg and Galenson (2005), Jones
and Weinberg (2011) and Jones (2010) provide evidence that a variety of innovators and
top scientists are more creative early in their careers, but they also acquire other types
of human capital (perhaps generating different types of creativity) later on. Jones (2009)
develops a model in which scientists have to spend more time mastering a given area and
have to work in teams because the existing stock of knowledge is growing and thus be-
coming more difficult to absorb and use. Relatedly, Sarada and Tocoian (2013) investigate
the impact of the age of the founders of a company on subsequent performance using
Brazilian data.20
Fourth, our work is related to the literature pioneered by Bertrand and Schoar (2003),
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) which investigates the
relationship between CEO and manager characteristics and firm performance. Benmelech
and Frydman (2014), for example, show that military CEOs pursue more conservative in-
vestment and financial strategies (lower investment in R&D), are less likely to be involved
in financial fraud, and perform better during times of distress. Bennedsen et al. (2008)
20See also Azoulay et al. (2011) who document the impact of changes in incentives driven by large aca-
demic awards and grants on creativity, and Azoulay et al. (2010) who investigate the impact of the death of
a very productive co-author on academic productivity.
There is also an extensive literature in social psychology, mostly using survey and experimental evidence,
on age and various attitudes both in general and in business. See, e.g., the survey by Walter and Scheibe
(2013).
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show that the death of a CEO or shocks to the CEO that potentially affect her focus
(death of an immediate family member) impact profitability or operating returns. Kaplan
et al. (2012) provide evidence from a factor analysis that CEO ability is positively corre-
lated with subsequent firm performance. Also noteworthy in this context is Barker and
Mueller (2002), who show that firms with younger CEOs spend more on R&D.
Finally, there is a growing literature on the impact of cultural factors and practices on
long-run economic development. The distinction between individualist and collectivist
cultures is deep-rooted in sociology (e.g., Durkheim (1933)) and has been widely ap-
plied within the sociology, anthropology and psychology literatures (e.g., Parsons (1949),
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), Schwartz (1994), Triandis (1995), and Hofstede (2001)).
It has been emphasized within the economics literature by Greif (1994), though we are not
aware of any other studies emphasizing or empirically investigating the impact of “open-
ness to disruption”.21 More closely related to our focus in this context is the vision of
Schumpeter (1934) of an innovator as creating disruption, partly in response to economic
incentives and partly for psychological motives that lead them to seek challenges and
deviate from norms, is more closely related to our focus. Traces of this approach can also
be seen in the psychological study of authoritarianism in Adorno et al. (1950), and in the
approaches to entrepreneurship found in McClelland (1961) and Winslow and Solomon
(1987) (see Kirzner (1997), for a survey). These ideas have been applied in a cross-country
context by Shane (1993), Shane (1995), Hofstede (2001), Schwartz (1994), Schwartz and
Bilsky (1990) and others. To the best of our knowledge, no other work links these ideas to
creative innovations, develops a formal theory along the lines of what we are attempting
here, or provides systematic evidence based on firm- or patent-level data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our motivating
model. Section 2.3 describes our data sources and variable construction and provides a
21Other aspects of cultural practices have been emphasized as major determinants of economic develop-
ments by, among others, Tabellini (2008a), Tabellini (2008b), Fernandez and Fogli (2009), Guiso et al. (2010),
and Alesina et al. (2011).
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few basic descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 presents our main empirical results, which are
based on firm-level data. Section 2.5 returns to the cross-country data and shows that the
patterns we identify in the microdata appear to aggregate up to the country level. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Motivating Theory
In this section, we provide a simple model of radical and incremental innovations to
motivate both the conceptual underpinnings of our approach and some of our empirical
strategies.
2.2.1 Production
We consider a continuous-time economy in which discounted preferences are defined
over a unique final good Y (t). This final good is produced by labor and a continuum of
intermediate goods j, each located along a circle, C, of circumference 1. The production
technology takes the following constant elasticity of substitution form
Y (t) =
1
1 − β
(∫
C
qj (t)
β k j (t)
1−β dj
)
Lβ, (2.1)
where k j (t) denotes the quantity and qj (t) the quality (productivity) of intermediate good
j used in final good production at time t, while L is the total amount of production labor,
which is supplied inelastically.
We follow Klette and Kortum (2004) in defining a firm as a collection of leading-edge
(best) technologies. A perfectly enforced patent for each leading-edge quality technology
is held by a firm, which can produce it at constant marginal cost γ in terms of the unique
final good. Because costs and revenues across product lines are independent, a firm will
choose price and quantity to maximize profits on each of its product lines. In doing so, it
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will face an iso-elastic inverse demand derived from equation (2.1), which can be written,
suppressing time arguments, as:
pj = Lβq
β
j k
−β
j , ∀j ∈ C.
The profit-maximization problem of the firm with leading-edge technology for interme-
diate good j can then be written as
Π
(
qj
)
= max
k j≥0
{
Lβqβj k
1−β
j − γk j
}
∀j ∈ C.
The first-order condition of this maximization problem implies a constant markup over
marginal cost, pj = γ/(1 − β), and thus
k j =
[
(1 − β)
γ
] 1
β
Lqj. (2.2)
Equilibrium profits for a product line with technology qj are
Π
(
qj
)
= β
[
(1 − β)
γ
] 1−β
β
Lqj
≡ πqj,
where the second line defines π.
2.2.2 Managers
In addition to workers, the economy is also populated by managers, who play both
an operational role (reducing costs for firms) and manage innovation.
Managers enter and exit the economy following a stationary Poisson birth and death
process, so that the measure of managers, M, and their age distribution is constant over
time. We index a manager by her age a, or equivalently by her birth date b. Denoting the
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death rate of managers by δ, the fact that the measure of managers is constant at M implies
that the age distribution of managers is simply given by an exponential distribution, i.e.,
the fraction of managers who are below the age a is 1 − e−δa.22
When a manager is born, she acquires the knowledge associated with the average
technology in the period in which she is born, giving her a knowledge base of
q̄b ≡
∫
C
qjbdj.
Similarly, we denote the current period’s knowledge stock—current average technology—
by
q̄t ≡
∫
C
qjtdj.
Managers will be hired by monopolists to manage production and innovation in their
leading-edge products. In equilibrium, managers will be paid a wage wb,t as a function
of the current period’s technology, q̄t, and their knowledge, q̄b. We assume that M < 1,
which implies that the measure of managers is less than the measure of product lines in
the economy, so some product lines will not use a manager. This simplifies the analysis
by providing a simple boundary condition for the determination of equilibrium wages of
managers. We also assume that M is not too small, which will ensure that all firms that
need a manager for a “radical innovation,” as described next, are able to hire one (one
can take M → 1 without any loss of generality).
2.2.3 Corporate Culture and Innovation Dynamics
The economy is populated by two types of firms, with firm type denoted by θ ∈
{θH, θL} where θH > θL. Firm type does not affect productivity directly, but influences
the success of radical innovations. In particular, high-type firms, i.e., those with θ =
θH, are those with corporate cultures that are open to disruption, and will thus have a
22It is also straightforward to see that if the birth rate of managers is given by δbirth, then M = δbirth/δ.
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comparative advantage in radical innovations. In contrast, we will suppose that low-type
firms, i.e., those with θ = θL, is incapable of engaging in radical innovations, thus setting
θL = 0. Firm type is initially determined upon entry (as described in the next subsection).
Thereafter, a low-type firm switches to high type at flow rate φ ∈ (0, 1).23
The productivity of each intermediate product is determined by its location along
a quality ladder in a given product line. In addition, as noted above and following
Klette and Kortum (2004), each leading-edge technology gives the firm an opportunity
for further innovation. Innovation dynamics at the firm level are determined by whether
the firm pursues an incremental innovation or a radical innovation strategy. Low-type firms
can only engage in incremental innovations as we describe next.
Incremental Innovation Incremental innovations improve the productivity of a product
line within the current technology cluster.24 A technology cluster here refers to a specific
family of technologies for that product line. Because incremental innovations take place
within this technology cluster, they will run into diminishing returns. We model this
by assuming that the additional productivity improvements generated by an innovation
decline in the number of prior incremental innovations within a technology cluster. In
addition, again for the same reason, incremental innovations build on a narrow technol-
ogy base and create improvements only over this base. This implies that, as illustrated in
Example 1 below, incremental innovations will have few citations and limited “general-
ity” (captured by the dispersion of citations they receive from different technology classes
as we discuss further below).
We assume that all firms (regardless of their type) can successfully innovate incre-
mentally at the exogenous rate ξ > 0. The nth incremental innovation in a technology
cluster improves the current productivity of product line j by a step size ηn(qj, q̄t), where
23We assume that there are no switches from high type to low type to simplify the expressions and the
analysis.
24Our modeling of technology clusters follows Akcigit and Kerr (2010) and Abrams et al. (2013).
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qj is the current productivity of the technology, and q̄t is the current period’s technology,
and
ηn(qj, q̄t) =
[
κq̄t + (1 − κ) qj
]
ηαn (2.3)
with α ∈ (0, 1), η > 0, and κ ∈ (0, 1). This functional form implies two features. First, each
innovation builds both on the current productivity of the product line where it originates,
with weight 1 − κ, and on average technology, q̄t, with weight κ. Second, productivity
gains from incremental innovations decline geometrically, at the rate α, in the number of
prior incremental innovations in the technology cluster.
Denoting by tn the time of the nth incremental improvement for product line j, the
evolution of the technology of product line j in a technology cluster that started with
productivity q0j after n incremental innovations can then be written as
qnj = q
0
j + ∑
n
i=0
[
κq̄ (ti) + (1 − κ) q0j
]
ηαi
= q0j
[
1 + (1 − κ) η 1 − α
n+1
1 − α
]
+ ηκ ∑ni=0 αi q̄ (ti) .
Radical Innovations Radical innovations combine the current technology of the prod-
uct line the firm is operating, the knowledge base of the manager, and the available
knowledge stock of the economy to innovate in a new area (creatively destroying the
leading-edge technology of some other firm). Similar to the approach in Weitzman (1998)
based on recombination, this combination of knowledge bases creates a new technology
cluster. Because they create new technology clusters, radical innovations tend to receive
more citations, are more likely to have a very high number of (“tail”) citations, and have
greater generality.
If there is a radical innovation in a particular product line, the innovator will initiate a
new technology cluster in a different product line (and will still keep its original product
line). The creation of a new technology cluster generates a larger improvement on current
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technology, and also provides the innovator with the opportunity to start a new series
of incremental innovations. Because radical innovations are not directed and each firm
controls an infinitesimal fraction of all products, the likelihood that it will be the firm
itself radically innovating over its own product is zero.25 Thus radical innovations are
associated with “Schumpeterian creative destruction.” We next describe the technology
for radical innovations.
A successful radical innovation leads to an improvement over the product line uni-
formly located on the circle C, and thus generates creative destruction. In particular, if
there is a successful radical innovation over a product line with technology qj, this leads
to the creation of a new leading-edge technology (now under the control of the innovating
firm and manager), with productivity
q0j = qj + η0,
where the superscript 0 denotes the fact that a radical innovation initiates a new cluster
with no prior incremental innovations.
Managers’ Role For each of their active product lines, firms hire managers who influ-
ence their revenues in two ways. First, a manager of age a = t − b contributes q̄t f (a)
to the revenues of a firm when the aggregate technology level is q̄t (e.g., by reducing
costs).26 We presume (but do not need to impose) that f is increasing, so that more expe-
rienced managers are better at cost reductions. If the firm hires no manager, then it does
not receive this additional revenue. Second, a manager affects the flow rate of radical
innovations for firms attempting such radical innovations, as we describe next.
A firm of type θ has a baseline flow rate of radical innovation (regardless of whether
25It may be more plausible to assume that radical innovations also take place over a range of products that
are “technologically close” to the knowledge base of the innovator. Provided that there is a continuum of
products within this range, this would not affect any of our results.
26We model this contribution as an additive element in the revenues of the firm so as not to affect its
monopoly price and quantity choices of the firm via this channel.
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they are pursuing radical or incremental innovations) equal to ψΛθ. In addition, if it
pursues a radical innovation strategy, hires a manager with knowledge q̄b and the current
technology in the economy is q̄t, it will also have a flow rate of radical innovation equal
to
Λθq̄a, (2.4)
where
q̄a ≡ q̄b
q̄t
is the relative average quality of managers of age a, and Λ ∈ (0, 1] (and the superscript,
rather than a subscript, here emphasizes that this is a ratio of two averages). This specifi-
cation implies that low-type firms, with θL = 0, cannot engage in radical innovations—i.e.,
both ψΛθL and ΛθL are equal to zero.
Moreover, since both high- and low-type firms have the same rate of success, at the
rate ξ, when they attempt incremental innovations, our model also implies that θ captures
the comparative advantage of firms for radical innovation. In addition, young managers also
have a comparative advantage in radical innovation—since the contribution of the manager
of age a to cost reductions is the same for all firms, and younger managers contribute to
the flow rate of radical innovation with high-type firms.
The parameter Λ captures the role of institutional or social sanctions on radical in-
novations. Such sanctions may permit only the implementation of certain radical innova-
tions, thus making successful innovations less likely.27
Radical Innovations and Citation Patterns The next example provides more details on
the evolution of technology clusters and the citation pattern for the patents related to the
27In particular, in the context of our modeling of product lines along the circle C, we may assume that
such sanctions permit a firm operating product line j to successfully innovate over technologies that are
sufficiently close to itself. Suppose, for example, that j may be allowed to innovate only on product lines that
are at most a distance Λ from itself. Then the case of no restrictions would correspond to Λ = 1/2, so that
radical innovations over any product lines on the circle C are possible, while Λ < 1/2 would correspond to
restrictions and thus lower the likelihood of successful radical innovations.
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incremental and radical innovations therein.
Example 1. The following chart provides an illustrative example focusing on two product
lines:
First product line:
|
|
|
η0︸︷︷︸
P1
η1︸︷︷︸
P2
η2︸︷︷︸
P6
η3︸︷︷︸
P7︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tech Cluster 1
|
|
|
η0︸︷︷︸
P11
η1︸︷︷︸
P12︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tech Cluster 2
|
|
|
η0︸︷︷︸
P13
η1︸︷︷︸
P14
η2︸︷︷︸
P15︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tech Cluster 3
Second product line:
|
|
|
η0︸︷︷︸
P3
η1︸︷︷︸
P4
η2︸︷︷︸
P5︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tech Cluster 1
|
|
|
η0︸︷︷︸
P8
η1︸︷︷︸
P9
η2︸︷︷︸
P10︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tech Cluster 2
In this example, Pn denotes the nth patent registered at the patent office and ηn denotes
the step size as described in equation (2.3). The first technology cluster starts with a
radical innovation associated with a patent P1. The productivity improvement due to this
patent is η0. Subsequently a new incremental innovation in this technology cluster, with
patent P2, follows on P1, increasing productivity by another η1 < η0. After this innovation,
there is a radical innovation P3 in the second product line, followed by two subsequent
incremental innovations P4 and P5. Since P5 and P6 are second incremental innovations
in their technology clusters, they increase productivity by η2 < η1. Note that P1, P3, P8,
P11 and P13 are radical innovations starting new technology clusters. As described above,
these come from innovations in other product lines operated by high-type firms. Suppose
also that the firm operating technology cluster 1 with patent P7 is a high-type firm, and
successfully undertakes a radical innovation after P7, launching a new technology cluster
on a different product line (shown above as patent P8).
Consider next the patterns of citation resulting from these innovations. It is natural
to assume that each incremental innovation will cite all previous innovations in its tech-
nology cluster, which is the pattern shown in the next table. (Alternatively, such patents
might also cite patterns from previous technology clusters on the same product line, with
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very similar patterns). In addition, it is also plausible that, because a radical innovation is
recombining ideas from its own product line and the product line on which it is building,
it should be citing the fundamental ideas encapsulated in the patents that initiated the
two technology clusters. For this reason, patents P8, P11, and P13 cite the patents initiat-
ing the previous technology cluster in this product line as well as the patent initiating
the most recent technology cluster in their own product line. The next table shows this
citation pattern for the first five patents.
Cited Citing
P1 : P2, P6, P7, P8, P11
P2 : P6, P7
P3 : P4, P5, P8
P4 : P5
P5 : none
For example, P2 builds only on P1 and thus only cites P1, and is in turn cited by P6 and P7.
P1 is cited not only by the patents that build on itself within the same product line, P2, P6,
P7 and P11, but also by P8 because this new patent comes out of recombining ideas based
on this technology cluster and those in some other product line. This pattern then im-
plies that radical innovations will receive more citations and will receive more “general”
citations as well. They will also be heavily overrepresented among “tail innovations,”
meaning among patents receiving the highest number of citations. These are the patterns
we will explore in our empirical work.
We close the model by assuming that new firms enter at the exogenous flow rate
x > 0, and entry corresponds to a (radical) innovation over an existing product line uni-
formly at random, which thus initiates a new technology cluster. We further assume
that immediately after entry, a firm’s type is also drawn at random. In particular, suc-
cessful entrant is high-type, θ = θH, with probability ζ ∈ (0, 1), and is low-type, θ = θL
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(= 0), with the complementary probability, 1− ζ. Thereafter, firm type (corporate culture)
evolves according to the Markov chain described above.
2.2.4 Value Functions and Firm Maximization
Recall that a firm makes the innovation decision in each of its product lines to max-
imize its present discounted value, which we denote by Ws
(−→q f ,−→n f ) where s ∈ {H, L},
−→q f is the vector of productivities of the firm, −→n f is the vector of the number of incre-
mental innovations in each of these product lines, i.e., −→q f ≡
{
q f ,j1 , q f ,j2 , ..., q f ,jm f
}
, and
−→n f ≡
{
n f ,j1 , n f ,j2 , ..., n f ,jm f
}
, and m f denotes the number of product lines that firm f is
operating.28 The value function for a low-type firm can be written as
rWL
(−→q f ,−→n f )− ·WL (−→q f ,−→n f ) =
m f
∑
m=1

maxa
{
πq f ,jm + q̄t f (a)− wa,t
}
+ξ

WL
 −→q f \ {q f ,jm} ∪
{
q f ,jm + ηn f ,jm+1
}
,
−→n f \
{
n f ,jm
}
∪
{
n f ,jm + 1
}

−WL
(−→q f ,−→n f )

+τ
[
WL
(−→q f \ {q f ,jm} ,−→n f \ {n f ,jm})− WL (−→q f ,−→n f )]

(2.5)
+ φ
[
WH
(−→q f ,−→n f )− WL (−→q f ,−→n f )] .
We can explain the right-hand side of this value function as follows: for each prod-
uct line m = 1, ..., m f , the firm receives a revenue stream of πq f ,jm as a function of its
productivity in this product line, q f ,jm . In addition, it has a choice of the age of the man-
ager it will hire to operate this product line (formally choosing a ∈ R+ ∪ {∅}, which is
suppressed to save on notation), and if the manager’s age is a, it will have additional
revenue/cost savings of q̄t f (a) and pay the market price for such a manager of age a at
time t, wa,t. Summing over all of its product lines gives the current revenues of the firm.
28Here and elsewhere, we suppress time as an explicit argument of the value functions to simplify notation.
73
In addition, the firm can undertake an innovation on the basis of each of its active prod-
uct lines. Since we are looking at a low-type firm, all innovations will be incremental,
thus arriving at the rate ξ. When such an innovation happens in product line m that has
already undergone n f ,jm incremental innovations, the mth element of
−→q f changes from
q f ,jm to q f ,jm + ηn f ,jm+1 and n goes up by one. We represent this with the arguments of
the value function changing to −→q f \
{
q f ,jm
}
∪
{
q f ,jm + ηn f ,jm+1
}
, −→n f \
{
n f ,jm
}
∪
{
n f ,jm + 1
}
(and the firm relinquishes its current value function WL
(−→q f ,−→n f )). The firm might also
lose one of its currently active product lines to creative destruction, which happens at
the endogenous rate τ (which will be determined in Section 2.2.6), and in that case, the
firm’s value function changes from WL
(−→q f ,−→n f ) to WL (−→q f \ {q f ,jm} ,−→n f \ {n f ,jm}) (i.e., −→q f
changes −→q f \
{
q f ,jm
}
and −→n f to −→n f \
{
n f ,jm
}
). Finally, the last term is due to the fact that
a low-type firm switches to high-type at the flow rate φ, in which case it relinquishes its
current value function and begets the value function of a high-type firm, WH
(−→q f ,−→n f ).
The value function of a high-type firm can be similarly written as
rWH
(−→q f ,−→n f )− ·WH (−→q f ,−→n f ) (2.6)
=
m f
∑
m=1
max

πq f ,jm
+maxa
q̄t f (a)− wa,t + ξ

WH
 −→q f \
{
q f ,jm
}
∪
{
q f ,jm + ηn f ,jm+1
}
,
−→n f \
{
n f ,jm
}
∪
{
n f ,jm + 1
}

−WH
(−→q f ,−→n f )

 ;
πqm + maxa
q̄t f (a) + ΛθH q̄a
 EWH
(−→q f ∪ {qj′ + η0} ,−→n f ∪ {0})
−WH
(−→q f ,−→n f )
− wa,t


+
m f
∑
m=1
τ
[
WH
(−→q f \{q f ,jm} ,−→n f \{n f ,jm})− WH (−→q f ,−→n f )]
+
m f
∑
m=1
ψΛθH
EWH
 −→q f ∪
{
qj′ + η0
}
,
−→n f ∪ {0}
− WH (−→q f ,−→n f )

The intuition for this value function is very similar to (2.5) except for the possibility
of a radical innovation. In particular, for each product line m, this high-type firm has a
radical innovation at the flow rate ψΛθH regardless of its innovation strategy. In addi-
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tion it has a choice between incremental and radical innovation, represented by the outer
maximization. The first option here is choosing incremental innovation for product line m
and is thus similar to the first line of (2.5). The second option is radical innovation, and in
this case the trade-off involved in the age of the manager is different, since manager age
affects the arrival rate of radical innovations as shown in (2.4). In the case of a success-
ful radical innovation, the value of the firm changes to EWH
(−→q f ∪ {qj′ + η0} ,−→n f ∪ {0}),
where the expectation is over a product line drawn uniformly at random upon which the
radical innovation will build.
The next proposition shows that, as in Klette and Kortum (2004) and Acemoglu et al.
(2013), these value functions can be decomposed into sums of value functions defined at
the product-line level.
Proposition 1. The value functions in (2.5) and (2.6) can be written as
Ws
(−→q f ,−→n f ) = m f∑
m=1
Vs
(
qj, n
)
,
where Vs
(
qj, n
)
is the (franchise) value of a product line of productivity qj with n incremental
innovations that belongs to a firm of type s ∈ {H, L} such that
rVL
(
qj, n
)
− V̇L
(
qj, n
)
= max
{
πqj + q̄t f (a)− wa,t
}
+ ξ
[
VL
(
qj + ηn+1, n + 1
)
− VL
(
qj, n
)]
(2.7)
− τVL
(
qj, n
)
+ φ
[
VH
(
qj, n
)
− VL
(
qj, n
)]
,
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and
rVH
(
qj, n
)
− V̇H
(
qj, n
)
= max

πqj + maxa
q̄t f (a)− wa,t + ξ
 VH (qj + ηn+1, n + 1)
−VH
(
qj, n
)

 ;
πqj + maxa {q̄t f (a) + ΛθH q̄aEVH (q̄t)− wa,t}
 (2.8)
− τVH
(
qj, n
)
+ ψΛθHEVH (q̄t) ,
where EVH (q̄t) denotes the expected value of a radical innovation when the aggregate technology
level is q̄t.
Proof. Both of these value functions can be derived straightforwardly by conjecturing the
above forms and verifying the conjecture.
2.2.5 Stationary Equilibrium With κ = 1
We now characterize the stationary equilibrium of this economy in the case where
κ = 1—so that all current innovations build on current technology, q̄t (and not on the
current productivity of the existing technology cluster). This assumption considerably
simplifies the analysis, and we return to the general case where κ < 1 below.
Value Functions in Stationary Equilibrium A stationary equilibrium is defined as an
equilibrium in which aggregate output, Yt, grows at a constant rate g, and the distribu-
tion of product lines between high- and low-type firms and over the prior number of
incremental innovations remains stationary.
As noted above, firms decide the age of the manager to hire for each of the product
lines they are operating and whether to engage in a radical or incremental innovation.
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Let us first consider the value of a product line for a low-type firm. From Proposition 1,
we can focus on the decisions and the value function of such a firm at the product line
level, and the relevant value function is given by (2.7).
Since some firms will not hire managers (as M < 1), all firms not undertaking radical
innovations must be indifferent between hiring and not hiring a manager, which implies
that the equilibrium wage for managers, employed by firms engaged in incremental in-
novations, satisfies the boundary condition:
wa,t = q̄t f (a) . (2.9)
Substituting the equilibrium wage (2.9) into (2.7), we obtain a simplified value function
for low-type firms as
rVL
(
qj, n
)
− V̇L
(
qj, n
)
= πqj + ξ
[
VL
(
qj + q̄tηαn+1, n + 1
)
− VL
(
qj, n
)]
− τVL
(
qj, n
)
+ φ
[
VH
(
qj, n
)
− VL
(
qj, n
)]
.
Solving this value function gives an explicit characterization of the value function of
low-type firms as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let us assume that the value function for a high-type firm takes the following form:
VH
(
qj, n
)
= Aqj + B̃ (n) q̄t. Then the value function of a product line operated by a low-type firm,
(2.7) takes the following form
VL
(
qj, n
)
= Aqj + B (n) q̄t (2.10)
where
A ≡ π
r + τ
; [r − g + ξ + τ + φ] B (n) = ξ Aηαn+1 + φB̃ (n) + ξB (n + 1) ;
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and B̃(n) is defined in Proposition 3 below.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The form of the value function in (2.10) is intuitive. It depends linearly on current
productivity, qj, since this determines the current flow of profits. It also depends on
current economy-wide technology, q̄t, since all innovations, including incremental ones,
build on this. Finally, it is decreasing in n (because B(n) is decreasing) since a higher
n implies that the next incremental innovation will increase productivity by less—and
incremental innovation is the only type of innovation that a low-type firm can undertake.
We next turn to the value of a product line operated by a high-type firm, which differs
from (2.7) because high-type firms have to decide whether to engage in incremental or
radical innovation, given by (2.8) above. Because (2.4) implies that younger managers
have comparative advantage in radical innovation, it follows straightforwardly that there
will exist a maximum age a∗ such that only managers below this age will work in firms
attempting radical innovation. Moreover, the maximization over the age of the manager
in (2.8) implies that such a firm must be indifferent between hiring any manager younger
than a∗. This implies:
q̄t f (a∗) + ΛθH q̄a
∗
EVH(q̄t)− wa∗,t = q̄t f (a) + ΛθH q̄aEVH(q̄t)− wa,t for all a < a∗.
Note that the oldest manager hired for radical innovation earns (from expression (2.9))
wa∗,t = q̄t f (a∗) .
Hence
wa,t =

q̄t f (a) for a > a∗
q̄t f (a) + ΛθH [q̄a − q̄a∗]EVH(q̄t) for a ≤ a∗
. (2.11)
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This wage schedule highlights that, in general, younger or older managers might be paid
more (this will depend on the f function). Younger managers have a comparative ad-
vantage in radical innovation, but older managers might be more productive in operating
firms.29
Now substituting for (2.11) in (2.8), we obtain a simplified form of the value function
of a product line operated by a high-type firm as
rVH
(
qj, n
)
− V̇H
(
qj, n
)
= max
 πqj + ξ
[
VH
(
qj + q̄tηαn+1, n + 1
)
− VH
(
qj, n
)]
;
πqj + ΛθH q̄a
∗
EVH(q̄t)

− τVH
(
qj, n
)
+ ψΛθHEVH(q̄t).
We next characterize the solution to this value function and also determine the alloca-
tion of managers to different product lines (and to incremental and radical innovations).
Proposition 3. The value function in (2.8) takes the following form
VH
(
qj, n
)
= Aqj + q̄tB̃ (n) , (2.12)
where A and B(n) are as defined in Proposition 2) and B̃ (n) is given by
[r − g + τ] B̃ (n) = ψ
[
A (1 + η) + B̃ (0)
]
(2.13)
+
 ξ
[
Ãηαn+1 + B̃ (n + 1)− B̃ (n)
]
for n < n∗
ΛθH q̄a
∗ [
(1 + η) Ã + B̃ (0)
]
for n ≥ n∗
,
where n∗ ∈ Z++ is the number of incremental innovations within a technology cluster at which
29The evidence in Galenson and Weinberg (1999), Galenson and Weinberg (2001), Weinberg and Galenson
(2005) and Jones and Weinberg (2011) is consistent with the possibility that either younger or older creative
workers might be more productive.
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there is a switch to radical innovation given by
n∗ =
⌈
n′
⌉
such that ξ
[
Aηαn
′+1 + B̃
(
n′ + 1
)
− B̃
(
n′
)]
= ΛθH q̄a
∗ [
(1 + η) A + B̃ (0)
]
.
(2.14)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for this high-type value function is similar to that for Proposition 2,
except that the dependence on the number of prior innovations in the current technology
cluster, n, is more complicated since when n exceeds n∗, a high-type firm will switch to
radical innovation (and from that point on n will no longer be relevant). This critical
value n∗ is given by (2.14), which designates the smallest integer after n′ where n′ equates
the value of attempting an additional incremental innovation to the value of attempting
a radical innovation (the notation ⌈n⌉ denotes the next integer after n).
It is also worth noting that this threshold, n∗, is constant in the stationary equilibrium.
This is because the value function increases linearly in q̄t, but the knowledge stock and
wages of managers also increase linearly, and in the stationary equilibrium, these two
forces balance out, ensuring that n∗ is constant while VH increases linearly in q̄t.
Given the form of VH, EVH(q̄t), the value of a new radical innovation, can be written
as
EVH(q̄t) = E
[
Ãqj + Ãηq̄t + q̄tB̃ (0)
]
= [Ã (1 + η) + B̃ (0)]q̄t
≡ vq̄t,
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where the last line defines v. Then the equilibrium wage schedule simplifies to:
wa,t =

f (a) q̄t for a > a∗
[ f (a) + ΛθH(q̄a − q̄a
∗
)v]q̄t for a ≤ a∗
. (2.15)
and is thus also linear in q̄t.
Equilibrium Characterization The next proposition provides the characterization of the
stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Low-type firms (those with θ = θL) always hire “old” managers (those with
a > a∗ or b < b∗t ), pursue incremental innovations and never generate radical innovations.
High-type firms (those with θ = θH) pursue incremental innovations on product lines less
than n∗ prior incremental innovations, where n∗ is given by (2.14), and hire “old” managers (those
with a > a∗ or b < b∗t ). They pursue radical innovations on product lines with more than n
∗ and
hire “young” managers (those with a ≤ a∗ or b ≥ b∗t ).
A lower Λ (corresponding to the society being less permissive to radical innovations) will
increase n∗ (so that a lower fraction of high-type firms will pursue radical innovation), and will
reduce the wages of young managers (because there is less demand for the knowledge of young
managers).
Proof. This result directly follows from Propositions 2 and 3.
Empirical Implications Our empirical work is inspired by Proposition 4. As explained
above, radical innovations will be associated with greater indices of our measures of cre-
ative innovations (innovation quality, tail innovations, superstar fraction, and generality).
We will first investigate the cross-sectional relationship between manager (CEO) age and
creative innovations. In these cross-sectional regressions, manager age is taken to be a
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proxy of a corporate culture that is more open to disruption. Therefore, from Proposition
4, we expect a negative cross-sectional relationship between manager age and creative
innovations. As just stressed, this cross-sectional relationship does not correspond to the
“causal effect” of manager age on creativity of innovations (which would apply if we
varied manager age holding the firm’s corporate culture constant); in particular, it also
reflects the sorting of younger managers to corporate cultures that are open to disruption
(and thus more conducive to creative innovations).
Our model also has longitudinal implications—that is, implications about how man-
ager age and creativity of innovations vary over time at the firm level—which shed further
light on the relative magnitudes of the sorting and the causal effects. To understand these
implications, let us consider the innovation dynamics of firms implied by Proposition 4.
Recall that low-type firms always engage in incremental innovations and never gen-
erate radical innovations. In contrast, high-type firms may attempt a radical innovation
depending on how many prior incremental innovations they have had on a product line.
• For product line with n < n∗, a high-type firm hires an old manager (or keeps
its already existing old manager), and pursues an incremental innovation strategy.
Given the technology specified above, however, such a firm still generates radical
innovations at the rate ψΛθH.
• For a product line with n ≥ n∗, a high-type firm hires a young manager and en-
gages in radical innovation. In this case, the average rate of radical innovation across
product lines with n ≥ n∗ and operated by high-type firms can be computed us-
ing the aforementioned fact that the age distribution of managers is given by the
exponential distribution, as
ψΛθH +
1
F (a∗)
∫ a∗
0
ΛθH q̄adF (a) = ψΛθH +
ΛθHδ
g + δ
[
1 − e−(g+δ)a∗
]
[1 − e−δa∗ ] . (2.16)
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Now consider a low-type firm that switches to high-type, and to simplify the dis-
cussion, suppose that it has a unique product line. Then, if this product line has had
n < n∗ incremental innovations, the firm will continue to pursue an incremental innova-
tion strategy, keeping its old manager.30 In the process, it will generate radical/creative
innovations at the flow rate ψΛθH as noted above. When it reaches n = n∗, it will hire
a young manager, switch to a radical innovation strategy, and at that point, its rate of
radical/creative innovations will increase, on average, from ψΛθH to the expression in
(2.16). In contrast, if the product line of the firm at the time of switching to high-type has
had n ≥ n∗ incremental innovations, it will immediately hire a young manager, pursue a
radical innovation strategy, and have radical innovations at the flow rate (2.16).
This discussion implies that when we focus on the relationship between within-firm
changes in manager age and creative innovations, we expect to find two regularities. First,
when a firm switches from an older to a younger manager, this should be associated
with an increase in creative innovations. Second, firms that switch from an older to a
younger manager should, on average, experience an increase in creative innovations even
before the switch. Namely, before the actual switch to a younger manager, the increase in
creative innovations approximately corresponds to ψΛθH, whereas following the switch to
a younger manager, there will be a further increase in creative innovations corresponding
to the second term in (2.16). Note, however, that even this further increase following the
switch to a younger manager does not correspond to the causal effect of manager age on
creative innovations for several reasons; first, for firms with n ≥ n∗, both events will be
taking place at the same time; second, even for firms with n < n∗, the impact following
the switch to a younger manager still contains the sorting effect and also depends on the
matching patterns between managers and firms as indicated by the presence of the terms
representing the age distribution of managers; and third, strictly speaking to obtain the
causal effect, we need to keep the firm type and number of prior incremental innovations
30Strictly speaking this is true under an infinitesimal cost of replacing managers. Otherwise, it could fire
its old manager and hire another old manager, with no impact on our results or discussion here.
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constant, and just change (exogenously) manager age—and this is the exercise will will
perform in Section 2.4.4 below.
Finally, though we will not be able to investigate this directly in our empirical work,
the implications of changes in Λ are interesting. A lower value of this parameter nat-
urally reduces radical innovations and, at the same time, decreases the wages of young
managers, thus making it look like the society is discriminating against the young; but in
fact this is a consequence of the society discouraging radical innovations.
2.2.6 General Equilibrium and the Stationary Distribution of Products
We next characterize the stationary distribution of product lines in this economy in
terms of the types of their owners and also in terms of the prior number of incremental
innovations, and then use these distributions to determine the aggregate growth rate of
the economy in the stationary equilibrium.
Let us next denote the fraction of product lines occupied by s-type firms (for s ∈
{L, H}) with n prior incremental innovations by µsn (these are not functions of time as we
are focusing on a stationary equilibrium). Let us also denote the total creative destruction
from s-type firms by τs. The stationary distribution of product lines is determined by
standard flow equations equating inflows and outflows from each state. For high types,
these take the form
Outflow Inflow(
τL + ξ
)
µH0 = τ
H (1 − µH0 )+ φµL0 for n = 0(
τL + τH + ξ
)
µHn = ξµ
H
n−1 + φµ
L
n for n∗ > n > 0(
τL + τH
)
µHn = ξµ
H
n−1 + φµ
L
n for n = n∗(
τL + τH
)
µHn = φµ
L
n for n > n∗
.
Consider the first line corresponding to n = 0. Outflows from this state, products with
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n = 0 operated by high-type firms, come from two sources. First, there is creative de-
struction coming from low-type firms, which takes place at the rate τL per product line
(and hence multiplied by µH0 ). Second, the high-type firm operating this product line
has a successful incremental innovation, which takes place at the rate ξ (similarly mul-
tiplied by µH0 ). Inflows into this state are due to creative destruction coming from the
high-type firm, which takes place at the rate τH (multiplied by the fraction of all product
lines except those that are already in this state, thus
(
1 − µH0
)
), or due to a low-type firm
operating a product line at n = 0 changing its type to high, which adds the flow rate
φµL0 . The other lines are explained similarly, except that creative destruction coming from
high-type firms also generates outflows for n > 1, and there is no inflow coming from
incremental innovations for product lines with n > n∗ since high-type firms switch to
radical innovation at n = n∗.31
The flow equations for the low-type product lines can be written similarly and have
a similar intuition
Outflow Inflow(
τH + ξ + φ
)
µL0 = (1 − µL0 )τL for n = 0(
τL + τH + ξ + φ
)
µLn = ξµ
L
n−1 for n > 0
.
The creative destruction rates from low-type and high-type firms, in turn, can be com-
puted as
τL = x (1 − ζ) and τH = xζ + M
∫ a∗
0
ΛθH q̄adF (a) + ψΛθH ∑∞n=0 µHn ,
where x is the entry rate, F(a) denotes the stationary distribution of manager age, a∗ is
the threshold below which managers are hired by firms to perform radical innovations,
and ψΛθH ∑∞n=0 µHn is the rate of radical innovations for high-type firms which applies
31These equations are written under the assumption that n∗ > 0. When n∗ = 0, high-type firms never
undertake incremental innovations, and thus the flow equations become τLµH0 = (1 − µH0 )τH + φµL0 for
n = n∗ = 0, and
(
τL + τH
)
µHn = φµ
L
n for n > n∗ = 0.
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regardless of whether they pursue a radical innovation strategy. Low-type firms, on the
other hand, generate creative destruction only when they initially enter the economy
(since they do not engage in radical innovation). Given these quantities, the total creative
destruction rate of the economy is given as
τ = τL + τH.
To derive the aggregate growth rate, we combine (2.1) with (2.2) to obtain
Y =
L
1 − β
[
(1 − β)
γ
] 1−β
β
q̄.
The growth rate of the economy is then equal to the growth of the average quality q̄t.
After a time interval ∆t > 0, the average quality is given by
q̄t+∆t = q̄t + ηq̄tτ∆t + q̄tηξ∆t
[
∑n
∗−1
n=0 µ
H
n α
n+1 + ∑∞n=0 µLnαn+1
]
+ o(∆t),
where we have used the fact that all radical innovations come from creative destruction,
which takes place at the rate τ, and o(∆t) denotes terms that are second order in ∆t. The
growth rate of the economy in the stationary equilibrium can then be computed as
g = ητ + ηξ
[
∑n
∗−1
n=0 µ
H
n α
n+1 + ∑∞n=0 µLnαn+1
]
. (2.17)
2.2.7 Equilibrium With κ < 1
In this subsection, we turn to the general case with κ < 1. We will show that the
structure of the equilibrium is similar, except that now the switch to radical innovation
for high-type firms will depend both on their current productivity and on their prior
incremental innovations.
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The value of a product line operated by low- and high-type firms can now be written,
respectively, as:
rVL
(
qj, n
)
− V̇L
(
qj, n
)
= maxa
{
πqj + q̄t f (a)− wa,t
}
+ ξ
[
VL
(
qj + ηn+1, n + 1
)
− VL
(
qj, n
)]
− τVL
(
qj, n
)
+ φ
[
VH
(
qj, n
)
− VL
(
qj, n
)]
,
and
rVH
(
qj, n
)
− V̇H
(
qj, n
)
= max

πqj + maxa
q̄t f (a)− wa,t + ξ
 VH (qj + ηn+1, n + 1)
−VH
(
qj, n
)
 ;
πqj + maxa≥0 {q̄t f (a) + ΛθH q̄aEVH(t)− wa,t}

− τVH
(
qj, n
)
+ ψΛθHEVH(t).
Here note that, with a slight abuse of notation, we wrote EVH(t) instead of EVH(q̄t)
for the value of a new radical innovation, since this depends in general not just on average
current productivity in the economy, q̄t, but also on the distribution of product lines across
different states. All the same, in the stationary equilibrium it will clearly grow at the same
rate as q̄t, g. Second, ηn is now a function of both the current productivity of the firm and
the average current productivity in the economy, q̄t.
With an argument similar to that in the previous subsection, the equilibrium wage
schedule for managers will be given by
wa,t =

f (a) q̄t for a > a∗
f (a) q̄t + ΛθH
[
q̄a − q̄a∗
]
EVH(t) for a ≤ a∗
This enables us to write simplified versions of the value functions as:
rVL
(
qj, n
)
− V̇L
(
qj, n
)
= πqj + ξ
[
VL
(
qj + ηn+1, n + 1
)
− VL
(
qj, n
)]
− τVL
(
qj, n
)
+ φ
[
VH
(
qj, n
)
− VL
(
qj, n
)]
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and
rVH
(
qj, n
)
− V̇H
(
qj, n
)
= max
 πqj + ξ
[
VH
(
qj + ηn+1, n + 1
)
− VH
(
qj, n
)]
;
πqj + ΛθH q̄a
∗
EVH(t)

− τVH
(
qj, n
)
+ ψΛθHEVH(t).
Proposition 5. Consider the economy with κ < 1. Then, for a product line with current quality
q operated by a high-type firm, the manager will be younger and will pursue radical innovation
when the number of prior incremental innovations is greater than or equal to n∗t (q), where n
∗
t (q)
is increasing in q. That is, a high-type firm is more likely to pursue radical innovation when its
current productivity is lower and the number of its prior innovations in the same cluster is higher.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition thus establishes that in this generalized setup (with κ < 1), the main
results from Proposition 4 continue to hold, but in addition we obtain the result that
radical innovation is more likely when a high-type firm has lower current productivity
(conditional on its prior number of incremental innovations); or conversely, for a given
level of productivity, it is more likely when there has been a greater number of prior
incremental innovations. We will investigate this additional implication in our firm-level
analysis.32
2.3 Data and Variable Construction
In this section, we describe the various datasets we use and our data construction.
We also provide some basic descriptive statistics.
32This result is related to the idea of “disruptive innovations” proposed in Christensen (1997). This result
also clarifies that our potential answer to the innovator’s dilemma, consistent both with Arrow’s replacement
effect and the results presented below, is that successful firms with higher sales have more to fear from
disruptive innovations and tend to retrench and become less open to new ideas, practices and innovations.
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2.3.1 Data Sources
USPTO Utility Patents Grant Data (PDP) The patent grant data are obtained from the
NBER Patent Database Project (PDP) and contain data for all 3,279,509 utility patents
granted between the years 1976-2006 by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). This dataset contains extensive information on each granted patent, including
the unique patent number, a unique identifier for the assignee, the nationality of the
assignee, the technology class, and backward and forward citations in the sample up to
2006. Following a dynamic assignment procedure, we link this dataset to the Compustat
dataset, which we next describe.33
Compustat North American Fundamentals We draw our main sample from the Com-
pustat data for publicly traded firms in North America. This data set contains balance
sheet items reported by the companies annually between 1974 and 2006. It contains 29,378
different companies, and 390,467 company × year observations. The main variables of in-
terest are net sales, employment, firm age (defined as time since entry into the Compustat
sample), SIC code, R&D expenditures, total liabilities, net income, and plant property and
equipment as a proxy for physical capital.
Executive Compensation Data (Execucomp) Standard and Poor’s Execucomp provides
information on the age of the top executives of a company starting from 1992. We use
information on CEO age or the average age of (top) managers of a company to construct
proxies for openness to disruption at the firm level.34
The Careers and Co-Authorship Networks of U.S. Patent Inventors Extensive infor-
mation on the inventors of patents granted in the United States between years 1975-2008
33Details on the assignment procedure are provided at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/.
34We drop observations where reported CEO age is less than 26.
89
is obtained from the dataset of Lai et al. (2009). These authors use inventor names and
addresses as well as patent characteristics to generate unique inventor identifiers upon
which we heavily draw. Their dataset contains 8,031,908 observations at the patent × in-
ventor level, and 2,229,219 unique inventors, and can be linked to the PDP dataset using
the unique patent number assigned by the USPTO.
Cross-Country Data on Manager Age We also collected data on the age of the CEOs
and CFOs of the 25 largest listed companies for 37 countries. We selected the top 25
companies, when available, according to the Financial Times’ FT-500 list, which ranks
firms according to their market capitalization. We completed the list by using information
from transnationale.org when the FT-500 did not include 25 companies for a country. We
then obtained the age of the CEOs and CFOs from the websites of the companies. Overall,
our dataset has on average 20 companies and 31.6 managers (CEO or CFO) per country.
National Culture Dimensions The Dutch social scientist Geert Hofstede devised five
different indices of national culture: power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, mas-
culinity vs. femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. The initial sur-
vey was conducted among IBM employees in 30 countries to understand cross-country
differences in corporate culture. This work has been expanded with additional surveys
that have been answered by members of other professions and expanded to 80 coun-
tries (see Hofstede (2001), and Hofstede et al. (2010)).35 We use the individualism and
uncertainty avoidance measures below.
The individualism measure is defined as “a preference for a loosely-knit social frame-
work in which individuals are expected to take care of themselves and their immediate
families only.” A low individualism score is indicative of a more collectivist society, where
social safety networks are more common and individuals are influenced by collective
goals and constraints.
35http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html
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The uncertainty avoidance measure expresses the degree to which the members of a
society seek to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity. Countries with a higher score are more
rigid in terms of belief and behavior and are more intolerant of unorthodox ideas. On
the other end of the spectrum, societies with a low score are more welcoming to new
ideas and value practice above principles. Both the individualism and the uncertainty
avoidance indices are normalized to lie between 0 and 1.
Other Data Sources We use the average years of schooling in secondary education from
the Barro-Lee dataset as a proxy of the human capital of a country.36 We also use real
GDP per capita numbers and R&D intensity from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators database.
In our baseline analysis, we focus on a balanced panel of firms, with complete infor-
mation on all variables used in our cross-sectional analysis. To maximize the number of
observations in this balanced panel, we focus on the years between 1995 and 2000, so ci-
tation and patents information in our baseline results come from 1995-2000 (with patents
classified according to their year of application). We then extend our analysis to an un-
balanced panel spanning 1992-2004 (we cannot go earlier than 1992 because our manager
age data start at the state, and we cannot go further than 2004 as we need a subsequent
window during which to measure citations). We also use citations from 1995-2000 in our
cross-country analysis.
2.3.2 Variable Construction
Innovation Quality Our baseline measure of innovation quality is the number of cita-
tions a patent received as of 2006. We also use the truncation correction weights devised
by Hall et al. (2001) to correct for systematic citation differences across different technol-
ogy classes and also for the fact that earlier patents will have more years during which
36http://www.barrolee.com/data/dataexp.htm. See Barro and Lee (2013) for details.
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they can receive citations (we also experiment with counting citations during a five-year
window for each patent). Based on this variable, an average innovation quality variable is
generated at the company × year and country × year levels. For our cross-country dataset,
the country of the assignee is used to determine the country to which the patent belongs.
Superstar Fraction A superstar inventor is defined as an inventor who surpasses his or
her peers in the quality of patents generated as observed in the sample. A score for each
unique inventor is generated by calculating the average quality of all the patents in which
the inventor took part. All inventors are ranked according to this score, and the top 5%
are considered to be superstar inventors. The superstar fraction of a company or country
in a given year is calculated as the fraction of patents with superstar inventors in that year
(if a patent has more than one inventor, it gets a fractional superstar designation equal
to the ratio of superstar inventors to the total number of inventors of the patent). The
country of the inventor is determined according to the country of the patent assignee.
Tail Innovations The tail innovation index is defined as the fraction of patents of a
firm or country that receive more than a certain number of citations (once again using
the truncation correction weights of Hall et al. (2001)). Namely, let s f t(p) denote the
number of the patents of a firm (or country) that are above the pth percentile of the year t
distribution according to citations. Then, the tail innovation index is defined as
Tail f t(p) =
s f t(p)
s f t(0.50)
,
where p > 0.50. This is of course also equivalent to the ratio of the number of patents by
firm f at time t with citations above the pth percentile divided by the number of patents
by firm f at time t with citations above the median (and is not defined for firms that have
no patents with citations above the median). For our baseline measure of tail innovations,
we choose p = 0.99, so that our measure is the fraction of patents of a firm or country
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that are at the 99th percentile of citations divided by the fraction of patents that are at the
median of citations. The reason we include s f t(0.50) in the denominator is that we would
like to capture whether, controlling for “average” innovation output, some companies,
innovators or countries have the tendency for generating “tail innovations” with very
high citations.37
Generality and Originality We also use the generality and originality indices devised
by Hall et al. (2001). Let i ∈ I denote a technology class and sij ∈ [0, 1] denote the
share of citations that patent j receives from patents in technology class i (of course with
∑i∈I sij = 1). Then for a patent j with positive citations, we define
generalityj = 1 − ∑
i∈I
s2ij.
This index thus measures the dispersion of the citations received by a patent in terms of
the technology classes of citing patents. Greater dispersion of citations is interpreted as
a sign of greater generality. The originality index is defined similarly except that we use
the citations it gives to other patents. Both indices are averaged across all of the patents of
a firm or a country to obtain our firm-level and cross-country generality and originality
indices. The patent classes used are the 80 two-digit International Patent Classification
(IPC) classes.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 21 provides descriptive statistics for our balanced firm, unbalanced
firm and cross-country samples. Since we focus on regressions weighted by the number
of patents held by a company or country, all statistics are weighted by the number of
patents. We multiply our indices for tail innovation, superstar fraction, generality, and
37If we do not include the correction in the denominator, all of the results reported below continue to hold,
and are in fact stronger. When we turn to patent-level regressions, we will not be able to include such a
correction (since there are no other patents that can be included in the denominator).
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R&D intensity by 100.
The table shows that average manager age is 52.3 in our firm-level (balanced or un-
balanced Compustat) sample and 56.1 in our cross-country sample, while average CEO
age is 55.3 in the balanced sample and 55.5 in the unbalanced sample. The comparison of
our average number of citations per patent, superstar fraction, tail innovation, and gen-
erality indices shows that, as expected, our Compustat firms have higher values than the
average country.
Panels B and C present the firm-level and cross-section country correlations between
our main measures of creativity of innovations, which are quite highly correlated except
for the generality index at the firm level. Panel D of Table 21 presents the correlation
between our three cross-country indices of openness to disruption. These three indices
are also highly correlated.
2.4 Firm-Level and Patent-Level Results
Our main empirical results exploit firm-level variation in manager age across Com-
pustat companies. Recall that in our theory manager age is in part an indicator of a
corporate culture that is open to disruption (because high-type firms that have a compet-
itive advantage in radical innovation select to hire younger managers). But there is also a
causal effect of manager age on creative innovations since, conditional on being employed
by such a firm, a young manager contributes to radical/creative innovations (because of
her more recent knowledge stock). Motivated by this reasoning, in this section we start
with the cross-sectional relationship between firm-level measures of creative innovations
and manager age (emphasizing throughout that our estimates do not necessarily corre-
spond to the causal effect of manager age on creative innovations).38 We then turn to
38Another caveat is that our theoretical results relate manager age at the product-line level to the innovation
strategy and creativity of innovations, while the bulk of our empirical analysis in this section will be at the
firm level focusing on the age of a firm’s CEO (or top managers).
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a more direct investigation of the effect of manager age on creative innovations, focus-
ing on regressions that exploit “within-firm” variation, and also investigate the timing
of increases in creative innovations at the firm level and the relationship of this to our
structural parameters.
2.4.1 Baseline Results
Our baseline results are presented in Table 22. Our estimating equation is
y f = αm f + X′f fi + δi( f ) + ε f , (2.18)
where y f is one of our measures of creative innovations introduced in the previous section
(innovation quality, superstar fraction, tail innovation, or generality) for firm f , and m f is
our firm-level measure of openness to disruption, the average age of company CEOs over
our sample window. In addition, X f is a vector of controls, in this case, firm age, log of
employment, log of sales, and log of total number of patents during our time window (we
do not have measures of the human capital of the firm’s employees).39 Controlling for
firm age is particularly important to distinguish the correlation of creativity of innovations
with manager age from its correlation with firm age. In addition, δi( f ) denotes a full set
of four-digit main SIC dummies, so that the comparisons are always across firms within
a fairly narrow industry.40 Finally, ε f is the error term.
Our baseline sample comprises 279 firms with complete information on CEO and
positive patents between 1995 and 2000 (as well as information on firm age, sales, and
employment). As noted above, we first exploit only cross-sectional information, so our
regressions have one observation per firm, and are weighted with the total patent count
of the firm, so that they put less weight on observations for which our measures of
39Our log employment and log sales variables in the cross-sectional regressions are computed as averages
of annual log employment and log sales.
40All firms in our baseline sample are in one of 120 four-digit SIC industries.
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creative innovations are computed from only a few patents. All standard errors are robust
against heteroscedasticity. Different columns of Table 22 correspond to our four different
measures of creative innovations.
Column 1 shows an economically sizable correlation between CEO age and our mea-
sure of innovation quality (average number of citations per patent). The coefficient esti-
mate, −0.278 (standard error = 0.088), is statistically significant at 1% and indicates that
companies with a younger CEO have greater innovation quality. We interpret this pattern
as evidence that companies that are more open to disruption tend to be the ones pro-
ducing more creative innovations. The quantitative magnitudes are significant and also
plausible. For example, a one-year increase in CEO age is associated with a 0.278 increase
in average citations, which is approximately 1.3% of the firm-level weighted mean of our
innovation quality variable (20.5).
The pattern of the covariates is also interesting. Firm age is negatively associated
with innovation quality, suggesting that younger firms are more creative (though this
pattern is not as robust as the impact of CEO age in other specifications). Our mea-
sures of creative innovations are also uncorrelated with employment and sales, and are
largely uncorrelated with the number of patents held by the firm (the exception being a
marginally significant relationship for tail innovations). This confirms that our measures
of creativity of innovations are quite distinct from the total number of patents.
Column 2 shows a similar relationship with the superstar fraction (−0.300, standard
error = 0.141). This also suggests that younger CEOs tend to work with higher-quality
innovators (a relationship we directly investigate in Table 29 below). Columns 3 and 4
show even more precisely estimated (significant at 1% or less) and economically large re-
lationships with our measures of tail innovations and generality. The implied quantitative
magnitudes are a little larger with the superstar fraction and tail innovation measures (a
one-year increase in CEO age is associated with, respectively, 2.4% and 5.5% increases
relative to weighted sample means in these two measures).
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Overall, these results suggest that there is a strong statistical and quantitative rela-
tionship between the age of the CEO of a Compustat company and each one of our four
measures of creative innovations. We next investigate the robustness of these patterns.
2.4.2 Robustness
Tables 23 and 24 probe the robustness of our firm-level results in different dimensions.
Table 23 looks at the alternative measures of creative innovations (these are a measure of
innovation quality using average citations per patent computed using only five years of
citations data, a measure of superstar inventors using information on the most highly
cited patent of the inventor, the tail innovation index with p = 0.90, and the originality
index). The results show that the pattern is quite similar to those in Table 22, except that
the relationship is no longer statistically significant with the alternative measure of the
superstar fraction.
Table 24 looks at several different robustness exercises. Panel A replaces the four-
digit SIC dummies with three-digit dummies (a total of 84 in our baseline sample), with
effects very similar to our baseline results.
Panel B goes in the opposite direction and enriches the set of controls. In particular,
this specification, in addition to the four-digit SIC dummies, includes several other firm-
level controls: profitability (income to sales ratio), debt to sales ratio, and log physical
capital of the firm. The results are virtually the same as those in Table 22, but a little more
precisely estimated. For example, CEO age is statistically significant at less than 1% with
all of our measures of creative innovations, except for the superstar fraction, for which it
is significant at 5%.
Panel C, in addition, adds R&D intensity (R&D to sales ratio) to the previous speci-
fication.41 This is intended to verify that our results cannot be explained by some firms
41To deal with outliers in R&D expenditures, we winsorize this variable at its 99th percentile value.
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performing more R&D than others (here the sample declines to 257 companies). The
results are once again very similar to those in our baseline regressions in Table 22.
Panel D uses the average age of the top management team rather than CEO age.
We prefer CEO age as our baseline measure because across companies there is consider-
able variation in the number of managers for which age data are available, making this
measure potentially less comparable across firms. Nevertheless, the relationship is very
similar to this measure as shown in Panel D.
Panels E and F reestimate the specifications in Table 22 for subsamples of high-tech
and low-tech firms, where high-tech firms are those in SIC 35 and 36 (industrial and com-
mercial machinery and equipment and computer equipment; and electronic and other
electrical equipment and components), and low-tech firms are the rest. This is intended
to check whether our results are driven by a subset of firms and whether they are differen-
tial between these two subsamples. The results are fairly similar in these two subsamples,
except for the superstar fraction variable, which shows a considerably stronger relation-
ship for the low-tech sample.
2.4.3 Panel Results
We now show that, though naturally much noisier, the correlation between CEO
age and creative innovations is present when we exploit within-firm variation in the age
of the CEO. We will also document, however, that consistent with our theory, creative
innovations start increasing before there is a decline in CEO age.
With this objective in mind, in Table 25 we start with our baseline balanced sample,
but now we compute our measures of creativity of innovations at an annual frequency.
The covariates we use are also at an annual frequency and include a full set of year
dummies. As a first step, in Panel A, we maintain our key right-hand-side variable,
average CEO age over the sample period, which is thus held constant across years in
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this panel. In this table, standard errors are robust for arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the
firm level (thus allowing for arbitrary dependence across the observations for the same
firm). These specifications are directly comparable to those in Table 22, and indeed, the
coefficient estimates and standard errors are very similar (though they are not identical
since the covariates are now time-varying).42
Panel B extends our sample in two different ways. First, we include firms that were
left out of the balanced panel (i.e., firms for which CEO age or patent information is
available in some but not all years). Second, with the unbalanced panel, we can now
consider a longer sample spanning 1992 − 2004 (we cannot go before 1992 because of
lack of data on manager age, and we prefer not to go beyond 2004, as this would make
the citation window too short and thus our measures much less reliable). The resulting
sample has 7111 observations (or 5803 observations with tail innovation, since we lose
firm-years when no patent is above the median of the citation distribution). Despite the
increase in the number of firms to 1256 (from 279) and the addition of seven more years of
data, the results are remarkably similar to those in Panel A and to our baseline estimates.
Panel C allows CEO age to vary across years but also includes firm fixed effects as
well as year effects (and, of course, in this case, SIC industry dummies and firm age
are dropped). This effectively means that the CEO age variable is being identified from
changes in CEOs.43 Hence, this is a demanding specification investigating whether in
years when a firm has a younger CEO, it tends to have more creative innovations, and
this motivates our choice of focusing on the 1992 − 2004 sample for this exercise. In
addition to throwing away all of the between-firm variation, another challenge to finding
meaningful results in this specification is that patent applications in one year are often
the result of research and product selection from several past years.44 Though these
42The number of observations is now lower in columns 3 and 4 because not all firms have patents with
citations above the median (for tail innovations) or with positive citations (for generality) in all years.
43This specification is related to the famous Bertrand and Schoar (2003) paper on the effect of managers
on corporate policies though, in contrast to our focus on CEOs, their sample includes chief financial and
operating officers as well as lower-level executives.
44Recall, however, that patents are classified according to their year of application, so we are investigating
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considerations stack the cards against finding a significant relationship between CEO age
and creative innovations, the results are generally quite consistent with our cross-sectional
estimates from the balanced panel. All of the coefficient estimates in these within-firm
regressions, except for generality, have the same sign and are statistically significant as in
our baseline results in Table 22. For innovation quality, the magnitude of the estimate is
about 12% larger than the specification without fixed effects in Panel B (e.g., −0.188 vs.
−0.168), whereas for superstar fraction and tail innovations, it is smaller—about 47% to
73% of the magnitude in Panel B.
The current CEO/manager influences the contemporaneous innovation strategy, and
in our model, this has an immediate impact on radical innovations. In practice, some of
the impact is likely to be delayed, since research projects, and even patenting, can take
several years. We may therefore expect the impact of the CEO’s human capital, decisions
and age to influence the creativity of innovations over time. We investigate this issue
in Panel D by including current CEO age and lagged CEO age simultaneously. Our
results show that, with all of our measures of creative innovations (except generality),
both matter with quantitatively similar magnitudes.
A related question concerns separating the impact of the current CEO from the per-
sistent effects of past innovations—in particular, past creativity may spill over into current
creativity in part because patents from the same project may arrive in the course of sev-
eral years. We investigate this issue by including the lagged dependent variable on the
right-hand side. Though such a model, with fixed effects and lagged dependent variable,
is not consistently estimated by the standard within estimator when the coefficient on the
lagged dependent variable is close to 1, the results in Panel E show that its coefficient is
very far from 1 and the estimates are fairly similar to those in Panel C.45
the impact of CEO age not on patents granted when the CEO is in charge but on patents applied for when
the CEO is in charge.
45If we estimate these models using the GMM estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991), the results are
similar with innovation quality and superstar fraction, but weaker with the tail innovation index, partly
because we lose about a quarter of our sample with these GMM models.
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Finally, in Panel F we turn to the more detailed longitudinal implications of our
model—that creativity of innovations should increase, on average, before the firm
switches to a younger manager. The simplest way of investigating this prediction is by in-
cluding the lead of CEO age together with current CEO age (similar to the specification in
Panel D, except that lead CEO age replaces lagged CEO age). The specifications reported
in Panel F show statistically significant negative effects of both current and lead CEO age
on the creativity of innovations (except with the generality measure). Interestingly, and
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the magnitudes of the lead and the contemporaneous
effects are quite similar. The significant effect of lead CEO age is prima facie evidence of
the importance of sorting of younger CEOs to firms that are firms that are more open to
disruption (more likely to have creative innovations).
Although the results in Panel F suggest that both the sorting and the causal effects
of CEO/manager age are important for the creativity of innovations, they do not di-
rectly translate into an estimate of the impact of CEO/manager age on creative innova-
tions for a given firm (because changes in CEO age are associated with changes in firm
type/corporate culture as well as the firm’s prior number of incremental innovations).
We next turn to an indirect inference procedure utilizing the structure of our model to
obtain an estimate of the size of this causal effect.
2.4.4 The Causal Effect of Manager Age on Creative Innovations
In this subsection, we perform a simple indirect inference exercise in order to shed
further light on the causal effect of manager age on creative innovations. We choose the
parameters of the model presented in Section 2.2 so that the model quantitatively matches
the reduced-form estimates—in particular, the coefficients of lead and current CEO age
for innovation quality. We then use these implied parameters to compute the implied
causal effect of manager age on creative innovations given these parameters.
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The (average) impact of a younger manager on the creativity of innovations for a
given firm type is 1F(a∗)
∫ a∗
0 ΛθH q̄
adF (a) = ΛθHδg+δ
[1−e−(g+δ)a
∗
]
[1−e−δa∗ ]
. Because of the sorting of
younger managers to firms that are more open to disruption, we cannot read off this
quantity from our reduced-form empirical exercise. Rather, we need to obtain estimates
of the parameters ψ and ΛθH (the parameters Λ and θH do not matter separately, and
thus in what follows, we will treat ΛθH as a single parameter). The reduced-form coeffi-
cient estimates are functions of these parameters, but they also depend on the transitions
between high-type and low-type firms, the distribution of incremental innovations per
product relative to the threshold for radical innovation, n∗, and the stationary distribu-
tions theoretically characterized above.
Though structurally estimating all of the underlying parameters of our model would
require more information on firm transitions and stationary distributions, we can obtain
estimates of the structural parameters that are relevant for the extent of the causal effect
of CEO age on creative innovations from a simple indirect inference exercise. For this
exercise, we set the discount rate to ρ = 0.02, and normalize the profit flow to π = 1
(which is without loss of any generality). We fit an exponential distribution to the age
distribution of managers in our sample to obtain an estimate of δ in the model. We
take the entry rate to be x = 5% which corresponds to the entry rate in our Compustat
sample. Finally, we take the parameter α, which determines how rapidly the productivity
of incremental innovations declines from Akcigit and Kerr (2015), who estimate a similar
parameter from the patent citation distribution.
This leaves the following parameter vector Ψ ≡ {ψ, φ, ΛθH, ξ, η, ζ} to be determined.
Once these parameter values have also been fixed, optimal innovation decisions and equi-
librium stationary distributions can be computed using the expressions provided in Sec-
tion 2.2. We can then generate simulated firm histories from which the equivalents of the
reduced-form regression coefficients in Table 25 can be computed. Of particular impor-
tance for this exercise are the specifications in Panels C and F of Table 25, where various
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measures of creative innovations were regressed on current CEO age (and lead CEO age
in Panel F), firm fixed effects and controls.
Let us denote the coefficient estimate on current CEO age in column 1, Panel C of
Table 25 by γcurrent, and the coefficient estimates on current and lead CEO age in column
1, Panel F, respectively, by γ′current and γ
′
lead. In our indirect inference procedure, we
will target these three parameters. Specifically, we generate data from the model given
a parameter vector Ψ, and convert the measure of successful radical innovation in the
model, which is a 0-1 variable, into the same units as our innovation quality variable (by
dividing it by its variance and multiplying it with the variance of innovation quality). We
then run the same regression as in Panel C and F of Table 25, and compare the estimates
to the empirical estimates of γcurrent, γ′current and γ
′
lead.
In addition to these three regression coefficients, our indirect inference procedure
targets three central moments in the data: the average annual growth rate of (real) sales
per worker, within-firm coefficient of variation of radical innovations, and the fraction of
incremental innovations, measured as fraction of internal patents which mainly build on
innovating firm’s existing lines (as opposed to innovating on product lines operated by
other firms).46 This implies that we have in total six data moments and six parameters.
Finally, we make two additional assumptions in matching the model to data. First, in
the model managers are employed at the product line level, whereas in the data we only
observe managers/CEO at the level of the company (which comprises several product
lines). We ignore this distinction, and treat the data as if it were generated from one
product firms. Second, in the model, the identity of the manager/CEO is indeterminate
as there are no costs of changing managers, so a firm could change its manager every
instant or at some regular interval even without changing its innovation strategy. To make
the model more comparable to the data, we assume that a firm keeps its manager until
46Following Akcigit and Kerr (2015), we define internal patents as those whose majority of citations are
self cites.
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it needs to switch from an older to a younger manager in order to change its innovation
strategy.
Table 26 provides the values of the parameters we have selected on the basis of exter-
nal data as well as the values of the parameters in the vector Ψ, which are chosen to match
the six aforementioned moments. Table 27 shows the match between the values of these
moments in the data and those implied by the model. The model-implied numbers are
on the whole very close to the targeted empirical moments. The most important lesson
from Table 27 is that the model is quite consistent with reduced-form regression results,
including the significant and sizable coefficient on lead CEO age, which is generated by
the fact that ψ > 0 and is a non-trivial source of creative innovations.
The implied pattern is also visible in Figures 11 and 12, which plot the probability of
a creative innovation and the average CEO age as a function of time since switching to
high-type. These figures show that firms slowly reduce the average age of their managers
after switching to high-type (if at first they are below n∗, they do not need to change their
CEO). Correspondingly, they also slowly increase their probability of creative innovations.
Because much of this increase in the probability of creative innovations takes place before
firms switch to a younger manager, in the reduced-form regressions it will be captured
by lead CEO age.
It is also useful to gauge whether, at these estimated parameter values, the model
performs well on some other dimensions. One empirical moment we have not used for
estimation is the probability of firms switching to younger managers. At the estimated
parameter values, 6% of all firms attempt a radical innovation (these are high-type firms
with n ≥ n∗). Consequently, “young” managers (defined as those with a < a∗ in Proposi-
tion 4) also make up 6% of the population of managers, implying that a∗ corresponds to
age 43 in our sample of managers/CEOs. Using this information, we can then compare
the annual probability of a firm switching from an old manager (with a > a∗) to a young
manager (with a ≤ a∗) in the data and in the model. Reassuringly, these two numbers are
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very close to each other, respectively 0.62% and 0.63%.
Using these parameter estimates, we next compute the “causal effect” of manager
age on creative innovations. There are several ways in which such a causal effect might
be defined. First, we could define the causal effect in a fashion analogous to “treatment
effect on the treated,” by considering the loss of creative innovation that firms that were
previously hiring young managers and pursuing radical innovations would suffer. Sec-
ond, one could focus on the “average treatment effect,” corresponding to the impact of
having a younger manager for an average firm in our sample. It is intuitive that these two
measures of causal effects will be quite different, since, as just noted, only 6% of firms are
attempting radical innovations in our stationary distribution.
For the first, we start with the equilibrium stationary distribution and reshuffle man-
agers only among firms attempting radical innovation (which are high-types with more
than n∗ incremental innovations and hiring managers younger than a∗), and we repeat
this for 13 periods. Because such firms will continue to attempt radical innovation after
the reshuffling (since the reshuffling involves only managers younger than a∗), the change
in the likelihood of radical innovation of any given firm captures the causal effect of a
younger (or older) manager on a firm attempting radical innovation. We quantify this
effect by running the same regression of the likelihood of radical innovation on the age of
manager for this subsample of firms (corresponding to Panel C) and then comparing it to
the reduced-form relationship between these two variables in the model-generated data,
−0.211 (as reported in Table 27).47 The resulting causal effect is estimated as −0.040. This
effect is thus considerably smaller than the reduced-form regression coefficient of −0.211,
though it should not be directly compared to this number, which applies to the entire
sample, while the causal effect of −0.040 is only for 6% of the entire sample. To obtain a
causal effect estimate more comparable to the reduced-form relationship, we next turn to
47We use the regression coefficient obtained from model-generated data rather than the regression coef-
ficient from Table 25, −0.188, since this will be compared to numbers also obtained from model-generated
data.
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the average treatment effect.
For this second exercise, we again start with the stationary distribution and reshuffle
managers randomly for 13 periods. We assume that after the reshuffling, each firm will
pursue the same innovation strategy.48 We then use the data generated by this thought
experiment to run a regression of the likelihood of a radical innovation on manager age
for the entire sample of firms (including both low-type firms and high-type firms not
attempting a radical innovation). This exercise yields an average causal effect of −0.003,
and thus accounts approximately for 1.5% (≃ 0.003/0.211) of the relationship between
CEO age and creative innovations. The rest of this relationship is explained by sorting
effects—because it is high-type firms that are hiring younger managers.
It is intuitive that the first estimate of the causal effect is much larger than the second,
because it explicitly focuses on the small subsample of firms attempting a radical inno-
vation. But even in this case, especially once we take into account that this causal effect
applies only to 6% of the sample of firms that are attempting a radical innovation, much
of the association between manager age and creative innovations is accounted for by the
sorting of younger managers to firms that are more open to disruption.
Overall, our indirect inference exercise establishes that the model can generate the
patterns we see in the data, and implies that much of the reduced-form relationship
between manager age and creative innovations is due to sorting, but also that there is a
small causal effect of younger managers on creative innovations as well.
48It is possible that some firms would switch their innovation strategy because they end up with much
older or much younger managers. However, whether this is the case or not would also depend on managerial
wages after reshuffling, which in turn depends on a variety of auxiliary assumptions on wage determination
under “mismatch”. Our strategy avoids this complication, but estimates a lower bound on this effect, though
this lower bound is likely to be fairly tight since low-type firms cannot change their innovation strategy and
most high-type firms would be unlikely to alter their innovation strategy unless there is a very large change
in the age of the manager assigned to them.
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2.4.5 Inventor Age and Creativity of Innovations
We next turn to patent-level regressions to investigate the relationship between the
age of inventor—defined as any inventor listed in our patent data—and our various mea-
sures of creativity of innovations. Though in our theoretical model there is no distinction
between managers and inventors, this distinction is of course important in practice. One
might then expect the role of product-line managers in our model to be played partly by
the top management of the firm and partly by inventors (or the lead inventor) working
on a particular R&D project. CEOs, then, not only decide which projects the company
should focus on but also choose the research team. In this subsection, we bring in infor-
mation on the age of inventors in order to investigate the effect of manager/inventor age
on the creativity of innovations once we control for the type of characteristics of the firm.
We use unique inventor identifiers from Lai et al. (2009) described above to create a
proxy for this variable. Our proxy is the number of years since the first innovation of the
inventor, which we will refer to as “inventor age.”
Our main regression in this subsection will be at the patent level and take the form
yi f t = ϕIi f t + αm f t + X′i f tfi + δ f + γi + dt + ε i f t. (2.19)
Here yi f t is one of our measures of the creativity of innovation for (patent) i granted to
firm f at time t. Our key right-hand-side variable is Ii f t, the age of the inventors named
in patent i (in practice, there is often more than one such inventor listed for a patent). In
addition, m f t is defined as CEO age at time t and will be included in some regressions,
Xi f t is a vector of possible controls, and δ f denotes a full set of firm fixed effects, so that
our specifications here exploit differences in the creativity of innovations of a single firm
as a function of the characteristics of the innovators involved in the relevant patent. In
our core specifications, we also control for a set of dummies, denoted by γi, related to
inventor characteristics as we describe below. All specifications also control for a full set
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of year effects, denoted by dt, and ε i f t is the error term.49
The results from the estimation of (2.19) are reported in Table 28. In Panel A we
focus on a specification similar to the regressions with firm fixed effects reported in Table
25. This is useful for showing that this different frame still replicates the results showing
the impact of CEO age on creativity of innovations. In particular, Panel A focuses on
Compustat firms for the period 1992 − 2004 and includes the same set of controls as in
Table 25 Panel C (firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, log employment, log sales and log
patents of the firm); it does not contain any variables related to inventor characteristics.
As in the rest of this table, these regressions are not weighted (since they are at the patent
level) and the standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level.
Our results using this specification are similar to those of Panel C of Table 25, though
a little smaller. In column 1, for instance, we see an estimate of −0.119 (standard error
= 0.038) compared to −0.188 in Table 25. We cannot define our measure of the superstar
fraction and tail innovations in these patent-level regressions. We can, however, look at a
patent-level measure related to tail innovations, a dummy for the patent in question being
above the pth percentile of the citation distribution. We report results using this measure
for two values, p = 0.99 and p = 0.90, in columns 2 and 3. Both of these measures
are negatively correlated with CEO age, though only marginally significantly in these
specifications.50
Panel B goes in the other direction and reports the estimates of a model that controls
for inventor characteristics and looks at the impact of inventor age, without controlling for
CEO age, for the same sample as in Panel A (thus restricting it to firms with information
on CEO age). As with all of the other models reported in this table, in Panel B we control
49A single patent can appear multiple times in our sample if it belongs to multiple firms, but this is very
rare and applies to less than 0.2% of the patents in our sample.
50For completeness, we also show results with the generality index, even though the results in Table 25
already indicated that, with firm fixed effects included, there is no longer a significant relationship between
CEO age and the generality index, and this lack of relationship persists for all of the estimates we report in
Table 28 (and for this reason, though we do show them for completeness, we will not discuss them in detail).
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for a full set of dummies for the maximum number of patents of any inventor associated
with the patent in question has over our sample period;51 a full set of dummies for the
size of the inventor team (i.e., how many inventors are listed); and a full set of dummies
for the three-digit IPC class.52 The inclusion of this rich set of dummy variables enables us
to compare inventors of similar productivity. It thus approximates a model that includes
a full set of inventor dummies.53 The results show that there is a strong relationship
between inventor age and the creativity of innovations. For example, in column 1, the
coefficient estimate on inventor age is −0.234 (standard error = 0.026), about twice as
large as the CEO age estimate in Panel A.
When we do not control for CEO age, the sample can be extended beyond 1992 −
2004. This is done in Panel C, which expands the sample in two different ways, first by
including Compustat firms without CEO information, and second by broadening the time
period covered to 1985 − 2004. The results are very similar to those in Panel B, indicating
that the focus on Compustat firms with CEO age information is not responsible for the
broad patterns we are documenting.
Panel D extends the sample further to non-Compustat firms, which can also be in-
cluded in our analysis since we are not using information on CEO age. This increases our
sample sixfold (since most patents are held by non-Compustat firms). However, in this
case, we can no longer include the employment and sales controls. Despite the addition of
almost 1.5 million additional patents and the lack of our employment and sales controls,
the results in this panel are again very similar to those in previous panels, and suggest
that, at least in this instance, our results are not driven by our focus on the Compustat
sample.
51In other words, we include a dummy variable for the assignee/inventor of this patent with the highest
number of total patents having k = 1, 2, ..., 89+ patents (where 89+ corresponds to 89 or more patents for the
inventor with the maximum number of patents).
52This corresponds to 374 separate technology classes and is roughly at the same level of disaggregation
as the SIC dummies we used in the firm-level analysis in Tables 22-24.
53We cannot include a full set of inventor fixed effects directly because inventor age would not be identified
in this case since we also have a full set of year dummies.
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Panel E provides our main results in this subsection. It returns to the Compustat
sample over the period 1992-2002 and adds back the CEO age variable; otherwise, the
specification is identical to that in Panel B. The results show precisely estimated impacts
of both CEO age and inventor age. For example, in column 1 with our innovation quality
variable, the coefficient on CEO age is −0.111 (standard error = 0.038) and that on inventor
age is −0.235 (standard error = 0.027); these are very close to the estimates in Panels A and
B, respectively. The pattern is similar in the other columns (except again for generality).
These results provide further evidence that the relationship between manager/CEO
age and the creativity of innovations in the data reflects an important dimension of sort-
ing. In particular, firms appear to make several associated changes—in top management
and innovation teams—around the same time they change their portfolio of innovation
and their innovation strategy (and perhaps their “corporate culture”). Reflecting this sort-
ing, the estimated magnitudes linking CEO age to our indices of creative innovations are
smaller in Table 28 than those in our baseline firm-level regressions. Our next results,
reported in Table 29, provide some direct evidence on this by looking at the relationship
between inventor age and CEO age. In particular, we estimate a regression similar to
equation (2.19) except that now the dependent variable is the average age of the inventors
on the patents granted for that firm in year t and the key right-hand-side variable is the
age of the CEO, and firm fixed effects are again controlled for. The first column of Table
29 reports a regression of the average age of inventors on firm and year fixed effects, log
employment, log sales, log patents, and CEO age, while the second column also adds
dummies for inventor team size and three-digit IPC class as in the specifications in Table
28. The results, which show a positive (though only marginally significant) relationship,
suggest that younger CEOs tend to hire younger inventors, indirectly corroborating the
sorting effect emphasized in our theoretical model.54
54Interestingly, this result disappears when we do not control for firm fixed effects.
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2.4.6 Stock of Knowledge, Opportunity Cost and Creativity of Innovations
Finally, Table 30 turns to an investigation of some additional implications of our ap-
proach already highlighted in our theoretical model (in particular, Proposition 5). We
noted there that we may expect openness to disruption to be more important for com-
panies that are technologically more advanced (as measured by the number of patents),
but also that companies that have more to lose (because of the greater opportunity cost of
disruption in terms of other profitable activities) may shy away from disruptive creative
innovations. The firm-level data enable us to look at this issue by including the interaction
between CEO age and log total patent count (as a proxy for how advanced the technology
of the company is) and also the interaction between CEO age and log sales (as a proxy
for company revenues that may be risked by disruptive innovations). According to the
theoretical ideas suggested above, we expect the interaction with log total patent count
to be negative, and that with sales to be positive (indicating that average manager age
matters more for the creativity of innovations for companies with a significant number of
patents and less for companies with high sales).
This is a demanding, as well as crude, test, since neither proxy is perfect, and more-
over, log sales and log patent counts are positively correlated (the weighted correlation
between the two variables is 0.7 in our sample), thus stacking the cards against finding
an informative set of results.
Nevertheless, Table 30, which uses the same unbalanced sample with annual obser-
vations as in Table 25 Panel C, provides some evidence that our theoretical expectations
are partially borne out. In all of our specifications, the interaction between CEO age and
log total patent count is negative and the interaction with log sales is positive. Moreover,
these interactions are statistically significant except for the log patent interaction for the
innovation quality measure.55 These results thus provide some support for the hypoth-
55As noted above, the main effects are evaluated at the sample mean and are typically close to the estimates
reported in Table 22.
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esis that the stock of knowledge of the company and opportunity cost effects might be
present and might in fact be quite important (at least quantitatively at this correlational
level).
2.5 Cross-Country Correlations
In this section, we provide evidence that the firm-level relationship between man-
ager age and creativity of innovations appears to aggregate up to the national level. In
particular, we document that there is a cross-country relationship between manager age
and creativity of innovations. Moreover, at the cross-country level, we can also use other
indices potentially proxying for openness to disruption, which also show similar results,
thus partially corroborating our interpretation of the manager age variables in our firm-
level and cross-country empirical work.
The interpretation of the cross-country relationships should be somewhat different
than the firm-level ones. At the country level, manager age, like our other measures of
openness to disruption presented below, is likely to have its impact on the creativity of
innovations not just because of its association with— and because of its impact on—firm-
level innovation strategies, but also through economy-wide institutions, attitudes and
values of the society. This suggests that the quantitative magnitudes of the relationships
might be somewhat larger at the country level than at the firm level.
Our main cross-country results are presented in Table 31, which reports OLS regres-
sions of the following form:
yc = αIc + X′cfi + εc, (2.20)
where yc is one of our measures of creative innovations (innovation quality, superstar
fraction, tail innovation, or generality) for country c, Ic denotes one of our measures
of openness to disruption (the individualism index, the uncertainty avoidance index, or
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average manager age), Xc is a vector of controls (including average log real GDP per
capita of the country, average years of secondary schooling and log of total patents of
the country during this time period), and finally, εc is an error term.56 The coefficient of
interest is α, which will reveal whether there is a cross-country correlation between our
measures of openness to disruption and the creativity of innovations.
All regressions in Table 31 include one observation per country. As with our firm-
level specifications, these regressions are weighted using the total number of patents
as weights, which is again motivated by the fact that countries with more patents are
both more important for their contribution to creative innovations and have much more
precisely estimated measures for our key variables (see Appendix Table 34 for the distri-
bution of total number of patents across countries). All standard errors continue to be
robust against heteroscedasticity.
Panel A of Table 31 focuses on our measure of manager age (which is available for 37
countries). The patterns are very similar to those we obtained in the firm-level analysis,
and show a strong correlation between average manager age and all four of our measures
of creative innovations. For example, in column 1, the estimate of α is −0.484 (standard
error = 0.225). We also see that log GDP per capita and average years of secondary
schooling are not significant correlates of the creativity of innovations, while log patent
count is significant and indicates that countries that have more patents also tend to have
more creative innovations. Consistent with the caveat about the interpretation of the
cross-country results, the quantitative magnitudes are somewhat larger than the firm-
level ones: a one-year change in manager age increases average citations by 0.48 (3.3%
compared to its mean of 14.5), the superstar fraction by 0.96 (14.4% relative to its mean),
tail innovations by 0.23 (11.7% relative to its mean) and generality by 0.28 (1.3% relative
56An additional covariate that might be useful to control for would be the average educational attainment
of managers in a country. Though this number is available in the World Bank dataset that Gennaioli et al.
(2013) use, there is very little overlap between this developing country sample and ours. We have instead
experimented with controlling for the average education of the managers of the companies we have used for
compiling our average manager age variable. This has no effect on the results reported here and is omitted
to save space. The details are available upon request from the authors.
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to its mean). These effects are about 2 to 5 times larger than the firm-level estimates
presented above.57
Panel B is similar to Panel A, except that it uses Hofstede’s individualism index (this
increases the sample from 37 to 50). The results are very similar to those using average
manager age, and the quantitative magnitudes of the correlation between individualism
and innovation quality are again sizable and somewhat larger than those in Panel A.58
Panel C has exactly the same structure, except that the right-hand-side variable is
Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index. The patterns are very similar and generally even
more precisely estimated (though, of course, they are now negative, since greater uncer-
tainty avoidance corresponds to less openness to disruption). The quantitative magni-
tudes are similar to those in Panel B.59
Tables 32 and 33 probe the robustness of these cross-country relationships. Table 32
looks at various alternative measures of creative innovations (which we also investigate
at the firm level). These are average citations per patent but now constructed using only a
five-year window (so that we do not have to rely on the correction factors); an alternative
measure of the superstar fraction of patents but now computed using information on the
most highly cited patent to the inventor (rather than lifetime average citations); the tail
innovation index computed with p = 0.90 (instead of p = 0.99); and the originality index
mentioned above. The results in all cases are similar to the baseline (though weaker and
not statistically significant with the alternative measure of superstar fraction).
57If, instead, we look at the quantitative implications of moving from the 75th percentile of the manager age
distribution to the 25th percentile, the magnitudes are more similar to the firm-level estimates. For example,
moving from the country at the 25th percentile of average manager age in our sample to the 75th percentile
(from 51.5 to 54.3) reduces our measure of innovation quality by 9.4% relative to the sample mean (14.5).
58For example, moving from the country at the 25th percentile of individualism in our sample to those
at the 75th percentile (from 0.19 to 0.73) increases our measure of innovation quality by 19% relative to its
weighted sample mean (14.5). Using the same metric for quantitative magnitude for the average manager
age gives an increase in innovation quality by 9.4% relative to the sample mean (14.5).
59We do not run regressions including multiple indices at the same time, since we believe this type of horse
race would not be particularly informative. Instead, we interpret each of these variables as a proxy for the
same underlying tendency for openness to innovation, new practices and ideas.
114
Table 33 , on the other hand, investigates whether these results can be explained by
the fact that R&D intensity (defined as total R&D spending divided by GDP at the coun-
try level) differs across countries. Our results largely might be reflecting the fact that
some countries invest more in R&D and as a result generate more creative innovations.
However, in our sample R&D intensity is not systematically related to individualism, un-
certainty avoidance, or average manager age. Moreover, Table 33 shows that controlling
for variation in R&D intensity does not change the basic correlations in our sample. The
parameter estimates do change in some cases, particularly with the individualism vari-
able, but the association between our measures of openness to disruption and creativity
of innovations always remains highly significant.60
2.6 Conclusion
Despite a large theoretical and now a growing empirical literature on innovation,
there is relatively little work on the determinants of the creativity of innovative activity,
and in particular, the likelihood of innovations and patents that contribute most to knowl-
edge. In this paper, building on Schumpeter’s ideas, we suggested that openness to new
ideas, disruptive innovations and unconventional practices—which we called openness
to disruption, for short— may be a key determinant of creative innovations, and likewise,
resistance to such disruptive behavior may hold back some of the most creative innovative
activities.
We provided a simple model drawing a clear distinction between radical (more cre-
ative) innovations and incremental innovations, whereby the former combines ideas from
several different lines of research and creates more significant advances (and contribu-
60We also experimented with using cross-country differences in demographics to instrument for average
manager age differences. Though these results corroborate the patterns shown here, we do not report them
both because demographics could have a direct effect on the creativity of innovations, invalidating the ex-
clusion restriction of such a strategy, and because we view the cross-country results as additional evidence
rather than as our main empirical focus.
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tions to knowledge). These advances can be discouraged or even stopped, either through
pecuniary or non-pecuniary means, preventing radical innovations directly or discourag-
ing cross-fertilization of ideas from different fields.
The bulk of our paper provides illustrative cross-country and firm-level correlations
consistent with the role of openness to disruption. We use several measures to proxy for
creative innovations. These include our proxy for innovation quality, which is the average
number of citations per patent; two indices for creativity of innovations, which are the
fraction of superstar innovators and the likelihood of a very high number of citations (in
particular, tail citations relative to median citations); and the generality index.
Our main proxy for openness to disruption is the age of the CEO or top management
of the company (or the average age of the CEO and CFO of the top 25 publicly listed
companies in a country). This variable is motivated based on the idea that only companies
or societies open to such disruption will allow the young to rise up within the hierarchy.
This is the only variable we have available as a proxy for openness to disruption at the
firm level. At the country level, we augment this variable with the popular indices for
individualism and uncertainty avoidance based on the work by the Dutch social scientist
Geert Hofstede.
Using these proxies, at the firm, patent and country level, we find fairly consistent
and robust correlations between openness to disruption and creative innovations. We also
show that these relationships are generally robust. They do not, however, correspond to
the causal effect of CEO (or manager) age on creative innovations because, as highlighted
by our theoretical model, younger managers tend to be employed by firms that are more
open to disruption and more creative. A simple indirect inference exercise using the
structure of our model suggests that most of the empirical relationship between CEO age
and creative innovations is due to these sorting effects, and the causal impact of CEO age
is quite small.
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Finally, our theoretical model further suggests that the impact of openness to dis-
ruption should be larger for companies that are technologically more advanced (closer
to the technology frontier) and smaller for companies that have a greater opportunity
cost of disruptive innovation. The empirical patterns in our firm-level data support this
prediction.
We view our paper as a first step in the study of the impact of various social and
economic incentives on creative activities and, in particular, on creative innovations. Fu-
ture work investigating the causal effect of manager age on creative innovations using
more systematic structural estimation techniques is an obvious next step. Further study
of various other firm-level or cross-country characteristics on the creativity of innovations
is also a natural direction. Another fruitful direction would be to systematically investi-
gate what types of firms and firm organizations encourage creativity and lead to more
creative innovations. This would involve both theoretical and empirical analyses of the
internal organization of firms and their research strategies and a study of the interplay
between institutional and society-level factors and the internal organization of firms.
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Chapter 3
Does the Cream Always Rise to the
Top? The Misallocation of Talent in
Innovation
Abstract
The misallocation of talent between routine production versus innovation activities is
shown to have a first-order impact on the welfare and growth prospects of an economy.
Surname level empirical analysis combining patent and inventor micro-data with census
data reveals new stylized facts: (1) People from richer backgrounds are more likely to
become inventors; but those from more educated backgrounds are not. (2) People from
more educated backgrounds become more prolific inventors; but those from richer back-
grounds exhibit no such aptitude. Motivated by this discrepancy, a heterogeneous agents
model with production and innovation sectors is developed. Individuals compete against
each other for scarce inventor training in a tournament setting. Those from richer families
can become inventors even if they are of mediocre talent by excessive spending on cre-
dentialing. This is individually rational but socially inefficient. The model is calibrated to
match the new stylized facts via indirect inference. A thought experiment in which the
credentialing spending channel is shut down reveals that the rate of innovation can be
increased by 10% of its value. Optimal progressive bequest taxes serve to increase social
welfare by 6.20% in consumption equivalent terms.
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3.1 Introduction
Albert Einstein was born in Ulm on March 14, 1879. His father was Hermann Einstein,
a rich salesman and engineer, and owned a company called Elektrotechnische Fabrik J.
Einstein & Cie that manufactured electrical equipment based on direct current. Albert
received his education in various high quality schools in Germany, Italy, and Switzerland,
and his alma mater was ETH Zurich. As a scientist and inventor, he produced over 300
scientific papers and 50 patented inventions. His groundbreaking contributions in the
field of physics changed the technological landscape. What would happen, though, if his
parents were poor and he could not receive the education he had? How would a world
look like with Einstein as a factory worker instead of a scientist? Better yet, how do we
know if we are not missing out on potential Einsteins right now?
Allocation of talent—assigning the right people to the right jobs—can have a first-
order effect on the productivity of a society. The susceptibility of the allocation mech-
anism to be distorted away from the socially optimal outcome by private expenditures
might create significant welfare losses in the presence of high levels of inequality in pri-
vate resources. The losses are especially magnified if the best and the brightest of a
society are not allocated to the professions where their social contributions would be the
greatest. This paper aims to quantify the misallocation of talent in the United States due
to economic inequality, with particular emphasis on its effects on innovation, and hence
the long-run prospects of the country.
Parents spend considerable time and resources in order to improve the likelihood
that their children end up with a desired job. The education system serves two main
purposes in this regard: improving human capital, and credentialing people’s talents.61
61Work on education’s role in improving human capital is discussed in detail in the related literature
subsection. For the use of education in credentialing people’s talents (as a “signaling” device), see Spence
(1973), Stiglitz (1975) and Fernandez and Gali (1999).
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The credentialing part can be seen as a tournament in which individuals seek to improve
their overall ranking compared to others in order to improve their job market prospects.
In 2010, the United States spent 7.3% of its gross domestic product on education, and
the share of private spending was 7.7% for non-tertiary and 63.7% for tertiary education
(OECD, 2013). Annual expenditure per student in tertiary education was $25,575, with
total yearly cost going up to $60,000 for elite universities. At the same time, the net wage
of the median worker was $26,364, whereas the median inventor earned above $100,000
per year. In such a high stakes environment where both the rewards and means to achieve
them are unequal, financial frictions can easily prevent the talented children of poor
families from being assigned to jobs suitable to their abilities since they are crowded out
by the less talented children from richer families. Is this actually what happens in reality,
or can we conclude that “the cream always rises to the top” regardless of inefficiencies of
the system?
The first contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the misallo-
cation of talent in innovation. Information on innovation in the United States is obtained
from inventor and patent level data from United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). This data includes all patents granted in the United States between 1976 and
2006, as well as all registered inventors of these innovations. Inventors are identified
uniquely throughout their careers, but direct information on their parental backgrounds
is unavailable. In order to overcome this issue, surnames of the inventors are used as a
proxy, and the inventor data is linked to socioeconomic background information at the
surname level from U.S. census data (1930). The stylized facts obtained can be summa-
rized as follows:62
Fact 1: Individuals from richer backgrounds are much more likely to become inventors
(23.9%); whereas those from more educated backgrounds experience no similar ad-
62The numbers in parentheses correspond to how much one standard deviation increase in the independent
variable causes the dependent variable to increase compared to its own standard deviation. The details of
the empirical analysis can be found in Section 3.3.
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vantage (0.1%).
Fact 2: Conditional on becoming an inventor, individuals from more educated back-
grounds turn out to be much more prolific inventors (17.5%); whereas those from
richer backgrounds exhibit no such aptitude (0.1%).
When the two facts are considered together, it appears that the misallocation of talent
is an issue for inventors. Fact 2 shows that it is the education associated with the surname
and not income that predicts higher inventor quality today. This is intuitive, since edu-
cation and (unobserved) innate ability are likely to be complementary (or at least highly
correlated), and in the presence of persistence of innate ability across generations, one
would expect the descendants of the more educated to be better inventors today con-
ditional on becoming one. However, Fact 1 shows that it is income and not education
that predicts higher chances of becoming an inventor today. This can be interpreted as
the allocation system choosing the wrong people as inventors. Those who come from
families that were wealthier but had average education in the past have a higher chance
of becoming inventors, but perform poorly conditional on becoming one. This observed
discrepancy provides the motivation to investigate the issue of misallocation of talent in
innovation quantitatively, so that its impact on the society can be assessed.63
In order to quantify the effects of the misallocation of talent in innovation and to
analyze potential policy changes that might alleviate the inefficiency, a new model which
can accommodate the observed correlation patterns is developed. The firm side exhibits
features found in the models from the endogenous growth literature: Firms undertake
routine production using unskilled labor, and generate productivity-improving innova-
63It is also noteworthy that the family background measures have such a high explanatory power. For
instance, it is found that one standard deviation increase in the income associated with the surname in 1930
increases the relative probability of becoming an inventor by 23.9%. Given that the measures are constructed
at the surname-level, and across two to three generations, just knowing the surname of an individual makes
it possible to predict his or her chances of becoming an inventor to a high degree. This means the intergen-
erational mobility in socioeconomic status as captured by the relative probability of becoming an inventor is
quite low, which is consistent with other recent name and surname level studies [Clark (2014), Olivetti and
Paserman (2013)].
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tions (featuring positive intertemporal spillovers between firms) via research and devel-
opment conducted by hired inventors. The household side is modeled in a detailed
fashion, borrowing from heterogeneous agents models64 in order to make the model ca-
pable of replicating the patterns observed in the data. The households are heterogeneous
in wealth, education, and unobserved innate ability that is persistent across generations.
Parents invest in the education of their offspring and leave bequests. The training nec-
essary to become inventors is scarce; hence individuals compete against each other in a
tournament setting to receive it. Factors that improve inventor productivity such as in-
nate ability and education increase the probability of receiving this training; but so does
private credentialing spending which is unproductive by itself. Thus, individuals who in-
herit generous bequests can become inventors even if they are of mediocre talent through
excessive spending on credentialing, preventing more talented individuals from poorer
backgrounds from becoming one. This is individually rational but socially inefficient;
reducing the quality of the inventor pool used in generating productivity-improving in-
novations that drive economic growth.
The tournament mechanism is the key ingredient that enables the model to replicate
the stylized facts. In an ideal world, a social planner would prefer to allocate the best
and the brightest of the society to the innovation sector, leading to a positive assortative
matching between the talents of individuals and the (social as well as private) produc-
tivity of the jobs. However, if this were the case, the discrepancy between the parental
backgrounds of those who become inventors and those who succeed as inventors would
not be empirically observed. In order to allow the model to generate different correla-
tion patterns at the two margins, individuals receive inventor training based on a score
that depends differentially on innate ability, early childhood education and credentialing
spending. The strength of each component in improving inventor probability as opposed
64This is in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994) since the heterogeneity of households is considered in a general
equilibrium setting, where the time-invariant distributions of household characteristics affect the prices and
the growth rate in the economy.
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to inventor productivity has different implications for the correlations of ancestor educa-
tion and income with the two outcome variables, and this provides the main identification
in the calibration of the model.
The model is calibrated to match the new stylized facts and data moments from
the U.S. economy where an exercise in indirect inference pins down the influence of the
new credentialing spending channel by replicating the two regressions from the empirical
analysis using model-generated data. The calibrated model is then used to measure the
economic importance of the misallocation of talent in innovation. A thought experiment
in which the credentialing spending channel is shut down reveals that the aggregate
growth rate of the economy can be increased by 10% of its value by assigning more
talented and better educated individuals as inventors. As a result, the consumption in-
equality in the economy increases, which is detrimental to overall welfare; however the
gain in output growth rate more than compensates for this loss, resulting in a welfare
gain of 5.96% in consumption equivalent terms.65
Seeking to alleviate the effects of misallocation in a decentralized economy, optimal
progressive bequest taxes are calculated, which are found to increase output growth rate
by 2.5% of its value. This increase is again through the allocation of higher innate ability
individuals as inventors, who are also more educated on average. The progressive nature
of the taxes cause the overall consumption inequality to remain the same. The increase
in the output growth rate and the relatively unchanged consumption inequality lead to a
social welfare gain of 6.20% in consumption equivalent terms. This is higher compared
to the credentialing spending shut-down experiment. The optimal bequest tax policy that
achieves these results is quite progressive: The average bequest tax rate faced by the top
1% is 12.1%, whereas this number falls to 4.2% for the top 10%. The bottom 95% of the
households are net recipients, whereas only the top 5% pay into the system.
65Welfare is defined as expected utility at the steady state.
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Related literature: The paper relates to the growing literature on misallocation (some
examples are Acemoglu et al. (2013), Akcigit et al. (2015), Guner et al. (2008), Hsieh
and Klenow (2009), Hsieh et al. (2013), Jones (2013), Jovanovic (2014), and Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008)). One of the closest papers in this literature is Hsieh et al. (2013) where
the misallocation of talent results from barriers to entry into certain occupations by dis-
tinct demographic groups, like women or non-white individuals. Another close paper is
Jovanovic (2014) where workers and jobs are heterogeneous in quality, and are matched
with each other under search frictions which affects the amount of on-the-job training,
and the transition to the balanced growth path. This paper differs from both works by
its emphasis on the financial frictions channel, and the special interest on how innovation
activities are influenced as a result. Empirically, the closest study is the ongoing work by
Bell et al. (2015) which focuses on the life cycle of inventors using administrative data cov-
ering the population of patent applicants in the U.S. Their finding that individuals from
higher income family backgrounds are more likely to become inventors is in agreement
with the findings of this paper. This paper provides further evidence on the differential
effects of ancestor income and education on becoming an inventor and success condi-
tional on becoming one, as well as build a quantitative model to assess the economic
costs of the misallocation of talent in innovation.
Another closely related field is the modern literature on inequality and economic de-
velopment (see among others: Galor and Zeira (1988, 1994), Banerjee and Newman (1993),
Maoz and Moav (1999), and Galor (2009) for a literature review). This paper differs from
the literature in that it acknowledges the scarce nature of training necessary to become
inventors, and focuses on how competition for this might create a misallocation of talent
between routine production and innovation. In addition, economic growth in this model
is driven by technological change as a result of firms investing in innovative activities,
similar to the literature on endogenous growth with quality improvements pioneered by
Aghion and Howitt (1992), and in the spirit of the broader endogenous growth literature
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[Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Lucas (2009), Alvarez et al. (2013), Lucas and Moll (2014).
See Aghion and Howitt (2009), Acemoglu (2009) and Aghion et al. (2013) for literature
surveys]. The firm side of the model builds upon Akcigit et al. (2015). Recent work
by Aghion et al. (2015) investigates the relationship between innovation and top income
inequality. The quantitative results of the current paper are in line with their empirical
finding of a positive correlation between the two.
The focus on who become inventors versus who make prolific inventors conditional
on becoming one links this work to the extensive literature on nature versus nurture, hu-
man capital and skill formation [Becker (1964), Ben-Porath (1967), Behrman et al. (1977),
Becker and Tomes (1979), Becker and Tomes (1986), Behrman et al. (1994), Aiyagari et al.
(2002), Heckman et al. (2006), Cunha and Heckman (2007), Dahl and Lochner (2012), Lee
and Seshadri (2014). See Cunha et al. (2006) for a survey]. This literature is quite diverse,
ranging from theoretical work such as the classic Becker and Tomes (1979) model, to em-
pirical estimates exploiting rare datasets such as that on twins (Behrman et al., 1994) to
separate the effects of nature and nurture. This paper investigates a related question, but
focuses on inventors and their productivities in coming up with disruptive inventions as
captured by patents. This enables the use of the two new stylized facts obtained in the
empirical analysis to tease out the persistence of innate ability versus the socioeconomic
status persistence due to intergenerational wealth transmission. The model is close in
spirit to Becker and Tomes (1979) type models, where parents cannot borrow against the
future income of their dynasties, or insure themselves against idiosyncratic risks.
Finally, the policy experiment on optimal taxation of bequests links the paper to the
literature on optimal taxation [Anderberg (2009), Bohacek and Kapicka (2009), Findeisen
and Sachs (2013), Grochulski and Piskorski (2010), Kapicka (2013), Kapicka and Neira
(2013), Krueger and Ludwig (2013), Stantcheva (2014)]. Two close papers in this field
are Krueger and Ludwig (2013) and Stantcheva (2014), where optimal progressive taxa-
tion and education subsidies are calculated in a model with heterogeneous households
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where human capital formation is also endogenous. The model in this paper also in-
cludes the endogenous human capital aspect, but enhances the problem by adding in the
misallocation of talent dimension and its effects on innovation. This naturally affects the
effectiveness of different policies in alleviating the inefficiencies that result from financial
frictions.
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the the-
oretical model. Section 3.3 describes the datasets employed and variables constructed in
the empirical analysis, and the resulting stylized facts. Section 3.4 describes the calibra-
tion of the model and the indirect inference. Section 3.5 presents and discusses the results
of the quantitative results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Environment and preferences
Time is discrete, and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, ... There is a continuum of households
indexed by m ∈ [0, 1]. The households are modeled in an overlapping generations frame-
work, where each generation lives for three periods: child, young adult and old adult.
The children are born when their parents are young adults. The parents interact with
their children in three ways: Parents (i) choose their consumption before they become
adults, (ii) invest in their education66 and (iii) leave non-negative bequests to them upon
death. The parents care about their children, and the relative weight of the utility of their
offspring is denoted by the altruism parameter α > 0. Preferences over consumption are
time separable with time discount factor β and exhibit constant relative risk aversion with
parameter ω. Thus, lifetime utility of generation born at time t of household m can be
66The education investment of the parents is thought of as pre-tertiary education or early childhood invest-
ment as discussed in Cunha and Heckman (2007). Individuals invest in their own tertiary education when
they become young adults, which is discussed later on.
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expressed as
Um,t (⃗cm,t) = Et
[
c1−ωc,m,t
1 − ω + β
c1−ωy,m,t
1 − ω + β
2 c
1−ω
o,m,t
1 − ω + αβUm,t+1(⃗cm,t+1)
]
(3.1)
where cc,m,t, cy,m,t and co,m,t denote the consumption of generation t of household m at
child, young, and old periods respectively, and c⃗m,t = {cc,m,T, cy,m,T, co,m,T}∞T=t.
3.2.2 Technology
Production and innovation
The final good is competitively produced by a continuum of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]
which combine capital k and unskilled labor lu according to the formula
o(z, k, lu) = zζkκ lλu (3.2)
where z stands for the firm-specific productivity, o denotes final good output, and ζ +
κ + λ = 1. Firms pay r + δ and wu for capital and unskilled labor services respectively.
Firms can engage in risky innovation activities in order to increase their productivity
if successful. Conditional on successful innovation, the productivity of the firm in the
next period evolves according to
z′ = z + γz̄ (3.3)
where z′ and z are the new and old productivities, z̄ is the average productivity in the
economy, and γ > 0 is a scale parameter.67 The firms which fail to innovate retain their
67Note that the z̄ term in (3.3) introduces intertemporal spillover effects between the firms in the economy
which is a salient feature of modern endogenous growth models. The additive structure is chosen over
multiplicative because (i) it allows for solving the firm value functions in closed form and (ii) it ensures the
existence of an invariant firm size distribution in a stationary equilibrium.
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old productivity, z′ = z. In order to increase the probability of successful innovation, firms
must hire skilled labor. For a firm which hires ls amount of skilled labor, the probability
of a successful innovation is given by
i(ls) = χl
ξ
s (3.4)
where χ > 0 is a scale parameter and ξ ∈ (0, 1) introduces diminishing returns.
Individual productivity, innate ability and early childhood education
Each generation t of each household m is heterogeneous in innate ability a, and early
childhood education h. The individual productivity of generation t of household m is a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of a and h given by
lm,t(hm,t, am,t) =
(
ψh
ϵ−1
ϵ
m,t + (1 − ψ)a
ϵ−1
ϵ
m,t
) ϵ
ϵ−1
(3.5)
where 0 < ψ < 1 is the share of early childhood education, and ϵ is the elasticity of
substitution. Innate ability a and early childhood education h remain constant as an
individual gets older. Individual productivity determines the effective labor supply of
the individual. This labor contributes to the aggregate skilled or unskilled labor supply
in the economy depending on the individual’s job allocation.
The cost of endowing one’s offspring with education level h in terms of the final good
is given by the cost function
ch(h, Θ) = κhhξh z̄ζ/(ζ+λ) (3.6)
where κh > 0 is a scale parameter, ξh > 1 introduces convexity, and z̄ζ/(ζ+λ) ensures the
cost scales up with aggregate output as the economy grows.
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The innate ability of an individual is determined at the transition from childhood to
young adult status, and depends on the innate ability of the parent. It is governed by a
stochastic AR(1) process given by
log a′ = (1 − ρ)µa + ρ log a + ϵa, ϵa ∼ N(0, σ2a ) (3.7)
which has a mean of one.68 The variables a and a′ denote the innate ability of the par-
ent and the child respectively. The persistence parameter ρ determines how much of
the parental ability the child inherits. The stochastic innate ability shock ϵa is normally
distributed with a mean of zero and variance of σ2a .
Tertiary education and job allocation
There are two types of jobs j in the economy: skilled/innovation jobs (j = s) and
unskilled/production jobs (j = u). The job of an individual determines which pool his or
her labor supply will contribute to, and hence the wage rate to be received per effective
labor unit supplied (ws if skilled and wu otherwise). Any worker in the economy can
get a production job. However, in order to get an innovation job, the individual needs to
receive tertiary education at a high quality institution. This tertiary education provides
the individual with (i) the training necessary to create innovations and (ii) an increase in
the individual productivity, given by l′ = Λl.69
The ratio of high quality tertiary education available in the economy over total pop-
ulation is denoted by η ∈ (0, 1) and assumed to be fixed.70 Since the innovation jobs
68For a discussion on how well this parsimonious specification fits the intergenerational transmission of
observed abilities, see Clark (2014).
69A good real world example of the described tertiary education would be an MSc or PhD degree in a
STEM field at a high quality institution. Although a PhD is not always necessary to work on innovations,
NSF National Survey of College Graduates (2003) shows that individuals who have invented at least one
patent throughout their lifetime are three times more likely to hold a PhD degree compared to non-inventor
college graduates.
70The opposite of this restriction would be having no restrictions on η, but fixing the score threshold s̄
instead, so that any individual who has a sufficiently high score would get the high quality tertiary education.
129
pay better than production jobs in equilibrium,71 individuals would like to get innovation
jobs. Because of this, high quality tertiary education is sought after; and since the supply
is fixed, there is competition amongst individuals to receive it, which is cleared by a score
mechanism described below.
At the beginning of the young adult period and after observing the innate ability a,
each individual receives a score given by
s̃(l(h, a), n) = (1 − ν)l(h, a) + νn + ϵj, ϵj ∼ N(0, σ2j ) (3.8)
where l(h, a) is individual productivity, n is credentialing spending (a choice variable),
ν ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that governs the relative power of l versus n in determining
the score, and ϵj is a normally distributed shock. After the scores for each individual
are realized, the fraction η of the individuals with the highest scores receive high quality
tertiary education, and are able to work in the innovation sector. The remaining (1 − η)
fraction of the individuals do not receive high quality tertiary education and cannot create
innovations, and thus have to work in the production sector.
In order to increase score upwards by the amount νn, the individual has to spend
resources given by
cn(n) = κnnξn z̄ζ/(ζ+λ) (3.9)
in terms of the final good, where κn > 0 is a scale parameter, ξn > 1 introduces convexity,
and z̄ζ/(ζ+λ) ensures the costs scale up with aggregate output as the economy grows.
This choice variable n captures any real world spending that increases the chances of
getting a high quality tertiary education, such as hiring private tutors, preparing towards
The quantitative experiments replicated with this alternative model deliver higher growth rate and welfare
responses to parameter and policy changes; so the assumption to fix η puts discipline on the counterfactual
implications of the model. See Appendix C.3.1 for details.
71This is not restriction of the model, but a result of the calibration exercise. See Section 3.4 for the details.
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standardized tests, spending extra money to get into a college without a scholarship, the
opportunity cost of studying as opposed to working in a job, etc.
Since the upper η fraction of the score distribution receives high quality tertiary edu-
cation, there exists a score threshold s̄ such that individuals with s̃ ≥ s̄ receive the educa-
tion, and the rest do not. In equilibrium, individuals with the necessary education always
choose the innovation sector over the production sector, so the probability of getting high
quality tertiary education and that of being a skilled worker are the same. The implied
probability distribution of having job j for an individual is denoted by F(j; l(h, a), n, Θ).
The aggregate state matters, since the score of a worker is only meaningful compared to
the score threshold s̄, as relative rank determines job allocation. The probability of having
a skilled job is increasing in innate ability a, early childhood education h and credentialing
spending n, whereas it is decreasing in the score threshold s̄.
3.2.3 Maximization problems
Timing of events
Before moving on to the decision problems of the firms and the households, the
timing of events within a period are listed below, which are also summarized on Figure
8:
1. The innate ability of young adults ay is observed.
2. Old adults choose their bequests b and consumption co.
3. Young adults decide on credentialing spending n to receive a better score s̃.
4. Scores s̃ are observed, tertiary education is provided, and young adults are assigned
to their jobs j.
131
Figure 8: Timing of events within a period.
5. Firms hire capital k and labor lu and ls for production and innovation. Production
takes place and successful innovations are realized. Wages are paid.
6. Young adults choose how much to consume cy, consumption of their children cc,
pre-tertiary education investment in their children h, and savings s.
Firm decision problems
The static profit maximization problem of the firm is given by
Π(z, Θ) = max
k,lu≥0
{zζkκ lλu − (r + δ)k − wulu} (3.10)
where the firm pays interest rate plus depreciation (r + δ) and unskilled wage wu for
capital and unskilled labor services respectively. The associated capital and labor demand
policy functions are denoted by k̂(z, Θ) and l̂u(z, Θ).
Given the period profits Π(z, Θ) from the static maximization problem and the inno-
vation technology described in (3.4), the intertemporal maximization problem of a firm
can be written in recursive form as follows:
V(z, Θ) = max
ls≥0
{
Π(z, Θ) +
χlξs
1 + r
V(z + γz̄, Θ′) +
(1 − χlξs )
1 + r
V(z, Θ′)− wsls
}
(3.11)
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The firm chooses how much skilled labor ls to hire, which increases the likelihood of
successful innovation χlξs . If successful, the firm’s productivity next period is increased
by γz̄. The prospect of earning higher profits in the future due to higher productivity
provide incentives for the firm to engage in costly innovation. The skilled labor demand
that solves this problem is denoted by l̂s(z, Θ).
Household decision problems
Given the ingredients of the model, there are three relevant decision problems for
each household in any given period: (i) the bequest decision of old adults, (ii) the cre-
dentialing spending decision of young adults before job allocation, (iii) the consumption,
pre-tertiary education investment and saving decisions of young adults after job alloca-
tion.72 The associated value functions of the problems will be denoted by Vo(.), W(.) and
Vy(.) respectively.
Decision problem of the old
Let subscripts c, y and o stand for child, young and old respectively. Time subscripts
will be suppressed for clarity. Let y denote wealth. Given the wealth of the old yo, the
early childhood education hy and innate ability ay of the young, and the aggregate state
of the economy Θ, the bequest decision problem of the old can be stated as
Vo(yo, hy, ay, Θ) = max
co ,b≥0
{
u(c0) + αW(b, hy, ay, Θ)
}
s.t. (3.12)
co + b ≤ y0
where co is the consumption of the old, b is the bequest left to the descendants and α > 0
is the altruism parameter. Old agents choose how much bequests b to leave to their
72Children in a household have no decision problems to solve. They receive pre-tertiary education chosen
by their parents and consume.
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children who are now young adults, at the cost of reducing the their own consumption
c0. The problem is solved by the choice of a single variable b since preferences ensure
the budget constraint holds with equality. Note the financial restriction that the bequests
must be positive. This disallows agents from borrowing against the future income of their
dynasty to consume today. The associated policy function is denoted by b̂(yo, hy, ay, Θ).
Decision problem of the young before job allocation
Given the bequest amount b, the early childhood education hy and innate ability ay of
the young, and the aggregate state of the economy Θ, the credentialing spending decision
problem of the young before job allocation can be stated as follows:
W(b, hy, ay, Θ) = max
n≥0
{
E
[
Vy(yy, ay, Θ)|·
]}
s.t. (3.13)
yy =
(
wjy +
w′jy
1 + r′
)
ly(hy, ay) + b − cn(n)
jy ∼ F(j; ly(hy, ay), n, Θ)
where jy is a random variable that denotes job allocation and yy stands for wealth as
a young adult after job allocation. The wealth of the young yy consists of the lifetime
labor income and the bequests b received from parents, minus the cost of improving
the score cn(n). The only choice variable is the resources spent on improving the score,
denoted by n. Spending more resources increases the likelihood of getting a better job
draw jy distributed according to F(j; l, n, Θ) discussed earlier. The optimal n that solves
this optimization problem is referred to as the credentialing spending policy function,
n̂(b, hy, ay, Θ).
Note that the young adults can borrow against their future lifetime labor income, so
the model allows agents to borrow resources at the risk free interest rate r′ to spend on
credentialing which improves their chances of getting a high quality tertiary education.
134
On the other hand, they cannot insure themselves against the idiosyncratic risk of not
getting high quality tertiary education, which is always positive due to the shock term ϵj
in (3.8). This forces them to be more prudent in increasing credentialing spending n by
borrowing due to risk aversion.
Decision problem of the young after job allocation
Given the wealth yy and the innate ability ay of the young, and the aggregate state
of the economy Θ, the consumption, early childhood education investment and saving
decision problem of the young after job allocation can be stated as follows:
Vy(yy, ay, Θ) = max
cy,cc,h′y,s≥0
{u(cy) + αu(cc) +
βE[Vo(y′o, h
′
y, a
′
y, Θ
′)|·]} s.t. (3.14)
yy ≥ cy + cc + ch(h′y) + s
y′o = (1 + r
′)s
a′y ∼ g(ay)
Θ′ = T(Θ)
Variables with primes indicate next period’s values. The choice variables are the
consumption of the young and their children, cy and cc, the early childhood educa-
tion investment in the children h′y which costs ch(h′y) in terms of the final good, and
the savings s. The sum of these expenditures must be below the wealth yy. The ex-
pectation is over the innate ability a′y of the child tomorrow, which depends on the in-
nate ability of the parent ay. The aggregate state of the economy evolves according to
the transition function T(.). The policy functions that solve this problem are given by
ĉy(yy, ay, Θ), ĉc(yy, ay, Θ), ĥ′y(yy, ay, Θ) and ŝ(yy, ay, Θ).
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3.2.4 Balanced growth path equilibrium
Let Z(z) denote the distribution of firm productivities in the economy. Labor market
clearing implies
Lu,t ≡
∫ 1
0
l̂u,t(z, Θ)dZ(z) = 2(1 − η)
∫
l(h, a)dΦu,t(h, a), and (3.15)
Ls,t ≡
∫ 1
0
l̂s,t(z, Θ)dZ(z) = 2η
∫
l(h, a)dΦs,t(h, a) (3.16)
where Φu,t(h, a) and Φs,t(h, a) denote the joint distribution of early childhood education
and innate ability at time t for unskilled and skilled workers respectively. The (1 −
η) and η terms in the labor supply expressions are multiplied by average individual
productivity because they designate the fraction of the population working in production
and innovation sectors respectively. The terms are also multiplied by two since in any
period both the young and old adults work. Aggregate savings in the economy is given
by
At+1 ≡
∫
ãm,t−1dÃ(ã) (3.17)
where ãm,t ≡ sm,t − l(hm,t, am,t)wjm,t,t+2/(1 + rt+2) denotes the net savings of the young
adults of household m born at time t.73 There are two kinds of assets in the economy:
physical capital and shares in the bundle of firms i ∈ [0, 1]. Both assets pay the risk-free
interest rate rt.74 The capital market clearing requires the physical capital supply in the
economy to equal the aggregate capital demand of the firms given by
Kt ≡
∫ 1
0
k̂u,t(z, Θ)dZ(z). (3.18)
73In order to calculate ãm,t, the labor income to be earned in the old adult stage is subtracted from sm,t
because it was included in the expression yy in the young agent’s recursive decision problem. This was done
to reduce the number of state variables to keep track of in the associated value function Vy(.).
74Although each firm i ∈ [0, 1] faces idiosyncratic risk, aggregating over i makes profits received from the
whole bundle a deterministic quantity due to the lack of aggregate fluctuations.
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Final good market clearing requires
Ot = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + Nt + Ht (3.19)
where Ot denotes aggregate output and Ct, Nt and Ht are aggregate spending on con-
sumption, score distortion and early childhood education investment at time t respec-
tively. Finally, the number of people who receive high quality tertiary education must
equal the exogenous restriction on their measure η. This imposes the condition
η =
∫ ∞
s̄t
s̃dS̃t(s̃) (3.20)
where S̃t(s̃) is the score distribution at time t and s̄t is the score cut-off above which agents
get high quality tertiary education.
Given these ingredients, an equilibrium of this economy is defined as follows:
Definition 2. An equilibrium is described by allocations [{⃗cm,t, bm,t, nm,t, hy,m,t, sm,t}∞t=0]1m=0 for
households, allocations [{zi,t, ki,t, lu,i,t, ls,i,t}∞t=0]1i=0 for firms, prices {rt, wu,t, ws,t}∞t=0, score cut-off
{s̄t}∞t=0, firm productivity distribution {Zt(z)}∞t=0, and joint distribution of jobs, early childhood
education, and innate ability {Φt(j, h, a)}∞t=0 such that:75
1. Given prices and score cut-off, household allocations maximize Vo(b, hy, ay, Θ),
Vy(yy, ay, Θ), and W(b, hy, ay, Θ).
2. Given prices and the productivity distribution, firm allocations maximize Π(z, Θ) and
V(z, Θ).
3. All markets clear.
Output growth in this economy is driven by improvements in the productivities of
the firms given by the distribution Zt(z). This paper focuses on the balanced growth path
75Arguments of the allocations are suppressed for clarity.
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equilibrium where aggregate variables Ot, Kt, Nt, Ht, and Ct grow at the constant rate
g. Along the balanced growth path, it turns out that the mean of the firm productivity
distribution, z̄ ≡
∫
zdZ(z), is a sufficient statistic to determine the growth rate of the
economy. Let the growth rate of the mean productivity z̄ be denoted by gz. Define
transformed variables ẑ ≡ z/z̄λ/(λ+ζ), z̃ ≡ z̄ζ/(λ+ζ) and w̃s ≡ ws/z̃. The balanced growth
path equilibrium of this economy is described below.
Theorem 3. The balanced growth path equilibrium of the economy has the following form:
1. Aggregate allocations Ot, Kt, Nt, Ht, and Ct, and wages wu,t and ws,t grow at constant rate
g.
2. Aggregate labor allocations Lu and Ls, interest rate r, score cut-off s̄, and joint distribution
of jobs, early childhood education, and innate ability Φ(j, h, a) are time-invariant.
3. Mean of the firm productivity distribution z̄ grows at constant rate gz, where 1 + g =
(1 + gz)ζ/(λ+ζ).
4. Period profits of the firm are linear in ẑ, given by Π(z, Θ) = πẑ.
5. The value function of the firm is linear in ẑ and z̃, given by V(z, Θ) = v1ẑ + v2z̃.
6. The constants v1, v2, π, prices r, wu,t, ws,t, growth rate gz, and aggregate production factors
Kt, Lu and Ls are jointly determined by a system of nonlinear equations given by (C.3),
(C.4), (C.5), (C.7), (C.8), (C.9), and (C.10), and the market clearing conditions.
Proof. See Appendix C.1
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Figure 9: Overview of the empirical analysis
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Overview
In order to assess whether there is any indication of a misallocation of talent in inno-
vation, several different data sources are combined. Figure 9 presents a simple schema of
the baseline empirical analysis. The information on the probability of becoming an inven-
tor, and how well one performs conditional on becoming one are obtained from various
datasets that cover the years 1976-2008. The information on the family backgrounds come
from the IPUMS-USA 5% sample of the U.S. census conducted in 1930. In order to link
the recent patent and inventor micro-data to the older census data, surname informa-
tion is used. Once the links between the families and the descendants are established
at the surname level, the probability of becoming an inventor and the productivity as
an inventor conditional on becoming one are regressed on family income and education.
It is revealed that it is income and not education that predicts a positive probability of
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becoming an inventor, whereas it is education and not income that predicts the proba-
bility of becoming a prolific inventor. This inconsistency between the extensive and the
intensive margins is the main focus of the empirical analysis. Following sections discuss
the data sources in detail, describe the variables created, present and discuss the baseline
empirical results, and conclude with some robustness checks.
3.3.2 Data Sources
NBER USPTO Utility Patents Grant Data
Patents are exclusionary rights, granted by national patent offices, to protect a patent
holder for a certain amount of time, conditional on sharing the details of the invention.
United States Patent and Trademarks Office (USPTO) is the agency in the U.S. Department
of Commerce that issues patents to inventors and businesses for their inventions. From
the great amount of information available in the files of USPTO, a substantial subsample
has been compiled in an easy-to-use format by a group of researchers from the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) under the name NBER Patent Data Project (PDP).76
This dataset contains detailed information on 3,210,361 utility patents granted by
USPTO between the years 1976 and 2006. Each patent granted in the U.S. is assigned a
unique patent number that makes it possible to link this dataset to many other datasets
that contain information on patents some of which will be described further along. An
important feature of this dataset is to provide citation links between individual patents.
Similar to an academic paper, a new patent has to cite previous patents on which it
builds, or other patents concerned with a similar but different invention, so that proper
boundaries between the new and old patents can be established. The number of citations
a patent receives from other patents is found in the literature to be a good proxy for its
76For more information, please visit https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/
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social and private value.77 Since the citations a patent will receive throughout its lifetime
cannot be known at a fixed point in time, and due to systematic citation differences
between patents that belong to different technology classes, corrections need to be made
to the citation numbers before using them as a proxy for patent quality. Hall et al. (2001)
devise some correction weights to account for these biases, and their correction is used
throughout this paper unless mentioned otherwise.
The Careers and Co-Authorship Networks of U.S. Patent-Holders
Filing a patent application in the U.S. requires providing the names of three types of
individuals in the application form: The assignees who own the patent once granted; the
applicants who are responsible for legal correspondence with USPTO; and the inventors
who actually came up with the innovation.78 Extensive information on the inventors of
patents granted in the U.S. between years 1975-2008 is obtained from a dataset produced
by Lai et al. (2009).79 Unlike the PDP data, this dataset contains the names of every
inventor who has worked on a patent granted in the U.S. between years 1975-2008. This
is crucial, since 55.3% of the patents in the sample were created by a group of inventors.
Another novel feature of this data is the provision of a unique inventor identifier which
makes it possible to track the patent portfolio of individual inventors throughout their
careers.
The dataset contains 8,031,908 observations at the patent × inventor level, and
2,229,219 unique inventors. Among other variables, the dataset contains address infor-
mation of the inventors as well as their names and surnames. The address information is
77For instance, Hall et al. (2005) argue that the citation-weighted patent portfolio of a firm is a plausible in-
dicator of the intangible knowledge stock of a private firm, and that this measure has additional explanatory
power for the market value of the firm beyond the conventional discounted sum of R&D spending.
78Hence, the owner of a patent or the manager in an innovating firm are not listed as inventors unless
they took part in the innovation process. USPTO explicitly states the following: “All inventor(s) named in
the provisional application must have made a contribution, either jointly or individually, to the invention
disclosed in the application.”
79Please visit http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12367 to access the data.
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used to determine the country the inventor lives in at the registration date of the patent
so that the analysis can be restricted to U.S. inventors only. The surname information is
used to create a relative representation (among inventors) measure at the surname level
and link the socioeconomic background data from 1930 to inventors today. Both of these
will be discussed in detail.
IPUMS-USA 1930 5% Sample
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) is a project dedicated to col-
lecting and distributing United States census data, and it consists of more than fifty
high-precision samples of the American population drawn from federal censuses. The
particular sample used in this project is the 1930 sample which contains information on
5% of all Americans who were counted in the 1930 census. The 1930 sample is preferred
over other samples since it is the most recent publicly available sample that contains name
and surname information at the observation level.80
Since the dataset contains census information, the wealth of information at the in-
dividual level is immense. The main information derived from this dataset is on so-
cioeconomic status of people with a particular surname, such as income and education
collapsed at the surname level. Similar to other studies that use the IPUMS samples prior
to 1940 (Olivetti and Paserman, 2013), income associated with a surname is measured
using the OCCSCORE variable measured in hundreds of 1950 U.S. dollars. This variable
includes income from non-wage activities such as interest income and dividends in ad-
dition to earnings. Finally, EDSCOR50 variable is used as the education variable which
measures college attendance. Ruggles et al. (2010) and the project website contain further
details on the dataset and variables.81
80Individual questionnaires of any specific census are not released by the National Archives until 72 years
after that specific census has been taken due to confidentiality requirements. Name and surname information
is also available for other samples spanning the years 1850-1920 in the IPUMS database; however they are
less recent, and most of these samples are at 1% level instead of 5%.
81IPUMS-USA project website can be accessed at https://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml.
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Demographic Aspects of Surnames from Census 2000
This dataset released by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2007 contains information on the
overall frequency of surnames in the U.S. constructed using the 2000 decennial census
of population, based on approximately 270 million individuals with valid surnames.82
It contains 151,671 unique surnames. Combined with the U.S. inventor data previously
discussed, it is possible to create measures of probability of becoming an inventor at the
surname level. This dataset further includes information on the ethnicity distribution for
each surname broken down into six categories (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific
Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native, or mixed). These variables are used to
create dominant race fixed effects for race associated with a surname. One caveat of the
data is that it only includes surnames that have a frequency above hundred, which makes
it unsuitable to use in questions regarding extremely rare surnames. Such rare surnames
are therefore excluded from the following analysis.
3.3.3 Data construction and variables
The summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented
on Table 8. The following subsections describe what they stand for and how they are
generated.
Surname level socioeconomic status variables (1930)
Socioeconomic status variables such as income, earnings, and education are con-
structed at the surname level by taking the averages of observations in the IPUMS-USA
1930 5% sample. In this process, observations without a valid occupation are not in-
82Refer to Word et al. (2008) for a detailed description, and http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/
data/2000surnames/index.html for the data.
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Panel A. Extensive Margin Analysis
Observation Mean St. Dev
relative representation (1975-2008) 110,290 83.1 68.6
income (1930) 110,290 21.7 3.70
education (1930) 110,290 15.8 17.5
is black 110,290 2.28 14.9
is asian 110,290 1.52 12.2
is native 110,290 .048 2.20
is hispanic 110,290 11.4 31.8
is mixed 110,290 .002 .438
Panel B. Intensive Margin Analysis
log quality weighted total patents (1975-2006) 81,348 3.65 .664
log average patent quality (1975-2006) 81,348 2.53 .387
log maximum patent quality (1975-2006) 81,348 2.95 .455
log total patents (renewed thrice) (1975-2006) 78,438 .695 .287
log total patents (top 10% only) (1975-2006) 81,348 .321 .200
log income (1930) 81,348 3.11 .158
log education (1930) 81,348 2.69 .494
is black 81,348 2.05 14.2
is asian 81,348 1.55 12.3
is native 81,348 .035 1.87
is hispanic 81,348 11.7 32.1
is mixed 81,348 .001 .38
Notes: Relative representation and dominant race indicator variables are multiplied by 100
for clarity. The means and standard deviations reported on the table are weighted by the
share of the surname in the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial census of
population of 2000. Patent quality is measured by the number of patent citations corrected
for truncation using the correction terms from Hall et al. (2001).
Table 8: Summary Statistics
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cluded.83
Relative representation of a surname among inventors (1975-2008)
The extensive margin analysis focuses on the question of how the socioeconomic
background of an individual affects the probability of becoming an inventor – or using
the model’s terminology, the probability of being assigned to a job in the innovation sec-
tor. The Careers and Co-Authorship Networks of U.S. Patent-Holders data contains the
names of all inventors who worked on patents granted in the U.S. between the years 1975
and 2008, from which it is possible to obtain the number of inventors with a particular
surname. However, the fact that there are many inventors with the surname Smith does
not mean that Smiths are more likely to become inventors by itself. In order to create
a measure of the probability, the number of inventors with a particular surname is di-
vided by the number of all people in the U.S. with the same surname obtained from
Demographic Aspects of Surnames from Census 2000; i.e.
inventor probability (surname) =
number of inventors (surname)
number of individuals (surname)
Relative representation of a surname among the inventor sample is then built simply by
dividing the inventor probability associated with the surname with the unconditional
probability of becoming an inventor in the U.S. given by
relative representation (surname) =
inventor probability (surname)
unconditional inventor probability
Thus a relative representation score above unity means that individuals with that surname
are more likely to become inventors than the average person, and vice versa.
83These observations correspond to those with OCC1950 values between 980 and 999. Visit https://usa.
ipums.org/usa-action/variables/OCC1950\#codes_section for a complete list of OCC1950 values.
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Patent and inventor quality metrics (1975-2006)
The intensive margin analysis considers the question of how the socioeconomic back-
ground of an individual affects the productivity as an inventor conditional on becom-
ing one. In order to conduct this analysis, it is necessary to come up with metrics that
measure inventor productivity. The unique inventor variable allows tracking the patent
portfolio of each inventor between the years 1975 and 2008. The productivity of an in-
ventor can be calculated as a function of the information on all the patents he or she has
worked on. This naturally leads to the question of how to assess the value of a patent. In
line with the literature, the quality of a patent is proxied by the citations received by the
patent, corrected for truncation bias and other concerns using the weights devised by Hall
et al. (2001). The patent quality information from the PDP data is linked to the inventor
data using the unique patent numbers granted by USPTO. The inventor quality metric
that is used in the baseline analysis is the total quality weighted patents of an inventor
throughout his or her career. Several additional alternative metrics are considered in the
robustness analysis in Section 3.3.4.
Since the data contains all inventors who worked on patents registered in the U.S.,
it is necessary to separate the foreign inventors from the sample used to create surname
level variables. The address information of an inventor is available for every patent,
and there is considerable variation between the countries. For this study, only inventors
who have stayed in the U.S. throughout their whole career are kept. Average inventor
quality metrics at the surname level are constructed by taking the unweighted average of
individual inventor qualities.
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relative relative relative
representation representation representation
(1975-2008) (1975-2008) (1975-2008)
income (1930) .239∗∗∗ .239∗∗∗
(.010) (.010)
education (1930) .029∗∗∗ .001
(.006) (.005)
Obs. 110,290 110,290 110,290
R2 0.27 0.23 0.27
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the
coefficients of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the
surname in the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000).
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 9: Extensive Margin Baseline
3.3.4 Empirical results
Extensive margin analysis
In order to understand whether there is a misallocation of talent in the innovation
sector or not, it is necessary to empirically demonstrate what is correlated with the prob-
ability of having a job in this sector. The surname level probability of being an inventor is
used as a proxy to gauge this, although inventors are not the only individuals who work
in the innovation sector. Socioeconomic background information at the surname level ob-
tained from IPUMS-USA 1930 dataset is connected to these probabilities using surnames.
Standard ordinary least squares estimation is used where the relative representation rate
is regressed on the socioeconomic variables: income and education.84 The three columns
of Table 9 correspond to regressions on income, education, and both variables at the same
time respectively.
84Since all of the variables are averages calculated at the surname level, using an ordinary least squares
estimator is essentially identical to a two-sample two-stage least squares estimator. Alternatively, if an ob-
servation was created for each individual in the Census 2000 sample with an indicator variable for being an
inventor or not, the OLS regression of this indicator variable on background information linked by surnames
would yield the same results as Table 9.
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Looking at the first two columns, it is observed that both income and education as-
sociated with a surname in 1930 are positively correlated with the relative representation
among inventors today (1975-2008) and statistically significant. A standard deviation in-
crease in income increases the relative representation rate by 23.9% compared to its stan-
dard deviation, while a standard deviation increase in education increases it by 2.90%.
Given that there are roughly three generations between 1930 and today, these numbers
are quite substantial ( 3
√
23.9% = 62.1%), and hint towards low intergenerational mobility
in social status, similar to the results in other studies that use surnames (Clark, 2014).
Looking at the third column tells another striking story: It is income and not edu-
cation that is strongly correlated with the over-representation among inventors. In other
words, people with surnames that were richer in the past are more likely to become in-
ventors today; but controlling for income, education has no further prediction power.85
This finding is the motivation behind the inclusion of the credentialing spending in the
model, which enables agents to increase the probability of getting the high quality tertiary
education necessary for innovation sector jobs by spending private resources.
Intensive margin analysis
Having discovered that income associated with the surname is significantly positively
correlated with the probability of being an inventor, the natural next step is to ask whether
these individuals are the individuals who would make the best inventors. In order to
investigate this question, the inventor quality metric described earlier is regressed on
income and education. Table 10 displays the results of three OLS regressions: log inventor
quality on log income, on log education, and on both variables at the same time.
85The insignificance of education is not driven by multicollinearity due to high correlation between the
variables. In order to address such concerns, a variance inflation factor test is conducted after each regression
in the paper in which both income and education are included as regressors. None of the tests result in a
VIF large enough to be concerned about (< 3). The results are available upon request.
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log quality wtd. log quality wtd. log quality wtd.
total patents total patents total patents
(1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006)
log income (1930) .066∗∗∗ .001
(.009) (.009)
log education (1930) .176∗∗∗ .175∗∗∗
(.008) (.009)
Obs. 81,348 81,348 81,348
R2 0.03 0.05 0.05
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the
coefficients of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the
surname in the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000).
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 10: Intensive Margin Baseline
Due to the log-log specification, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. By
themselves, both income and education turn out to be positively correlated with inventor
quality, and the associated coefficients are statistically significant. Once again, given that
there are three generations between the samples, the elasticity estimates are considerably
high. However, this time the standard error for education is much smaller than that for
income, the opposite of what was observed in the extensive margin analysis.
The last column regresses inventor quality on both income and education, and the re-
sults are striking. The elasticity of inventor quality with respect to education is very close
to that on column 2, but the elasticity with respect to income vanishes, and is statistically
insignificant. Conditional on becoming an inventor, it is the inventors with “more edu-
cated” surnames who are the most successful in creating new path-breaking innovations.
This is in direct contrast to the extensive margin results, and suggests that the individuals
who would make the best inventors might not be the same as those the society allocates as
inventors. This fact is captured in the model by three ingredients: (i) education increases
individual productivity in the innovation sector, (ii) education and innate ability are com-
plementary in determining individual productivity, (iii) credentialing spending increases
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log avg. patent log max. patent log total patents log total patents
quality quality (renewed thrice) (top 10% only)
(1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006)
log income (1930) .000 .013∗ .031∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.008)
log education (1930) .130∗∗∗ .142∗∗∗ .098∗∗∗ .085∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Obs. 81,348 81,348 78,438 81,348
R2 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03
Notes: See notes for Table 10.
Table 11: Intensive Margin Robustness - Alternative Measures
the probability of getting in an innovation sector job, but it does not increase individual
productivity compared to other inventors (as opposed to education, which does both).
Alternative inventor quality measures
In the baseline intensive margin analysis, quality weighted total patents of an inven-
tor was used as the inventor quality metric, where patent quality was measured by the
citations a patent receives. This section establishes that the results are robust to using dif-
ferent measures of inventor quality. Results pertaining to additional alternative measures
can be found on Table 35 in the empirical appendix.
Table 11 replicates the regression on column 3 of Table 10 using different inventor
quality metrics.86 The first two columns preserve the same patent quality metric (cita-
tions), but consider the average and maximum patent quality for inventors respectively.
Compared to the baseline measure, the average patent quality measure puts less weight
on inventors who come up with a high number of innovations which are of mediocre
quality. Similarly, the maximum patent quality measure only considers the best invention
of a given inventor, comparing inventors according to the best ideas they came up with
86Results for replicating columns 1 and 2 are also very similar, but excluded to conserve space. These are
available upon request from the author.
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and ignoring everything else. The results are very similar to the baseline analysis: log ed-
ucation dominates in both regressions, and log income is either statistically insignificant,
or significant at the 10% level and economically insignificant.
On column 3, a new patent quality metric is introduced: patent renewal status.
USPTO requires the patent holders to renew their patents on the 4th, 8th and 12th years
after the patent grant date by paying a small fee. If the patent holders do not renew their
patents on these dates, they lose the monopoly rights on their invention. There is signifi-
cant variation about how many times patents are renewed. The patent quality metric used
on column 3 assigns a quality of 1 if the patent was renewed three times throughout its
duration, and 0 otherwise. Hence only patents which were seen sufficiently valuable by
their holders to renew three times are counted.87 The results with this metric are similar
in that education dominates income, but this time the effect of income is not statistically
insignificant.
Last column does the opposite, and focuses on a patent quality measure that only
puts weight on the best inventions produced in a year. For each year, the patents are
ranked according to the citations they receive. Only the top 10% of the inventions in a
given year are assigned a quality of 1, whereas the remaining 90% are assigned a quality
of 0. Using the inventor quality measure derived from this new measure of patent quality,
the results are similar to column 3: education is found to dominate income once again.
Controlling for demographic changes and immigration between samples
The Unites States is a country of immigrants, and it has received significant immi-
gration during the time period from 1930 to 2008. Many surnames that were very rare
87Note that although this quality metric is very reliable in weeding out patents that turn out to be worthless
over time, it provides no quality variation between patents which are sufficiently valuable to be renewed
every single time. Hence it should be thought of as a quality measure that is more informative in the lower
tail of the unobserved quality distribution as opposed to the upper tail.
151
in the 1930s are now quite common. In contrast, some surnames are now less frequent,
either due to being crowded out by the new or existing surnames, or due to low num-
ber of offspring or higher mortality rates. Could any of these demographic changes bias
the obtained estimates in a particular direction, potentially causing wrong conclusions to
be drawn? Recognizing this possible problem, this section is dedicated to investigating
whether this is true.
In order to tackle this issue, a simple variable called population share ratio is con-
structed. The share of a surname in the population in 2000 is divided by that in 1930.
This ratio is larger than unity if the surname has increased in frequency, which is the
case for many immigrant surnames. Conversely it is smaller than unity for surnames
which actually lost their prominence over time. Using this ratio as an additional explana-
tory variable, Table 12 repeats the extensive margin regression on column 3 of Table 9.
Columns 1 and 2 repeat the regression after dropping the top and bottom 25% of the
sample according to population share ratio. Hence they drop the extremely over- and
under-achieving surnames from the sample respectively. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the
same exercise keeping only the top and bottom halves of the sample respectively, i.e.
looking at over- and under-achievers within their own groups. The last column retains
the whole sample, but includes the population share ratio as a linear regressor. Although
the magnitudes change, income is found to be dominant in all cases, whereas education
is found to be either insignificant, or significant but negatively correlated. In addition,
when included as a linear regressor, the population share ratio turns out to be insignifi-
cant. Consequently, the findings of the extensive margin analysis are found to be robust.
Table 13 repeats the same analysis done in Table 12 for column 3 of Table 10. The
results are quite similar: Although the exact quantitative magnitudes may vary, the effect
of education is always quite large and positive, dominating that of income. The effect of
income is found to be either statistically or economically insignificant in all cases. The
only difference is observed when population share ratio is added as a linear regressor:
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relative representation (1975-2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
income (1930) .341∗∗∗ .249∗∗∗ .232∗∗∗ .158∗∗∗ .239∗∗∗
(.009) (.011) (.013) (.006) (.010)
education (1930) −0.021∗∗∗ .003 .005 −.002 .001
(.004) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.005)
pop. share(2000)/pop. share(1930) −.025
(.032)
Obs. 82,718 82,735 55,148 55,210 110,290
R2 0.13 0.30 0.34 0.04 0.27
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 repeat the regression in the last column of Table 9 after dropping the
top and bottom 25% of the sample according to population share ratio respectively. Columns 3
and 4 repeat the same exercise for the top and bottom halves of the sample respectively. Column 5
repeats the same regression with the whole sample while introducing the population share ratio
linearly as a regressor in addition to income and education. All notes for Table 9 apply.
Table 12: Immigration Robustness (1930-2000) - Extensive Margin
log quality wtd. total patents (1975-2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log income (1930) −.015∗ .011 .011 .037∗∗∗ .001
(.009) (.010) (.012) (.008) (.009)
log education (1930) .162∗∗∗ .173∗∗∗ .177∗∗∗ .145∗∗∗ .177∗∗∗
(.006) (.010) (.012) (.008) (.009)
pop. share(2000)/pop. share(1930) .016∗∗
(.032)
Obs. 61,013 61,011 40,684 40,676 81,348
R2 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 repeat the regression in the last column of Table 10 after dropping the
top and bottom 25% of the sample according to population share ratio respectively. Columns 3
and 4 repeat the same exercise for the top and bottom halves of the sample respectively. Column 5
repeats the same regression with the whole sample while introducing the population share ratio
linearly as a regressor in addition to income and education. All notes for Table 10 apply.
Table 13: Immigration Robustness (1930-2000) - Intensive Margin
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Its coefficient turns out to be significant at the 5% level and positive. However, estimated
at 1.6%, its coefficient is much smaller compared to the coefficient of education (17.7%).
Hence, it is once again concluded that the findings in the intensive margin analysis are
robust.
One could also be worried about another issue: It is possible that a surname the fre-
quency of which is stable over the 1930-2008 time period actually belonged to people who
were recent immigrants in 1930. Systematic differences between such surnames and those
who were already largely stable in frequency prior to 1930 could lead to potential biases
similar to those discussed earlier. Luckily, it is possible to construct a similar population
share ratio using surname frequencies in 1930 and 1880, using an earlier IPUMS-USA
sample. The cost of doing so is losing observations that belong to surnames which do not
exist in the 1880 census sample. The results of this robustness analysis are qualitatively
very similar, and can be found on Tables 36 and 37 in the empirical appendix.
Summary of empirical results
The two stylized facts obtained in the empirical analysis can be summarized as fol-
lows:
Fact 1: Individuals from richer backgrounds are much more likely to become inventors
(23.9%); whereas those from more educated backgrounds experience no similar ad-
vantage (0.1%).
Fact 2: Conditional on becoming an inventor, individuals from more educated back-
grounds turn out to be much more prolific inventors (17.5%); whereas those from
richer backgrounds exhibit no such aptitude (0.1%).
However, these results by themselves would be insufficient to establish whether there
is an economically significant misallocation of talent or not, given that innate ability is
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unobserved in the data. This is important, since (i) innate ability is likely to play a large
role in determining the probability of becoming an inventor as well as success conditional
on becoming one, (ii) innate ability is found to be very persistent across generations
by other studies (Clark, 2014), and this might be causing the observed strong positive
correlations. In order to measure the extent of the misallocation of talent in innovation, the
model developed in Section 3.2 is employed, where the regressions run here are replicated
within the model, targeting the empirical coefficient estimates. The next section describes
this calibration exercise.
3.4 Calibration
3.4.1 Solution method
Computation of the solution requires value function iteration to solve for
Vo(yo, h, a; Θ), W(b, h, a; Θ) and Vy(yy, a; Θ) and the associated policy functions
b̂(yo, h, a; Θ), n̂(b, h, a; Θ), ĥ(yy, a; Θ) and ŝ(yy, a; Θ). Simulation of the joint stationary dis-
tribution of jobs, innate ability, and early childhood education as well as the stationary
distribution of normalized savings are necessary to calculate the aggregate supplies as
well as the cut-off score threshold s̄. The results of the firm’s maximization problem and
the market clearing conditions boil down to analytical non-linear equations in K, Lu and
Ls as discussed in Section 3.2. Then these are solved to obtain the balanced growth path
equilibrium. The pseudo-code for the algorithm used to solve for the BGP equilibrium
can be found in Appendix C.1.
3.4.2 Identification
The simulation of the model requires the assignment of values to several parameters.
There are nineteen parameters to pick: β, ω, α, κ, λ, δ, Γ, ξ, ψ, ϵ, ρ, ν, σa, η, κh, ξh, κn, ξn, σj. In
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Parameter Description Identification
External Calibration
ω = 2.00 CRRA parameter Kaplow (2005)
α = 0.50 Parental altruism Aiyagari et al. (2002)
κ = 0.25 Capital’s share in production Corrado et al. (2009)
λ = 0.60 Labor’s share in production Corrado et al. (2009)
δ = 0.82 Depreciation rate U.S. NIPA
ξ = 0.50 Concavity of innovation production Hall and Ziedonis (2001)
σa = 0.70 St. dev. of innate ability shock Knowles (1999)
η = 11.6% Fraction of skilled jobs U.S. Census (2013)
Internal Calibration
β = 0.28 Discount factor Real interest rate
Γ = 0.92 Innovation productivity increase GDP growth rate
ρ = 0.70 Persistence of innate ability IG corr. of earnings
κh = 0.04 Cost of pre-tertiary education investment Education spending/GDP
κn = 0.05 Cost of score distortion investment Inequality targets
ξh = 1.30 Convexity of pre-tertiary education inv. Inequality targets
ξn = 2.50 Convexity of score distortion inv. Inequality targets
ψ = 0.40 Education share of ind. productivity Regression targets
ϵ = 1.90 Ind. productivity elasticity Regression targets
ν = 0.89 Influence of credentialing spending Regression targets
σj = 0.80 St. dev. of job shock Regression targets
Notes: All internally calibrated parameters are identified jointly; the moments in the internal
calibration panel are provided for intuition.
Table 14: Parameter Values
order to select values for the parameters, a set of empirical targets are specified for the
model to match. Some common parameters are chosen from existing studies, and the
rest are internally calibrated by employing a minimization routine that seeks to match
the data targets with the associated model-generated counterparts. In particular, some of
the regressions found on Section 3.3 are replicated in the model, and the minimization
algorithm attempts to achieve the same coefficients (“betas”) with regressions run on
model-simulated data, where the variables are normalized in the same manner. The
summary of the calibration exercise is presented on Table 14. The details are as follows:
1. CRRA parameter: This parameter is taken to be ω = 2.00, consistent with the esti-
mates listed in Kaplow (2005).
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Target U.S. Data Model
Aggregate targets
Yearly real interest rate 4.00% 4.00%
Yearly GDP growth rate 2.00% 2.00%
Education spending/GDP 7.30% 8.55%
Intergenerational correlation targets
IG corr. of earnings 0.70 0.70
IG corr. of wealth 0.37 0.33
Inequality targets
Wage income Gini index 0.48 0.52
Log 90/10 ratio 1.08 1.17
Log 90/50 ratio 0.46 0.52
Log 50/10 ratio 0.62 0.65
Regression targets
Extensive margin, income effect 0.24 0.19
Extensive margin, education effect 0.00 0.07
Intensive margin, income effect 0.00 0.08
Intensive margin, education effect 0.18 0.22
Table 15: Calibration Targets
2. Parental altruism parameter: This variable is chosen to be α = 0.50, following Aiyagari
et al. (2002).
3. Capital’s and labor’s share of income: Corrado et al. (2009) calculate the shares of tan-
gible capital, labor, and intangible capital to be κ = 0.25, λ = 0.60 and ζ = 0.15
respectively. The share of intangible capital they calculate is mapped to the share of
productivity of a firm in generating output in the model.
4. Depreciation rate for capital: The annual depreciation rate of physical capital is chosen
as 6.9% which is consistent with the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
Since each period lasts 25 years, δ = 0.82.
5. Concavity of innovation production: Following Hall and Ziedonis (2001), the concavity
parameter of the innovation production function is chosen as ξ = 0.50. This is the
most widely used value in the literature.
6. Standard deviation of innate ability shock: This parameter is chosen to be σa = 0.70, in
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line with findings on empirical income distributions reported in Knowles (1999).
7. Fraction of skilled jobs: This parameter is chosen such that it equals the percentage of
individuals in the U.S. with graduate degrees, which is 11.6% (U.S. Census, 2013).
8. Long-run interest rate: The long-run interest rate of 4.0% is targeted, which deter-
mines the discount factor β.
9. Long-run output growth: Since 1945, the the aggregate output in the U.S. grew at circa
2% per year. The parameter Γ determines the increase in productivity innovation
generates, and hence it plays the foremost role in determining the output growth
rate in the model.
10. The ratio of education spending to GDP: The ratio of the aggregate spending on edu-
cation to GDP in the U.S. is around 7.30% (OECD, 2013).The model counterpart of
this ratio is the aggregate resources spent on education over total output.
11. Intergenerational correlation of earnings: The persistence of earnings across generations
is an important statistic for the model to replicate, since it puts discipline on the
persistence of innate ability which is unobserved. The value of 70% is targeted in
the baseline analysis (Knowles (1999)).88
12. Intergenerational correlation of wealth: The persistence of wealth across generations
is also an important statistic to replicate, since the mechanism that generates the
misallocation of talent in the model works through the wealth inequality between
households. This value is estimated to be 37% in Charles and Hurst (2003).
13. Inequality targets: The calibration procedure aims to generate a realistic income dis-
tribution. To this end, various inequality metrics are calculated using the model-
generated distribution, and matched with their empirical counterparts. These are
88Since there are also estimates of intergenerational correlation of earnings as low as 40% in the literature,
the model is re-estimated with a lower target as a robustness check in Section 3.5.4.
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the Gini index, and log 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 ratios.89
14. Indirect inference: The baseline extensive and intensive margin regressions in Section
3.3 are replicated in the model. Income is proxied by the income of the agents in the
model, and education is proxied by pre-tertiary education. Relative representation
among inventors in the data is mapped to relative representation in the innovation
sector jobs. Inventor quality in the data is mapped to individual productivity con-
ditional on having an innovation job. As in the empirical analysis, all variables are
normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The
coefficients of income end education in both margins are then targeted.
The success of the calibration exercise in matching the data targets is presented on
Table 15. The interest rate and the yearly GDP growth rate are hit very precisely, and
they determine the values of β and Γ respectively. The model generates an education
spending to GDP ratio somewhat higher than what is observed in the U.S. data. Given
that the number taken from the data does not include the opportunity cost of time spent
by parents in order to nurture their children, overshooting might not be a significant
problem.
The intergenerational correlation of earnings is hit precisely, which disciplines the
persistence of (unobserved) innate ability ρ (positively related), but is also influenced by
the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic job shock σj (negatively related). The intergen-
erational correlation of wealth the model produces is 0.33, which is somewhat lower than
the value of 0.37 observed in the data, but still within a reasonable range.
The model generates a wage income distribution slightly more unequal compared
to the U.S. economy. For instance, the Gini index is calculated to be 0.52 as opposed to
0.48 observed in the data. However, the remaining inequality targets that measure the
89Note that one of these three ratios is a deterministic function of the other two; so it provides no additional
information.
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Figure 10: Changes in Income and Education Effects with Varying Values of ν
inequality in different sections of the distribution show that the model is successful in
matching the shape. Log 90/10, log 90/50 and log 50/10 ratios are all slightly higher
than their data counterparts by similar percentages.
The model is able to replicate the dominance of income on the extensive margin (the
probability of getting an innovation sector job) and the dominance of education on the
intensive margin (the success conditional on getting an innovation job). The coefficients
of the dominated effects (education on the extensive margin, and income on the intensive
margin) are not precisely zero, so the starkness of the differences are more similar to
those observed in the regressions on Columns 3 and 4 of Table 11, as opposed to that on
Column 3 of Table 10 on the intensive margin.
Generating the discrepancy between the effects of income and education on the two
margins is made possible by the credentialing spending channel. Figure 10 plots the
effects of income (red) and education (blue) while varying the influence of credentialing
spending ν in the range of values it can take (ν ∈ [0, 1]). The left panel plots the effects
on the extensive margin, and the right panel plots the same on the intensive margin. As
ν increases from 0 to 1, the predictive power of ancestor income on the probability of
becoming an inventor increases, whereas that of education decreases. On the other hand,
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increasing ν from 0 to 1 does not change the predictive power of ancestor income and
education in opposite directions, slightly increasing both at the same time.90 This makes
it possible to change the value of ν such that the dominance pattern observed in the data
can be hit in the model generated regressions. This differential effect of ν on the two
margins provides the intuition on how targeting the dominance pattern helps pin down
its value.91
3.5 Quantitative Results
In this section, using the parameter values estimated in Section 3.4, several quanti-
tative experiments are conducted to better understand the mechanism of the model, to
assess the welfare costs associated with the misallocation of talent due to the credentialing
spending channel, and to determine socially optimal progressive bequest tax schedules.
The first subsection describes the social welfare function used in the study, and how
two different steady-state economies are compared with each other. The following sub-
section conducts a hypothetical thought experiment where the credentialing spending
channel is completely shut down, which results in an increase in the aggregate output
growth rate as well as social welfare through a reduction in the misallocation of talent.
The third subsection focuses on how a benevolent government can increase social
welfare and economic growth in a decentralized market economy through the policy tool
90Whether income or education dominates on the intensive margin (i.e. inventor productivity) is deter-
mined by other parameters of the model. The model is able to generate any correlation pattern, including
the exact opposite of the empirically observed pattern of dominance, by changing the parameter values.
91One could be worried about whether other parameters that play a part in the determination of the
individual score could generate a similar differential effect on the two margins. The prime candidates are the
elasticity of substitution between innate ability and early childhood education ϵ, and the share of education
in individual productivity ψ. It is found out that this is not the case. In particular, if the credentialing
spending channel is shut down (ν = 0), both ϵ and ψ change the effects of income and education in the same
direction on both margins at the same time. Therefore if the credentialing spending channel is removed from
the model without introducing any other mechanisms, the model is unable to mimic the domination patterns
observed in the data.
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of progressive bequest taxation. Although the growth effect is found to be around 25% of
what can be achieved by shutting down the credentialing spending channel, the welfare
increase is found to be larger and quite significant: 6.20% in consumption equivalent
terms
In Section 3.5.4, the model is recalibrated with a lower intergenerational correlation of
earnings target of 0.45 in order to check whether the model generates similar quantitative
implications. Repeating the credentialing spending shut-down experiment with the new
calibration leads to higher growth and welfare effects, however the increase in magnitudes
are not too large.
3.5.1 Welfare comparisons
In order to measure welfare, a utilitarian social welfare function is employed where
each household is weighed equally. The social planner is assumed to assign equal value
to the utility from consumption of all members of a household at a given time. The utility
in the future is discounted by the discount factor β of the household. Hence, the social
welfare in a balanced growth path equilibrium with output growth rate g is given by
W =
∞
∑
t=0
βt
∫ 1
m=0
(
c1−ωc,m,t
1 − ω +
c1−ωy,m,t−1
1 − ω +
c1−ωo,m,t−2
1 − ω
)
dm
=
∫ 1
m=0
(
c1−ωc,m,0 + c
1−ω
y,m,−1 + c
1−ω
o,m,−2
)
dm
(1 − ω)(1 − β(1 + g)1−ω) (3.21)
The welfare comparisons between different economies will be conducted by comparing
the balanced growth path equilibria.92 In order to make two different economies A and
B comparable, both economies will be started at the same aggregate productivity level
z̄A0 = z̄
B
0 = 1. Let ν > 0 be the scalar such that multiplying every agent’s consumption
in economy A with ν results in a welfare number equivalent to the one in economy B.
92Hence this analysis ignores the welfare effects of the transition to the new steady state.
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Simple algebra reveals that ν is given by
ν = (WB/WA)1/(1−ω) (3.22)
where WA and WB denote the welfare in economies A and B respectively. The welfare
gain or loss a move from economy A to economy B provides in consumption equivalent
terms is given by ν − 1. This welfare measure is used in all quantitative exercises.
3.5.2 Shutting down the credentialing spending channel
How does the misallocation of talent affect economic growth and social welfare? In
order to address this question, a simple hypothetical thought experiment will be con-
ducted. Recall that individuals heterogeneous in innate ability, early childhood education
and wealth are able to receive high quality tertiary education if they can achieve a high
enough score given by
s̃(l(h, a), n) = (1 − ν)l(h, a) + νn + ϵj.
The score of an individual is partially influenced by the actual individual productivity
l(h, a), partially by the credentialing spending n, and partially by the random shock ϵj.
Given the scarcity of high quality tertiary education, increasing the growth rate of the
economy is only possible through improving the composition of the individuals who get
high quality tertiary education in terms of individual productivity. If the influence of
credentialing spending could be diminished such that ν = 0, the scores of the individuals
would be perfectly correlated with their actual individual productivity sans the random
shock. This would result in highly talented individuals ending up in the innovation
sector, where they can contribute to the aggregate productivity growth. Following this
line of thought, the economy calibrated in Section 3.4 is taken, and the parameter ν is set
to 0. This hypothetical economy is then compared to the baseline economy.
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Variable Baseline ν = 0 Change
Extensive margin, income effect 0.19 0.05 -73.7%
Extensive margin, education effect 0.07 0.15 114%
Intensive margin, income effect 0.08 0.06 -25.0%
Intensive margin, education effect 0.22 0.20 -9.09%
Yearly GDP growth rate 2.00% 2.21% 10.4%
Education spending/GDP 8.55% 10.2% 19.1%
Aggregate skilled labor, Ls 0.48 0.62 28.4%
Aggregate unskilled labor, Lu 1.91 2.00 4.69%
Mean innate ability of skilled workers, a 2.08 2.57 23.4%
Mean early childhood education of skilled workers, h 2.27 2.96 30.1%
Mean parental wealth of skilled workers, yo 0.87 0.84 -4.32%
Mean bequests received of skilled workers, b 0.49 0.25 -49.5%
Wage income Gini index 0.52 0.56 6.61%
Log 90/10 ratio 1.17 1.20 3.10%
Log 90/50 ratio 0.52 0.57 9.30%
Log 50/10 ratio 0.65 0.64 -1.88%
Table 16: Shutting down the credentialing spending channel
Table 16 displays the values of several statistics of interest in the baseline and hypo-
thetical economies and how much they change in percentage terms. The first four rows
display how the effects of income and education in the extensive and intensive margins
change. In the baseline economy, income effect dominated in the determination of the
chances of getting an innovation job, whereas education effect dominated in the predic-
tion of productivity conditional on becoming an inventor. Now that the credentialing
channel has been shut down, education effect dominates in both the extensive and inten-
sive margins. Thus the people who would perform better as inventors and those who
actually become inventors largely coincide.
The annual GDP growth rate changes from 2.00% to 2.21%, a large increase. This
is caused by a 28.4% increase in the aggregate skilled labor supply Ls. Investigating the
changes in the characteristics of the people who become inventors reveals that this is
driven by higher quality individuals in terms of both innate ability and early childhood
education. The mean innate ability a of inventors increases by 23.4%, indicating a bet-
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ter allocation of naturally talented individuals to where their contribution would be the
greatest. Furthermore, these individuals also receive more early childhood education in-
vestment when they are children, further increasing the average individual productivity
of inventors.
Looking at the parental backgrounds of the inventors, it is observed that the mean
parental wealth is slightly lower by -4.32%. However the mean bequests received fall
tremendously by 49.5%. This is driven by two effects working in the same direction:
(1) since ν = 0, it is no longer possible for less talented children with wealthier parents
to outperform the more talented but less wealthy competitors in score by outspending
them in credentialing, (2) given that their children do not need to spend any money on
credentialing; the parents do not deem it necessary to leave large bequests, spending some
of the extra windfall for their own consumption, and the rest on the productive early
childhood education investment which improves individual productivity l and score s̃
simultaneously.
The inequality measures tell a different story: The decrease in the misallocation of
talent is beneficial for economic growth, but it also leads to a more unequal society in
terms of income. The Gini index increases from 0.52 to 0.57. Examining the income ratios
is more revealing: Log 90/10 ratio increases by 3.10%, exhibiting an increase in the gap
between the rich and the poor. However log 90/50 ratio increases at a much higher rate
of 9.30%, whereas log 50/10 ratio decreases by 1.88%. These results indicate that the
increase in inequality is largely driven by the upper tail of the income distribution. As
more naturally talented individuals have better chances at becoming inventors, they are
also able to earn higher incomes, drifting away from the rest of the workers.
As a combined result of all of these changes, the welfare in the hypothetical economy
is 5.93% higher than the baseline economy in consumption equivalent terms. However, it
is important to keep in mind that the hypothetical economy is still far away from the first
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best. Although the misallocation of talent in the tertiary education stage is reduced to
the effect of the randomness inherent in the allocation process only, the early childhood
education investment in children is still a function of parental wealth. Thus there is still
room for improvement. In addition, the egalitarian social welfare function assigns impor-
tance into equalizing outcomes between households in terms of consumption, so holding
everything constant, there are also potential gains from redistribution of resources. The
following subsection discusses a potential government policy which can address a com-
bination of the listed concerns simultaneously.
3.5.3 Progressive bequest taxation
The previous thought experiment shows that reducing the misallocation of talent in
the economy by shutting down the credentialing spending channel can lead to signifi-
cant gains in growth and welfare. Can a benevolent government achieve similar gains
by utilizing available policy options in a decentralized economy? To this end, socially
optimal progressive bequest taxes will now considered. In order to reduce the cost of
computation, a particular functional form is assumed with the scale parameter τs and
the progressivity parameter τp such that the budget constraint of the old adults in the
decision problem given in (3.12) becomes
co +
(
b
1 − τs
) 1
1−τp
≤ yo
which is equivalent to the old budget constraint if τs = τp = 0. All the collected taxes
are then transferred to the young adults as a type-independent lump sum transfer Tr,
changing the equation that determines yy in (3.13) to
yy =
(
wjy +
w′jy
1 + r′
)
ly(hy, ay) + b − cn(n) + Tr.
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Variable Baseline Optimal b tax Change
Extensive margin, income effect 0.19 0.17 -10.5%
Extensive margin, education effect 0.07 0.08 14.3%
Intensive margin, income effect 0.08 0.02 -75.0%
Intensive margin, education effect 0.22 0.27 22.7%
Yearly GDP growth rate 2.00% 2.05% 2.50%
Education spending/GDP 8.55% 9.13% 6.85%
Aggregate skilled labor, Ls 0.48 0.51 6.29%
Aggregate unskilled labor, Lu 1.91 1.93 0.94%
Mean innate ability of skilled workers, a 2.08 2.15 3.33%
Mean early childhood education of skilled workers, h 2.27 2.47 8.90%
Mean parental wealth of skilled workers, yo 0.87 0.85 -3.05%
Mean bequests received of skilled workers, b 0.49 0.43 -10.6%
Wage income Gini index 0.52 0.53 1.92%
Log 90/10 ratio 1.17 1.17 0.54%
Log 90/50 ratio 0.52 0.52 0.00%
Log 50/10 ratio 0.65 0.66 0.01%
Table 17: Optimal progressive bequest taxation results
In order to prevent lump sum taxes, Tr ≥ 0 is imposed, and the government must balance
its budget every period.
The welfare maximizing values of τs and τp are found to be 0.125 and 0.171 respec-
tively. The bequest tax schedule implied by these two values is quite progressive: The
average bequest tax rate faced by the top 1% is 12.1%, whereas this number falls to 9.70%
for the top 5%, and 4.18% for the top 10%. In fact, when the transfers are also taken into
account, the bottom 95% of the households are net recipients, whereas only the top 5%
pay into the system. Furthermore, as it will be demonstrated later on, this progressive
taxation scheme does not result in a less productive society: the aggregate productivity of
the inventors and the growth rate of output are higher in this alternative economy. Hence
the increased equity does not come at the cost of reducing efficiency.
Table 17 shows how the statistics of interest change compared to the baseline under
the optimal progressive bequest taxation policy. Looking at the regression targets, and the
extensive margin in particular, income loses its explanatory power by 10.5% of its value,
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whereas that of education increases by 14.3%. The effects on the intensive margin are
much more pronounced, where income loses 75% of its explanatory power, and education
completely dominates. All of these targets point towards a decrease in the misallocation
of talent.
The growth rate of the economy increases to 2.05% from its baseline value of 2.00%,
which corresponds to one quarter of the effect observed in the case of ν = 0. This is
caused by the increase in the aggregate skilled labor supply Ls by 6.29%. Examining
the mean innate ability a and early childhood education h of inventors, the increase of
quality in the composition is driven more by early childhood education (8.90%) rather
than innate ability (3.33%). So it can be argued that the optimal bequest taxes contribute
to the growth rate of the economy more through reducing the suboptimal investment
in early childhood education rather than allocating higher innate ability people to the
innovation sector. However, both channels have a positive contribution regardless of their
relative power.
In contrast to the thought experiment where credentialing spending is shut down, the
increase in the growth rate of the economy is not accompanied by a significant increase
in income inequality. The inequality metrics under the optimal taxation policy have very
similar values to their baseline values. This is caused by the redistributive nature of the
optimal tax policy. As a result of this, even though the growth gain is one quarter of the
ν = 0 case, the welfare gain is calculated to be slightly higher: 6.20% in consumption
equivalent terms.
3.5.4 Recalibration with lower intergenerational earnings persistence
The intergenerational persistence of innate ability ρ is an important parameter of the
model, the value of which has an important bearing on quantitative counterfactuals. Since
innate ability is not directly observable, the value of ρ is indirectly inferred by trying to
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Variable Baseline ν = 0 Change
Extensive margin, income effect 0.05 0.03 -40.0%
Extensive margin, education effect 0.03 0.05 66.7%
Intensive margin, income effect 0.05 0.07 40.0%
Intensive margin, education effect 0.06 0.09 50.0%
Yearly GDP growth rate 2.00% 2.29% 14.5%
Education spending/GDP 7.09% 10.7% 51.5%
Aggregate skilled labor, Ls 0.37 0.52 42.5%
Aggregate unskilled labor, Lu 1.72 1.92 11.9%
Mean innate ability of skilled workers, a 1.85 2.45 32.5%
Mean early childhood education of skilled workers, h 1.43 2.18 52.7%
Mean parental wealth of skilled workers, yo 0.70 0.74 5.34%
Mean bequests received of skilled workers, b 0.45 0.28 -38.3%
Wage income Gini index 0.49 0.52 6.37%
Log 90/10 ratio 1.03 1.00 -3.11%
Log 90/50 ratio 0.48 0.46 -3.71%
Log 50/10 ratio 0.56 0.54 -2.59%
Table 18: Shutting down the credentialing spending channel - Low earnings persistence
match the intergenerational correlation of earnings (IGE) generated in the model with
that found in the data. However, the exact value of IGE in the U.S. over the time period
is not a settled topic in the literature.93 Although consistent with the highly persistent
effects of income and education discovered in Section 3.3, the value of 0.70 targeted in
the baseline analysis is on the higher end of the estimates found in the literature. This
section repeats the calibration exercise in Section 3.4 with a lower IGE target of 0.45, and
assesses its effects.
The calibrated values of most parameters remain very similar to the results in Table
14, with the exception of intergenerational persistence of innate ability, ρ. This falls from
0.70 to 0.40, a very significant decrease. As a result, the effects of income and education
on both margins fall, as well as the differences between the effects for a given regression.
The earnings inequality in the steady state is also lower.
93See the seminal work of Solon (1999) on the issue, and Black and Devereux (2010), Chetty et al. (2014)
and the references therein for a recent survey of the literature.
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How does the lower value of ρ effect the counterfactual experiments? In order to
answer this question, the hypothetical thought experiment in Section 3.5.2 is repeated un-
der the new calibration. Table 18 summarizes the results of shutting down credentialing
spending by setting ν = 0. The output growth rate of the economy increases from 2.00%
to 2.29%, driven by a huge 42.5% increase in aggregate skilled labor supply. Compared
to the baseline economy, the welfare gain is found to be 6.63% in consumption equivalent
terms.
These values are slightly higher compared to those found in Section 3.5.2. Why is this
the case? Inspection reveals that this is caused by a higher degree of initial misallocation
of talent in the low IGE economy. Under the baseline calibration, due to the higher
persistence of innate ability ρ at 0.70, the rich and the talented largely coincide in the
stationary equilibrium. When this persistence is lower at 0.40, the chances of a genius
being born to a comparatively poor household are higher. As a result of this, the mean
innate ability a of inventors is lower before the shutdown of the credentialing channel.
Hence, the growth and welfare implications are amplified when ρ is lower.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper develops a model of misallocation of talent in the innovation sector. Work-
ers in the economy are finitely-lived, and heterogeneous in terms of wealth, early child-
hood education, and innate ability. The sectors in the economy are separated into pro-
duction and innovation, where the latter serves to improve the productivity of the prior.
The training necessary to become a worker in the innovation sector is scarce. Agents
compete against each other in order to acquire this scarce training so that they can get
innovation sector jobs that pay more. They use productive early childhood education
investment as well as (socially) unproductive credentialing spending in order to increase
their chances. Financial frictions in the form of a non-negative bequest constraint and the
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inability to insure against idiosyncratic risk, coupled with the misalignment of private
and social incentives result in a misallocation of talent across the two sectors. The nature
and magnitude of this misallocation of talent are examined.
Empirical analysis makes use of three sets of micro-data—NBER USPTO Utility
Patents Grant Database, The Careers and Co-Authorship Networks of U.S. Patent-
Holders, and IPUMS-USA 1930 5% Sample—that were previously unlinked in order to
establish two new stylized facts: (1) People from richer backgrounds are more likely to
become inventors; but those from more educated backgrounds are not. (2) People from
more educated backgrounds become more prolific inventors; but those from richer back-
grounds exhibit no such aptitude. This discrepancy suggests a misallocation of talent in
the innovation sector, which motivates the development of a model that can generate the
correlation patterns observed in the data. The results are robust to the use of alternative
patent and inventor quality measures, as well as potential biases that might be caused by
immigration and similar demographic changes.
The developed model is calibrated to match data targets including aggregate mo-
ments of the U.S. economy such as the yearly long-run output growth and real interest
rates and the ratio of education spending to GDP; moments obtained using micro data
such as intergenerational correlation of earnings and wealth and various inequality mea-
sures regarding the earnings distribution; as well as data targets taken from the original
empirical analysis such as the effect of income and education on the probability of getting
an innovation sector job, and the productivity conditional on having one. The calibrated
model is then used to explore how the misallocation of talent between the production and
innovation sectors is generated, and the findings suggest that the welfare effects of this
misallocation might be substantial.
The quantitative analysis reveals that if the credentialing spending channel could
be shut down, the aggregate output growth rate would increase from 2.00% to 2.21%,
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leading to a welfare gain of 5.93% in consumption equivalent terms. Another quantitative
experiment that seeks to calculate the socially optimal bequest taxation policy reveals that
the growth rate could be increased to 2.05% even in a decentralized market economy by
leveling the playing field and reducing the effect of suboptimal early childhood education
spending due to financial frictions. The resulting welfare gain is quite significant at 6.20%.
A robustness analysis is conducted to show how the model performs when different
calibration targets are chosen, and the quantitative results remain largely similar.
The stylized facts established in the empirical analysis are quite provoking, and the
model suggests that reducing the existing misallocation of talent in the economy might
yield significant welfare gains through an increase in the long-run output growth rate.
Given how important the upper tail of the talent distribution is in generating the ideas that
drive economic progress, it is likely that policies that alleviate the misallocation through
reducing wealth inequality or financial frictions might be desirable. Future research is
needed to establish more detailed policy responses that take additional life-cycle elements
into account, as well as the welfare implications of the transition to the new steady-state.
The empirical methodology used in the paper can also be applied in any other sector
where surname-level information is available, which would considerably expand our un-
derstanding of the allocation of talent in other sectors, as well as the intergenerational
dynamics of socioeconomic status.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
The appendix contains two sections, namely Sections A.1 and A.2. Section A.1 deals
with theoretical aspects of the analysis. In particular, the full solution for the symmetric
balanced growth is provided. Section A.2 pertains to the empirical work. This section
describes the databases that are used and discusses how they are cleaned and linked
together. The construction of the distance metrics and patent stock measures used in the
analysis are then detailed. The empirical section also repeats the panel data regression
analysis reported in Table 3 when the licensing intensity of a sector is included. Last, the
Jacobian associated with the calibration procedure is presented.
A.1 Theory Appendix
A.1.1 Balanced Growth
The analysis is restricted to studying a symmetric balanced growth path. The solution
to the economy along a balanced growth path will now be characterized. Suppose that
mean level of productivity for firms, z, grows at the constant gross rate g. Specify the
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variables z and z in transformed form so that z̃ = zζ/(ζ+λ) and z̃ = z/zλ/(ζ+λ). Thus, z̃
grows at rate gζ/(ζ+λ) and, on average, so will z̃. It turns out that z̃ (or equivalently z)
is sufficient to characterize the aggregate state of the economy along a balanced growth
path. It also turns out that the form of the distribution for d-type patent buyers, or G,
does not matter.
Proposition 6. (Balanced Growth) There exists a symmetric balanced growth path of the following
form:
1. The interest factor, r, and rental rate on capital, r̃, are given by (1.22) and (1.23).
2. The value functions for buying, keeping and selling firms have linear forms in the state
variables z̃ and z̃. Specifically, B(z; z) = b1z̃ + b2z̃, K(z + γdxz; z) = k1z̃ + k2(x)z̃, and
S(z; z) = s1z̃ + s2z̃.
3. The indicator function for an innovator specifies a threshold rule such that Ik(z, x; z) = 1,
whenever x > xk, and is zero otherwise. I.e., an innovating firm keeps its d-type idea when
x > xk and sells otherwise.
4. The indicator function for a sale between a buyer and the patent agent for a d-type idea
specifies a threshold rule such that Ia(z, x; z) = 1, whenever x > xa, and is zero otherwise.
I.e., a sale between a buyer and a patent agents occurs if and only if x > xa.
5. The value function for a patent agent has the linear form A(z) = az̃.
6. The beginning-of-period value function for a firm has the linear form V(z; z) = v1z̃ + v2z̃.
The constant rate of innovation for a d-type idea by a firm is
i = i =
{
1
χ
[
X(xk)s2 +
∫ 1
xk
k2(x)dX(x)− b2
]}1/ρ
. (A.1)
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7. The constant net rate of growth for aggregate productivity, g − 1, is implicitly given by
g − 1 = γd
[
i
∫ 1
xk
xdX(x) + (1 − i)mb(
na
nb
)
∫ 1
xa
xdx
]
+ γnp, (A.2)
with the aggregate law of motion (1.3) taking the simple form
z′ = gz.
8. The prices for selling and buying d-type patents are
q = az̃,
and
P(z, x; z) =
[
(1 − ω)σrgζ/(ζ+λ)a+ ω(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γdx
]
z̃,
where π is a constant.
9. The matching probabilities for sellers and buyers of d-type patents are constant and implicitly
defined by
ma(
na
nb
) = η
{
{1 − σ[1 − ma( nanb )(1 − xa)]}(1 − i)
σiX(xk)
}1−µ
, (A.3)
and
mb(
na
nb
) = η
{
σiX(xk)
{1 − σ[1 − ma( nanb )(1 − xa)]}(1 − i)
}µ
. (A.4)
10. The constants a, b1, b2, k1, π, s1, s2, v1, v2, xa and xk, as well as the linear term
k2(x), are determined by a nonlinear equation system, in conjunction with the 5 equations
(1.22), (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) that determine the 5 variables g, i, r, ma(na/nb), and
mb(na/nb). This system of nonlinear equations does not involve either z̃ or z̃.
Along a balanced growth path, wages grow at the constant gross rate gζ/(ζ+λ), a fact
evident from equation (1.20). So will aggregate output and profits, as can be seen from
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(1.7). The gross interest rate, 1/r, will remain constant along a balanced growth path.
Point 2 implies that on average the values of the firm at the buying, selling, and keeping
stages also grow at the rate of growth of output. So, the relative values of a firm at these
stages remain constant in a balanced growth equilibrium. Thus, it is not surprising then
that the decisions to buy, sell or keep d-type patents in terms of propinquity, x, do not
change over time. Hence, the function Ik(z, x; z) does not depend on z. It may seem
surprising that the decision doesn’t depend on z, either. This transpires because a firm’s
profits are linear in z, as equation (1.7) shows. It turns out that k1 = s1, which implies
that only x is relevant [when comparing k1z̃ + k2(x)z̃ with s1z̃ + s2z̃]. Likewise, the value
of a patent agent also increases at rate gζ/(ζ+λ)–point 3. Hence, equation (1.21) dictates
that the price, q, at which a firm can sell a d-type patent must also grow at this rate.
Additionally, it is easy to see from (1.16) that the price at which the agent sells a d-type
patent to firms, p, will appreciate at this rate too. Note that this price does not depend on
z, because given the linear form of the value function, V, only x will be relevant (when
comparing v1z′ with v1z). Additionally, using (1.17) it should now not be too difficult to
see that the function Ia(z, x; z) will only depend on x. It’s easy to deduce from equation
(1.14) that the rate of innovation, i, will be constant over time if B, K, and S grow at
the same rate as aggregate productivity. Since the decisions to buy and sell patents only
depend on x, it is straightforward that the number of buyers and sellers on the patent
market are fixed along a balanced growth path. To see that the form for the distribution
function over buyers, G(z), does not matter note that this function only enters value
function for the patent agent (1.15). But, by points (4) and (8), the functions Ia(z, x; z) and
P(z, x; z) do not depend on z. Thus, G(z) is irrelevant in (1.15). Last, the evolution of
shape of the distribution function Z over time does not matter for the analysis. Its mean
grows at the gross rate g, independently of any transformation in shape.
Proof of the Existence of a Balanced Growth Path. The proof proceeds using a guess and ver-
ify procedure (or the method of undetermined coefficients).
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Point (1). To derive the interest factor and rental rate, r and r̃, imagine the problem of
a consumer/worker who can invest in one period bonds that pay a gross interest rate of
1/r. The Euler equation for asset accumulation will read
c−ε = (β/r)(c′)−ε.
Along a balanced growth path, if the mean level of productivity grows at rate g then
consumption, the capital stock and output must grow at rate gζ/(ζ+λ). This fact can be
gleaned from the production function (1.1), by assuming z grows at rate g, that capital
and output grow at another common rate, and that labor remains constant. Therefore,
r = β/gεζ/(ζ+λ). In standard fashion, the rental rate on capital is given by r̃ = 1/r − 1 +
δ = gεζ/(ζ+λ)/β − 1 + δ.
Point (4). The form of the threshold rule for buying a d-type patent follows from
the fact the sum of the surplus (sans price) accruing to a firm that buys a patent and
the surplus (sans price) to the patent agent must be greater than zero; otherwise, a non-
negative sale price, p, for the d-type patent would not exist. First, plug the solutions for
w and r̃, or (1.20) and (1.23), into the profit function (1.7) to obtain
e′Π(z, z) = π
e′z
zλ/(ζ+λ)
= πe′ z̃, (A.5)
and
E[e′Π(z, z)] = πz̃, since E[e′] = 1,
with
π ≡ ζ
gλ/(ζ+λ)
(
κ
gεζ/(ζ+λ)/β + δ − 1
)κ/(ζ+λ)
. (A.6)
Second, conjecture that the value functions V(z; z) and A(s) have the forms V(z; z) =
v1z̃ + v2z̃ and A(s) = az̃. Third, given the above, note that the (sans price) surpluses for
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a buying firm and the patent agent are given by
π(z̃ + γdxz̃)− πz̃ + rE[V
(
z + γdxz, z′
)
]− rE[V
(
z, z′
)
] = (π +
rv1
gλ/(ζ+λ)
)γdxz̃,
and
−σrA(z′) = −σrgζ/(ζ+λ)az̃ [cf. (1.17)].
It is easy to deduce from (1.16) and (1.17) that sum of these two quantities must be
positive for a trade to take place. Note that whether or not the sum of the above two
equations is nonnegative does not depend on z̃. This sum is also increasing in x. Solving
for the value of x that sets the sum to zero yields
xa =
σrgζ/(ζ+λ)a
(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γd
. (A.7)
Thus, xa is a constant.
Point (8). The solutions for d-type patent prices, q and P(z, x; z), are easy to obtain.
Insert the above formulae for the (sans price) surplus for a buying firm and the (sans
price) surplus for a patent agent into expression (1.16) to get
P(z, x; z) =
[
ω(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γdx + (1 − ω)σrgζ/(ζ+λ)a
]
z̃.
It is immediate from (1.21) that q = az̃, predicated upon the guess A(s) = az̃.
Point (5). It will now be shown that the value function for the patent agent, A(z),
has the conjectured linear form. Focus on equation (1.15), which specifies the solution
for A. The price for a d-type patent does not depend on z, given Point (8). Additionally,
D(x) = U[0, 1]. Furthermore, Ia = 1 for x > xa and is zero otherwise. Thus,
A(z) = az̃ = ma(na/nb)
∫ 1
xa
P(z, x; z)dx + [1 − ma(na/nb)Pr(x ≥ xa)]σrA(z′),
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from which it follows that
a = σrgζ/(ζ+λ)a− ma(na/nb)(1 − xa)ωσrgζ/(ζ+λ)a (A.8)
+ma(na/nb)ω(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γd(1 − xa)(1 + xa)/2.
Point (2). The value function for a buying firm, B(z; z), can be determined in a manner
similar to that for A in Point (5). Here
B(z; z) = b1z̃ + b2z̃,
with
b1 = π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ), (A.9)
and
b2 = −mb(na/nb)(1 − xa)(1 − ω)σrgζ/(ζ+λ)a+ rv2gζ/(ζ+λ) (A.10)
+mb(na/nb)(1 − ω)(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γd(1 − xa)(1 + xa)/2
+(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnp.
To derive this solution, the results in Points (4) and (8), along with the conjectured solution
for V, are used in equation (1.8). Similarly, using equation (1.11) it can be shown that the
value function for a seller, S(z; z), is given by
S(z; z) = s1z̃ + s2z̃,
with
s1 = π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ), (A.11)
and
s2 = σa+ rv2gζ/(ζ+λ) + (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnp. (A.12)
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Last, following from (1.10), a keeper’s value function can be written as
K(z + γdxz; z) = k1z̃ + k2(x)z̃,
with
k1 = π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ), (A.13)
and
k2(x) = (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γdx + rv2gζ/(ζ+λ) + (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnp. (A.14)
Point (3). The threshold rule for keeping or selling a d-type patent is determined by
the condition
k1z̃ + k2(xk)z̃=s1z̃ + s2z̃;
that is, at the threshold a firm is indifferent between keeping or selling the patent. Now,
s1 = k1 so that
(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γdxk + rv2gζ/(ζ+λ) + (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnp = σa+ rv2gζ/(ζ+λ)
+(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnp.
Hence,
xk =
σa[
π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ)
]
γd
, (A.15)
a constant.
Point (6). Turn now to the beginning-of-period value function for the firm, V(z; z),
and the rate of innovation, i, that it will choose. By using the linear forms for the value
functions B(z; z), K(z + γdxz; z), and S(z; z), the fact that b1 = k1 = s1, and the property
that the threshold rule takes the form Ik = 1 for x > xk and Ik = 0 otherwise, the firm’s
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dynamic programming problem (1.13) can be rewritten as
V(z; z) = z̃ max
i∈[0,1]
{[X(xk)s2 +
∫ 1
xk
k2(x)dX(x)− b2]i −
χ
1 + ρ
i1+ρ}
+ (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))z̃ + b2z̃.
Differentiating with respect to i then gives
X(xk)s2 +
∫ 1
xk
k2(x)dX(x)− b2 = χiρ,
from which (A.1) follows. Using the solution for i, as given by (A.1), in the above pro-
gramming problem yields
V(z; z) =
ρ
(1 + ρ)χ1/ρ
[X(xk)s2 +
∫ 1
xk
k2(x)dX(x)− b2]1+
1
ρ z̃ + (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))z̃ + b2z̃.
It then follows that
v1 =
gλ/(ζ+λ)
gλ/(ζ+λ) − r
π, (A.16)
and
v2 = b2 +
ρ
(1 + ρ)χ1/ρ
[X(xk)s2 +
∫ 1
xk
k2(x)dX(x)− b2]1+
1
ρ . (A.17)
Point (7). The gross rate of growth for aggregate productivity, g, will now be cal-
culated. Suppose that aggregate productivity is currently z. A fraction i of firms will
innovate today. Those firms that draw x > xk will keep their good patent. The produc-
tivity for these firms will increase. The fraction 1 − i of firms will fail to innovate. Out of
these firms the proportion mb(na/nb) will find a seller on the market for d-type patents.
They will buy a d-type patent when x > xa. Thus, z will evolve according to
z′ = z + i
∫ 1
xk
γdxzdX(x) + mb(na/nb)(1 − i)
∫ 1
xa
γdxzdx + γnpz.
This implies (A.2).
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Point (9). The number of buyers on the market for d-type patents is given by nb =
1 − i; all firms that fail to innovate will try to buy a d-type patent. Along a symmetric
balanced growth path, the number of patent agents, na, must satisfy the equation
na = σna[1 − ma(na/nb)(1 − xa)] + σiX(xk).
Focus on the right-hand side. Take the first term. Suppose that there are na patent agents
at the beginning of the period. A fraction σ of these agents will survive into next period.
Out of these, mb(na/nb)(1 − xa) will find a buyer. Thus, they will not be around these
next period. Move to the second term. A mass of iX(xk) new firms will decide to sell
their patents Out of this, the fraction σ will survive. The sum of these two terms equals
the new stock of patent for sale, na. Solving yields
na =
σiX(xk)
1 − σ[1 − ma(na/nb)(1 − xa)]
and
na
nb
=
σiX(xk)
(1 − i){1 − σ[1 − ma(na/nb)(1 − xa)]}
.
Equations (A.3) and (A.4) follow immediately.
Point (10). The 12 constants, viz a, b1, b2, k1, π, s1, s2, v1, v2, xa and xk, in conjunction
with the linear term k2(x), are specified by the 12 non-linear equation (A.6) to (A.17). The
equations include the variables g, i, r, ma(na/nb), and mb(na/nb). So, equations (1.22),
(A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) must be appended to the system to obtain a system of 17
equations in 17 unknowns. This system does not depend on either z̃ or z̃.
A.1.2 More on Tacking on a Market for n-type Patents
The discussion in Section 1.3.4 is completed here. An n-type idea is worth (π +
rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnz̃ in production value to a firm.94 Specifically, it will increase z′ by γnz.
94In Section A.1.1 it is shown that the value functions for buying, keeping, selling and innovating firms are
linear in the expected value of a new n-type idea, as can be seen by examining the coefficients, b2, k2(x), s2,
and v2. The terms in question have the all form (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))np, implying that the production value of
an n-type idea is (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))n–see (A.10), (A.12), (A.14) and (A.17).
182
This will lead to increase in current profits in the amount πγnz̃ and discounted expected
future profits by rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ)γnz̃. Any price, qb, in the interval [0, (π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnz̃]
can be an equilibrium market price on the market for n-type patents. The exact value for
qb doesn’t matter though. At the time of all decision making, the expected discounted
present value of profits arising from an n-type patent is p[(1 − ps)(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnz̃
+psqb]+(1− p)pb[(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnz̃ − qb], which takes into account the keeping, sell-
ing and buying events, respectively. This expression reduces to p(π + rv1/gλ/(ζ+λ))γnz̃,
using the fact that pps = (1− p)pb. Thus, the expected discounted present value of profits
associated with an n-type patent does not involve the equilibrium market price, qb, or the
buying and selling probabilities, pb and ps. Therefore, adding a market for n-type patents
does not alter the solution for the balanced growth path presented in Proposition 6.
A.2 Empirical Appendix
The brunt of the analysis relies on data from three sources: USPTO, NBER Patent
Database Project (PDP), and Compustat. The first source contains data on the patents that
are reassigned across firms. The second is used to retrieve information on the technology
classes for patents and the stocks of patents for firms. Facts about the employments and
stock market values for firms are obtained from the third source.
A.2.1 Patent Reassignment Data (PRD)
The patent assignment data is obtained from the publicly available U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) patent assignment files hosted by Google Patents Beta. These
files contain all records of changes made to U.S. patents for the years 1980-2011. The files
are parsed and combined to create the dataset. The following variables are kept:
• Patent number: The unique patent number assigned to each patent granted by the
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USPTO.
• Record date: Date of creation for the record.
• Execution date: Date for the legal execution of the record.
• Conveyance text: A text variable describing the reason for the creation of the record.
Examples are: “Assignment of assignor’s interest”, “Security Agreement”,
“Merger”, etc.
• Assignee: The name of the entity assigning the patent (i.e., the seller if the patent is
being sold).
• Assignor: The name of the entity to which the patent is being assigned (i.e., the
buyer if the patent is being sold).
• Patent application date: Date of application for the patent.
• Patent grant date: Date of grant for the patent.
• Patent technology class: The technology class assigned to the patent by the USPTO
according to its internal classification system.95
The entries for which this information are inaccessible are dropped from the sample.
During the parsing process, the following are done:
• Only transfer agreements between companies are kept.
• Only utility patents are kept; entries regarding design patents are dropped.
This cleaning process leaves 966,427 observations. Using the string variable that states the
reason for the record, all reassignments that are not directly related to sales are dropped
(for instance, mergers, license grants, splits, mortgages, court orders, etc.)
95This variable is not used, however, to represent the technology class for a patent, as is discussed below.
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In order to create an even more conservative indicator of patent reassignments, a
company name-matching algorithm is employed, so that marking internal transfers as
reassignments can be avoided, where patents are moved within the same firm, or between
the subsidiaries of the firm. The idea behind the company name-matching algorithm is to
clean the string variables for the assignor and the assignee of all unnecessary indicators
and company type abbreviations. If the cleaned assignor and assignee strings are equal,
the type of the record is changed to internal transfer, provided that it was identified as a
reassignment before.
The pseudo-code for the algorithm, an enhanced version of Kerr and Fu (2006), is as
follows:
1. All letters are made upper case.
2. The portion of the string after the first comma is deleted. (e.g., AMF INCORPO-
RATED, A CORP OF N.J. becomes AMF INCORPORATED)
3. If the string starts with “THE ”, the first 4 characters are deleted.
4. All non-alphanumeric characters are removed.
5. Trailing company identifiers are deleted if found. The string goes through this pro-
cess 5 times. The company identifiers are the following: B, AG, BV, CENTER, CO,
COMPANY, COMPANIES, CORP, CORPORATION, DIV, GMBH, GROUP, INC, IN-
CORPORATED, KG, LC, LIMITED, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, LLC, LP, LTD NV,
PLC, SA, SARL, SNC, SPA, SRL, TRUST, USA, KABUSHIKI, KAISHA, AKTIENGE-
SELLSCHAFT, AKTIEBOLAG, SE, CORPORATIN, CORPORATON, TRUST,
GROUP, GRP, HLDGS, HOLDINGS, COMM, INDS, HLDG, TECH, and GAISHA.
6. If the resulting string has length zero, that string is declared as needing protection.
Some examples that are protected by this procedure: “CORPORATION, ORACLE”,
“KAISHA, ASAHI KAISEI KABUSHIKI”, “LIMITED, ZELLWEGER ANALYTICS”.
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7. The algorithm is re-run from the beginning on the original strings with one differ-
ence: The strings that are declared as needing protection skip the second step.
A.2.2 USPTO Utility Patents Grant Data (PDP)
The patent grant data comes from the NBER Patent Database Project (PDP), and
contains data for all the utility patents granted between the years 1976-2006. How the
PDP and PRD are linked to each other is discussed later on.
A.2.3 Compustat North American Fundamentals (Annual)
The Compustat data for publicly traded firms in North America between the years
1974-2006 is retrieved from Wharton Research Data Services. The Compustat database
and the NBER PDP database are connected using the matching procedure provided
alongside the PDP data. Extensive information on how the matching is done can be
found on the project website.
A.2.4 Connecting PRD and PDP Data
There are two different questions of interest, which require combining the Patent
Database Project data with the Patent Reassignment Data. The first analysis is on whether
a patent is ever reassigned (i.e. sold) over its entire lifetime, and what determines the
probability of this event. For this purpose, it is only necessary to connect the information
from PRD to the firm which applied for the patent. This is easily done by using the
unique patent number each patent is given by USPTO.
The second question involves the change in match quality of the patent when it is
traded between two firms. In this case, one needs to know the characteristics of both the
assignor and the assignee firm for each reassignment record in the PRD dataset. However,
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there is no existing connection established between the PRD and PDP datasets. To connect
these datasets, the company name-matching algorithm described earlier is employed.
A.2.5 Variable Construction
Patent-to-Patent Distance Metric
In order to construct a topology on the technology space empirically, it is necessary
to create a distance metric between different technology classes. Such a metric enables
one to speak about the distance between two patents in the technology space, and leads
to the construction of more advanced metrics.
The first 2 digits of the IPC (International Patent Classification) codes of a patent are
chosen to indicate its technology class. The IPC code used for a patent is taken from the
PDP data and differs from the classification scheme employed in the PRD data. It should
be noted that the PDP data actually contain more than a single IPC class for a single
patent in some cases, since the IPC codes were assigned using a concordance between the
IPC and the internal classification system of USPTO. The IPC code provided in the PDP
file with assignees is used in such cases, which is unique for each patent.
As discussed in the main text, a plausible distance metric between patent classes can
be generated by looking at how often two different technology classes are cited together.
Formally:
d(X, Y) ≡ 1 − #(X ∩ Y)
#(X ∪ Y) , with 0 ≤ d(X, Y) ≤ 1.
where #(X ∩ Y) denotes the number of patents that cite technology classes X and Y
together, and #(X ∪ Y) denotes the number of patents which either cite X or Y or both.
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Definition of a Firm in the Data
There are four different entity identifiers in the NBER PDP dataset. The USPTO
assignee number is the identifier provided by USPTO itself, but the creators of the PDP
have found that it is not very accurate. A single assignee might have many different
USPTO assignee numbers. The PDP uses some matching algorithms on the names of
the assignees to create a more accurate assignee identifier, called PDPASS. They also link
the patent data to Compustat data. Compustat has an identifier called GVKEY. However,
these refer to securities rather than firms. So a single firm might be represented by many
GVKEY’s. For this reason, they use a dynamic matching algorithm again to link all
GVKEY’s to certain PDPCO’s, where the latter is a unique firm identifier that is created
for the NBER PDP database project. The project creates this identifier in order to be able
to account for name changes, mergers & acquisitions, etc. This paper follows the same
procedure.
Patent-to-Firm Distance Metric
In order to measure how close a patent is to a firm in the technology spectrum, a
metric is necessary. However, throughout their lifetimes firms register patents in multiple
technology classes. Hence the patent-to-patent distance metric is insufficient for this
purpose. One possible way to construct a patent-to-firm distance metric is to compare
a patent to the past patent portfolio of the firm. The distance measure between each
patent a firm registered in the past, and the new patent in question can be calculated
using the patent-to-patent distance metric offered earlier. The distance between the firm
and the patent should be a function of these separate distances. Equation (1.24) defines
a parametric family of distance measures indexed by ι. The analysis is conducted for
several values of ι.
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Creating the Patent Stock Variable for Compustat Firms
As argued in Hall et al. (2005), the citation-weighted patent portfolio of a firm is a
plausible indicator of the intangible knowledge stock of a firm. The authors demonstrate
that this measure has additional explanatory power for the market value of a firm above
and beyond the conventional discounted sum of R&D spending of a firm, since R&D is a
stochastic process which can succeed or fail; whereas patents are quantifiable products of
this process when it is successful. Furthermore, it is revealed that the number of citations
a patent receives is a fine indicator of the patent’s worth, increasing the market value of a
firm at an increasing rate as the number of citations go higher.
Since all the future citations to a patent cannot be observed at any given date, the
citations variable suffers from a truncation problem. There are also technology class and
year fixed effects to consider. All of these issues are thoroughly investigated by Hall et al.
(2005); they provide a variable called hjtwt in order to correct the citation number of
each patent in the PDP dataset. This study uses their correction method. In the end, a
corrected citations number for each patent is obtained. In order to create the patent stock
variable of a firm (PDPCO), the corrected citations number across all the patents of a firm
are added together at each year. This variable is called patent stock.
In addition to the patent stock, the corrected citations number across all the patents
of a firm, multiplied by the patent-to-firm distance generated at the date of the patent’s
inclusion into the portfolio are also added together to create a new variable. This variable
quantifies the overall waste in the patent stock caused by the mismatch between the
technology class of the patents and the firm. This variable is expected to have a negative
effect on market value of equity for a firm. The variable is called the distance-adjusted
patent stock.
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Patent Sale Decision
(Compustat Sample with Licensing Intensity)
Dependent Variable (=1, if sold, 0 otherwise)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
distance 3.737*** 3.728*** 3.741*** 4.125*** 4.123*** 4.413***
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.142) (0.142) (0.157)
tech-class litigation intensity no yes no no yes no
patent litigation dummy no no yes no yes no
sector licensing intensity no no no yes yes no
only renewed patents no no no no no yes
Obs 1,151,348 1,151,348 1,151,348 1,078,735 1,078,735 919,421
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.34
Table 19: Patent Sale Decision with Licensing Intensity
A.2.6 Patent Sale Decision with Licensing Intensity
Table 19 introduces the licensing intensity of the sector. This variable is available only
for Compustat firms. Therefore the sample is reduced by half. Because of this sizable
change, columns 1-3 repeat the same exercises as their counterparts in Table 3. One major
difference to note is that the association between the distance and sale indicators becomes
more pronounced, almost doubled. Column 4 introduces licensing intensity and column
5 includes the litigation and licensing controls simultaneously. The last column redoes
the regression in column 1 while purging the patents that were not renewed once.
A.2.7 The Impact of Parameter Values on the Data Targets
Table 20 presents the Jacobian associated with the calibration/estimation. This Jaco-
bian provides useful information about how the parameters influence the model’s ability
to hit the data targets. By moving along a row, one can see how a parameter in question
influences the various data targets. Alternatively, by going down a column one can gauge
what parameters are important for hitting the data target of concern.
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Calibration/Estimation Jacobian (Elasticities, %)
Param Growth R&D/GDP Frac. sold Avg. Dur. Dur. CV daps/ps ps/emp dist red, all
γd 74.39 47.39 -8.64 0.36 -0.18 15.71 -4.64 -4.12
χ -17.18 -10.55 23.06 -4.81 2.42 -7.68 -23.37 4.67
µ 0.86 -1.41 9.63 -4.22 2.12 -4.27 -2.03 18.87
η 3.32 -5.45 37.25 -16.34 8.21 13.00 -8.60 73.06
γn 22.46 -24.81 5.66 -1.75 0.88 -17.79 -98.84 0.21
p 22.46 -24.81 47.46 -1.75 0.88 -3.74 -51.07 -71.53
ps 0 0 64.57 0 0 18.55 -36.70 -71.74
STD(ln e) 0 0 0 0 0 -3.84 225.95 0
Table 20: Calibration/Estimation Jacobian
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. We conjecture that the value function for low-type firms takes the
form in (2.10) . Substituting this conjecture into (2.7), we get
r
[
Aqj + B (n) q̄t
]
− B (n) gq̄t = πqj + ξ Aq̄tηαn+1 + ξ [B (n + 1) q̄t − B (n) q̄t]
− τAqj − τB (n) q̄t + φ
[
Aqj + q̄tB̃ (n)− Aqj − B (n) q̄t
]
.
Equating the coefficients on qj and q̄t, we obtain
rAqj = πqj − τAqj,
and
rB (n) q̄t − B (n) gq̄t = ξ Aq̄tηαn+1 + q̄tξ [B (n + 1)− B (n)]− τB (n) q̄t
+ q̄t φ
[
B̃ (n)− B (n)
]
.
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Solving these equations for A and B (n), while taking B̃ (n) as given and to be determined
in Proposition 3, completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Following the same steps, we conjecture that the value function for
high-type firms takes the form in (2.12), and substitute this into (2.8) to get
r
[
Aqj + q̄tB̃ (n)
]
− gq̄tB̃ (n) = max
 πqj + ξ
[
Aq̄tηαn+1 + q̄tB̃ (n + 1)− q̄tB̃ (n)
]
;
πqj + ΛθH q̄a
∗ [
Aq̄t + Aηq̄t + q̄tB̃ (0)
]

+ ψΛθH
[
Aq̄t + Aηq̄t + q̄tB̃ (0)
]
− τ
[
Aqj + q̄tB̃ (n)
]
,
which implies
(r + τ)
[
Aqj + q̄tB̃ (n)
]
− gq̄tB̃ (n) = πqj + ψΛθH
[
Aq̄t + Aηq̄t + q̄tB̃ (0)
]
+ max
 q̄tξ
[
Aηαn+1 + B̃ (n + 1)− B̃ (n)
]
;
ΛθH q̄a
∗ [
Aq̄t + Aηq̄t + q̄tB̃ (0)
]
 .
Once again equating coefficients, we obtain A = πr+τ and
(r − g + τ) B̃ (n) = ψΛθH
[
A (1 + η) + B̃ (0)
]
+ max
 ξ
[
Aηαn+1 + B̃ (n + 1)− B̃ (n)
]
;
ΛθH q̄a
∗ [
(1 + η) A + B̃ (0)
]
 . (B.1)
Let us next define B̂ (n) as the solution to the equation:
(r − g + τ) B̂ (n) = ψΛθH
[
A (1 + η) + B̃ (0)
]
+ ξ
[
Ãηαn+1 + B̂ (n + 1)− B̂ (n)
]
.
Under the hypothetical scenario where the max operator in (B.1) always picks the first
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term, we have B̃ (n) = B̂ (n). Collecting terms, we can write
B̂ (n) = βψ̂/ξ + βÃηαn+1 + βB̂ (n + 1)
where β = ξ
(r−g+τ+ξ) and ψ̂ = ψΛθH
[
A (1 + η) + B̃ (0)
]
. From standard dynamic pro-
gramming arguments (e.g., Theorem 4.7 in Stokey and Lucas Jr. (1989)), B̂ (n) is strictly
decreasing and limits to ψ̂r−g+τ . Now note that if n
∗ = ∞ (meaning that incremental inno-
vations were always optimal), then we would have B̃ (n) = B̂ (n).
The other option in the max operator, ΛθH q̄a
∗ [
(1 + η) A + B̃ (0)
]
, does not depend
on n and is strictly positive, which implies that switching to radical innovation for n
sufficiently high would yield B̃ (n) =
ψ̂+ΛθH q̄a
∗
[(1+η)A+B̃(0)]
r−g+τ >
ψ̂
r−g+τ . Hence, there must
exist n∗ such that firms with n < n∗ undertake incremental innovation and switch to
radical innovation at n∗. The expression for n∗ follows by equating the value of pursuing
radical and incremental innovations at n′ and setting n∗ as the smallest integer greater
than n′.
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that
(r + τ)VH (qn,t, n)− V̇H (qn,t, n) = πqn,t + ψΛθHEVH(t)
+ max
 ξ [VH (qn,t + ηn+1,t(qn,t), n + 1)− VH (qn,t, n)] ;ΛθH q̄aEVH(t)
 ,
where we have written explicitly ηn+1,t(qn,t) as the incremental improvement in produc-
tivity starting from quality qn,t that has been improved n times already and average qual-
ity in the economy is q̄t (subsumed in the time argument t).
The threshold number of incremental innovations as a function of current productiv-
ity, n∗t (q) equivalently defines a threshold value of productivity q
∗
n,t as a function of the
number of incremental innovations. Clearly this threshold productivity level is defined
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as the value that sets the two terms in the max operator equal to each other. Thus
VH
(
q∗n,t + ηn+1,t(q
∗
n,t), n + 1
)
− VH
(
q∗n,t, n
)
=
ΛθH q̄a
ξ
EVH(t), (B.2)
and at this value, we also have
(r + τ)VH
(
q∗n,t, n
)
− V̇H
(
q∗n,t, n
)
= πq∗n,t + ΛθH q̄
aEVH(t) + ψΛθHEVH(t). (B.3)
Now we will consider two alternative cases:
Case 1:
q∗n+1,t ≥ q∗n,t + ηn+1,t(q∗n,t). (B.4)
This condition implies that if a particular high-type firm finds it optimal to switch to
radical innovation today, but instead undertakes a successful incremental innovation (as
a deviation off-the-equilibrium path), then subsequently it will still want to immediately
switch to radical innovation.
Under this case, we have
(r + τ)VH
(
q∗n,t + ηn+1,t(q
∗
n,t), n + 1
)
− V̇H
(
q∗n,t + ηn+1,t(q
∗
n,t), n + 1
)
(B.5)
= πq∗n,t + πηn+1,t(q
∗
n,t) + ΛθH q̄
aEVH(t) + ψΛθHEVH(t).
This follows from the fact that, by definition, in this case, at q∗n,t + ηn+1,t(q
∗
n,t), the firm
will want to switch to radical innovation.
Now differentiating (B.2) with respect to time, we have
V̇H
(
q∗n,t + ηn+1,t(q
∗
n,t), n + 1
)
− V̇H
(
q∗n,t, n
)
=
ΛθH q̄a
ξ
∂EVH(t)/∂t
=
ΛθH q̄a
ξ
gEVH(t), (B.6)
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where, in the second line, we have used the fact that in a stationary equilibrium EVH(t)
grows at the rate g. Subtracting (B.3) from (B.5) and using (B.6), we obtain:
(r + τ)[VH
(
q∗n,t + ηn+1,t(q
∗
n,t), n + 1
)
− VH
(
q∗n,t, n
)
] = πηn+1,t(q∗n,t) +
ΛθH q̄a
ξ
gEVH(t).
(B.7)
Then, combining (B.2) and (B.7) we can derive
πηn+1,t(q∗n,t) =
r − g + τ
ξ
ΛθH q̄aEVH(t). (B.8)
In this case, for all q less than q∗n,t, it is optimal to switch to radical innovation.
Now let us define
vt ≡
r − g + τ
πξ
ΛθH q̄aEVH(t), (B.9)
which is independent of both q and n. Using (B.9) equation (B.8) can be written as
[κq̄t + (1 − κ)q∗n,t]ηαn+1 = vt, (B.10)
or
q∗n,t =
vt/ηαn+1 − κq̄t
1 − κ . (B.11)
This equation immediately implies that q∗n,t is increasing in n or equivalently that n
∗
t (q) is
increasing in q.
We next derive the condition under which (B.4) indeed applies. For this reason, note
that from (B.10) written for n + 2 incremental innovations, we have
q∗n+1,t =
vt/ηαn+2 − κq̄t
1 − κ . (B.12)
Combining equations (B.11) and (B.12), we obtain that (B.4) is satisfied if
(1 − κ)ηαn+2 + α ≤ 1. (B.13)
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Thus whenever (B.13) holds (and we are in Case 1), we have the desired result that
n∗t (q) is increasing in q. We next establish that whenever the converse of (B.13) holds, the
same result applies.
Case 2:
q∗n+1,t − ηn+1,t(q∗n,t) < q∗n,t. (B.14)
This implies that if a high-type firm is indifferent between radical and incremental inno-
vation at n + 1st prior incremental innovations at time t, then it would have preferred to
switch to radical innovation at nth prior incremental innovations. This condition is clearly
the complement of (B.4).
In this case, start with q∗n+1,t, which satisfies (B.5). Under condition (B.14), q
∗
n,t satisfies
(B.3), so we again arrive at (B.2), (B.8) and (B.11). But then from (B.11) q∗n,t is increasing in
n or n∗t (q) is increasing in q.
We next verify that Case 2 applies for the complement of the parameter values for
which (B.13) holds. Note that the same expressions for q∗n+1,t as in (B.12) again applies
under Case 2. Thus the condition for (B.14) to be satisfied, with an identical argument, is
(1 − κ)ηαn+2 + α > 1,
which is indeed the complement of (B.13).
Consequently, regardless of whether (B.13) or its converse holds, equation (B.11) ap-
plies, and q∗n,t is increasing in n (or equivalently, n
∗
t (q) is increasing in q). This completes
the proof of the proposition.
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B.2 Tables and Figures
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Balanced Firm Sample (Firm Averages, 1995-2000)
CEO age 279 55.3 6.47
average manager age 279 52.3 4.32
innovation quality 279 20.5 8.76
superstar fraction 279 12.3 10.1
tail innovation 279 2.72 2.56
generality 279 21.5 5.53
log patents 279 5.86 1.51
log employment 279 3.84 1.38
log sale 279 4.34 1.47
firm age 279 37.3 14.4
R&D intensity 257 8.52 17.0
Unbalanced Firm Sample (Annual Firm Observations, 1992-2004)
CEO age 7111 55.3 6.84
average manager age 7111 52.3 4.38
innovation quality 7111 15.9 10.9
superstar fraction 7111 9.91 10.7
tail innovation 5803 3.41 5.42
generality 6232 18.5 9.96
log patents 7111 5.61 1.60
log employment 7111 3.71 1.51
log sale 7111 4.12 1.61
firm age 7111 35.1 16.3
Cross-Country Sample (Country Averages, 1995-2000)
individualism 50 .813 .263
uncertainty aversion 50 .492 .195
average manager age 37 56.1 2.98
innovation quality 50 14.5 3.26
superstar fraction 50 6.68 3.65
tail innovation 50 1.92 .945
generality 50 21.0 1.81
log patents 50 10.5 1.52
log income per capita 50 10.3 .305
secondary years of schooling 50 4.84 .827
R&D intensity 44 2.59 .363
- Table continued on next page -
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Firm-Level Innovation Variables
innovation quality superstar fraction tail innovation generality
innovation quality 1.000
superstar fraction 0.925 1.000
tail innovation 0.893 0.829 1.000
generality -0.177 -0.204 -0.145 1.000
Panel C: Correlation Matrix of Cross-Country Innovation Variables
innovation quality superstar fraction tail innovation generality
innovation quality 1.000
superstar fraction 0.932 1.000
tail innovation 0.945 0.990 1.000
generality 0.902 0.880 0.906 1.000
Panel D: Correlation Matrix of Openness to Disruption Variables
individualism uncertainty aversion average manager age
individualism 1.000
uncertainty aversion -0.884 1.000
average manager age -0.770 0.844 1.000
Notes: All statistics in this table are weighted by the number of patents (of the country or the firm). Individualism and uncertainty
aversion are Hofstede’s indices of national cultures (and are normalized to lie between 0 and 1), and country average manager age
is the average manager of CEOs and CFOs of up to the 25 largest firms in the country. Innovation quality is the average number
of citations per patent (using the truncation correction weights devised by Hall et al. (2001)); superstar fraction is the fraction of
patents accounted for by superstar researchers (those above the 95th percentile of the citation distribution); tail innovation is the
fraction of patents of a country or firm above the 99th percentile of the citation distribution divided by the fraction of patents
above the median of the distribution; and generality index measures the dispersion of citations received across two-digit IPC
technology classes. Log income per capita at the country level, and log employment, log sales at the firm level are computed
as the average of, respectively, annual log income per capita, log employment and log sale between 1995 and 2000. CEO age is
the age of the CEO and average manager age is the average age of the top management, both from the Execucomp dataset. The
balanced firm panel is the sample of firms from Compustat with complete data on CEO age, employment, sales, and firm age and
positive patents in each year between 1995 and 2000. The unbalanced firm panel is a sample of firms from Compustat with at
least one year of complete data between 1992 and 2002. See text for the definition of other variables and further details.
Table 21: Summary Statistics
Baseline Firm-Level Regressions
Innovation Quality Superstar Fraction Tail Innovation Generality
CEO age -0.278 -0.300 -0.151 -0.183
(0.088) (0.141) (0.054) (0.055)
firm age -0.219 -0.238 -0.063 0.029
(0.078) (0.106) (0.029) (0.046)
log employment -1.599 -4.813 -0.908 -4.574
(1.937) (3.376) (0.793) (1.500)
log sales 1.833 5.215 0.743 4.421
(1.425) (2.645) (0.650) (1.331)
log patent 1.073 0.093 0.662 -0.696
(0.769) (1.336) (0.356) (0.633)
R2 0.88 0.81 0.79 0.83
N 279 279 279 279
Notes: Weighted cross-sectional regressions with total number of patents as weights. The sample is the balanced firm panel and each observation is
the sample average between 1995-2000 as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variables are innovation quality, superstar fraction, tail
innovation, and generality (the last three are multiplied by 100 to ease legibility). In addition, all regressions control for a full set of dummies for
four-digit SIC industries. See text and notes to Table 1 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 22: Baseline Firm-Level Regressions
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Firm-Level Regressions (Alternative Measures)
Innovation Quality Superstar Fraction Tail Innovation Originality
(5 years) (Best Patent) (90/50)
CEO age -0.129 -0.497 -0.299 -0.285
(0.041) (0.332) (0.094) (0.075)
R2 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.87
N 279 279 279 279
Notes: Weighted cross-sectional regressions with total number of patents as weights. The sample is the balanced firm panel and each observation
is the sample average between 1995-2000 as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variables are alternative measures of innovation
quality (computed over the next five years), superstar fraction (with superstars defined according to the best patent), tail innovation (with share of
the patents of the firm among all the patents above the 90th percentile of the citation distribution in the numerator), and the originality index (the
last three are multiplied by 100 to ease legibility). All regressions control for firm age, log employment, log sales, log total patents, and a full set
of dummies for four-digit SIC industries. See text and notes to Table 1 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 23: Firm-Level Regressions (Alternative Measures)
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Firm-Level Regressions (Robustness)
Innovation Quality Superstar Fraction Tail Innovation Generality
Panel A: With SIC3 Dummies
CEO age -0.257 -0.284 -0.126 -0.086
(0.070) (0.123) (0.050) (0.091)
R2 0.77 0.72 0.64 0.70
N 279 279 279 279
Panel B: With Additional Controls
CEO age -0.270 -0.282 -0.150 -0.194
(0.090) (0.140) (0.052) (0.054)
R2 0.88 0.82 0.79 0.83
N 279 279 279 279
Panel C: With Additional Controls Plus R&D Intensity
CEO age -0.258 -0.295 -0.142 -0.184
(0.088) (0.149) (0.048) (0.053)
R2 0.89 0.82 0.81 0.84
N 257 257 257 257
Panel D: With Average Manager Age
average manager age -0.418 -0.467 -0.224 -0.339
(0.163) (0.206) (0.094) (0.084)
R2 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.83
N 279 279 279 279
Panel E: High-Tech Subsample
CEO age -0.227 -0.191 -0.145 -0.189
(0.068) (0.157) (0.045) (0.043)
R2 0.92 0.84 0.86 0.81
N 87 87 87 87
Panel F: Low-Tech Subsample
CEO age -0.439 -0.704 -0.143 -0.153
(0.200) (0.252) (0.085) (0.146)
R2 0.85 0.82 0.72 0.86
N 192 192 192 192
Notes: Weighted cross-sectional regressions with total number of patents as weights. The sample is the balanced firm panel and each of the
ratios is the sample average 1995-2000 as described in the notes to Table 1.The dependent variables are innovation quality, superstar fraction, tail
innovation, and generality (the last three are multiplied by 100 to ease legibility). Each panel is for a different specification. Unless otherwise
stated, all regressions control for firm age, log employment, log sales, log total patents, and four-digit SIC dummies (see text and notes to Table
1 for variable definitions). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A controls for three-digit SIC dummies instead of the four-digit
dummies. Panel B adds to the specification of Table 2 profitability (profit over sales), indebtedness (debt over sales) and log physical capital.
Panel C adds to the specification of Panel B R&D intensity (R&D expenditure over sales). Panel D uses average manager age instead of CEO
age. Panels E and F are for the high-tech and low-tech subsamples. High-tech sample includes all firms with a primary industry classification of
SIC 35 (industrial and commercial machinery and equipment and computer equipment) and 36 (electronic and other electrical equipment and
components), while the low-tech sample includes the rest.
Table 24: Firm-Level Regressions (Robustness)
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Firm-Level Panel Regressions
Innovation Quality Superstar Fraction Tail Innovation Generality
Panel A: Average CEO Age (No Fixed Effects), Balanced, 1995-2000
average CEO age -0.227 -0.336 -0.132 -0.183
(0.068) (0.103) (0.041) (0.044)
R2 0.70 0.69 0.47 0.75
N 1,674 1,674 1,594 1,655
Panel B: Average CEO Age (No Fixed Effects), Unbalanced, 1992-2004
average CEO age -0.168 -0.319 -0.104 -0.171
(0.075) (0.133) (0.045) (0.044)
R2 0.66 0.54 0.31 0.77
N 7,111 7,111 5,803 6,232
Panel C: CEO Age (Fixed Effects), Unbalanced, 1992-2004
CEO age -0.188 -0.149 -0.076 0.036
(0.044) (0.051) (0.023) (0.029)
R2 0.78 0.80 0.44 0.85
N 7,111 7,111 5,803 6,232
Panel D: CEO Age and Lagged CEO Age (Fixed Effects), Unbalanced, 1993-2004
CEO age -0.131 -0.098 -0.052 0.031
(0.041) (0.039) (0.023) (0.026)
lagged CEO age -0.123 -0.100 -0.055 0.020
(0.051) (0.049) (0.029) (0.035)
R2 0.80 0.81 0.46 0.85
N 5,407 5,407 4,562 4,780
Panel E: CEO Age and Lagged Dependent Var (Fixed Effects), Unbalanced, 1993-2004
CEO age -0.096 -0.075 -0.065 0.037
(0.026) (0.030) (0.019) (0.024)
lagged dependent variable 0.472 0.452 0.194 0.200
(0.034) (0.046) (0.051) (0.042)
R2 0.86 0.86 0.46 0.86
N 5,985 5,985 4,772 5,207
Panel F: CEO Age and Lead CEO Age (Fixed Effects), Unbalanced, 1992-2003
CEO age -0.113 -0.084 -0.042 0.042
(0.042) (0.048) (0.019) (0.029)
lead CEO age -0.125 -0.109 -0.043 -0.007
(0.049) (0.044) (0.022) (0.028)
R2 0.78 0.81 0.48 0.85
N 5,409 5,409 4,849 5,097
Notes: Weighted firm-level panel regressions with annual observations with number of patents (in that year) as weights. The dependent variables
are innovation quality, superstar fraction, tail innovation, and generality (the last three are multiplied by 100 to ease legibility). Robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Panel A is for our balanced firm sample 1995-2000, and controls for firm age, log employment,
log sales, log patents, a full set of four-digit SIC dummies, and year dummies (and thus no firm dummies), and the key right-hand side variable is
average CEO age (constant over time). Panel B is identical to Panel A except that the sample is extended to the unbalanced firm panel 1992-2002.
In Panel C, the key right-hand side variable is CEO age (in that year), and the regression also includes a full set of firm fixed effects (and thus firm
age and the four-digit SIC dummies are no longer included). Panel D is identical to Panel C except that it also includes a one year lag of CEO
age as well as current CEO age, and Panel E is identical to Panel C except that it also includes a one year lag of the dependent variable on the
right-hand side. See text and notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
Table 25: Firm-Level Panel Regressions
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Structural Parameters g
Parameter Description Identification
External Calibration
x = 0.05 Entry rate Compustat sample
ρ = 0.02 Discount rate Standard value
δ = 0.04 Manager death rate Compustat sample
α = 0.93 Reduction rate of innovation size Akcigit and Kerr (2015)
Indirect Inference
ψ = 10.2 Baseline radical innovation rate for high type Estimate
ΛθH = 0.005 High-type innovation parameter Estimate
φ = 0.149 Transition rate from low type to high type Estimate
ξ = 0.031 Incremental innovation rate Estimate
η = 0.449 Initial innovation size Estimate
ζ = 0.254 Probability of high-type entrant Estimate
Notes: Parameter choices and estimates. See Section 4.4 for details.
Table 26: Structural Parameters
Empirical and Model-Generated Moments
Target U.S. Data Model
Current manager age coefficient of Table 5 Panel C −0.188 −0.211
Lead manager age coefficient of Table 5 Panel F −0.125 −0.129
Current manager age coefficient of Table 5 Panel F −0.113 −0.111
Annual growth rate 5.75% 5.39%
Within-firm coefficient of variation of radical innovations 1.99 2.17
Fraction of internal patents 21.5% 23.8%
Notes: Empirical and model-generated moments for the indirect inference procedure. See Section 4.4 for details.
Table 27: Empirical and Model-Generated Moments
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Patent-Level Panel Regressions
Innovation Quality Tail Innovation Tail Innovation Generality
(Above 99) (Above 90)
Panel A: CEO Age, Unbalanced Firm Sample, 1992-2004
CEO age -0.119 -0.314 -1.239 0.028
(0.038) (0.132) (0.413) (0.025)
R2 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.11
N 316,516 316,516 316,516 263,641
Panel B: Inventor Age, Unbalanced Firm Sample, 1992-2004
inventor age -0.234 -0.440 -2.883 -0.019
(0.026) (0.121) (0.321) (0.022)
R2 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.15
N 316,516 316,516 316,516 263,641
Panel C: Inventor Age, Extended Sample, 1985-2004
inventor age -0.226 -0.377 -2.842 -0.017
(0.022) (0.075) (0.293) (0.017)
R2 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.15
N 572,169 572,169 572,169 466,378
Panel D: Inventor Age, Extended Sample, 1985-2004
inventor age -0.201 -0.327 -2.359 -0.046
(0.010) (0.036) (0.134) (0.011)
R2 0.27 0.15 0.19 0.25
N 1,855,887 1,855,887 1,855,887 1,550,825
Panel E: CEO Age and Inventor Age, Unbalanced Firm Sample, 1992-2004
inventor age -0.233 -0.438 -2.876 -0.019
(0.026) (0.121) (0.321) (0.022)
CEO age -0.119 -0.317 -1.218 0.028
(0.036) (0.126) (0.388) (0.022)
R2 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.15
N 316,516 316,516 316,516 263,641
Notes: Patent-level panel regressions with annual observations. The dependent variables are innovation quality at the patent level; a dummy for the
patent being above the 99th percentile of the citation distribution; dummy for the patent being above the 90th percentile of the citation distribution;
and generality index at the patent level (the last three are multiplied by 100 to ease legibility). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level
are in parentheses. Panel A is for our unbalanced firm sample 1992-2002 and controls for log employment, log sales, log patents, a full set of firm
fixed effects, and application year dummies, and the key right-and side variable is CEO age. Panel B is for our unbalanced firm sample 1992-2002
and controls for log employment, log sales, log patents, application year dummies, a full set of firm fixed effects, a full set of dummies for inventor
team size, a full set of dummies for three-digit IPC technology class dummies, and a full set of dummies for the total number of patents of the
inventor within the team with the highest number of patents, and the key right-and side variable is average inventor age. Panel C expands the
sample of Panel B to 1985-2002 and also adds Compustat ÂĚfirms without CEO information into the sample. Panel D extends the sample of Panel
C to include non-Compustat firms as well (hence excludes log sales and log employment, and still includes a full set of firm fixed effects). Panel
E is for our unbalanced firm sample 1992-2002 and adds CEO age to the specification of Panel B. See text and notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
Table 28: Patent-Level Panel Regressions
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Inventor Age and CEO Age
Unbalanced Firm Sample, 1992-2004
Inventor age Inventor age
(1) (2)
CEO age 0.014 0.013
(0.006) (0.002)
R2 0.11 0.13
N 316,516 316,516
Notes: Patent-level panel regressions with annual observations for the unbalanced firm sample 1992-2002.
The dependent variable is the average age of inventors. The first column controls for log employment, log
sales, log patents, application year dummies, and a full set of firm fixed effects, and the second column
adds to this a full set of team size dummies and a full set of dummies for three-digit IPC technology class
dummies. See text and notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
Table 29: Inventor Age and CEO Age
Stock of Knowledge, Opportunity Cost, and Creative Innovations,
Unbalanced Firm Sample, 1992-2004
Innovation Quality Superstar Fraction Tail Innovation Generality
CEO age -0.180 -0.216 -0.087 -0.044
(0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.016)
log sales 1.465 2.081 0.285 1.201
(0.449) (0.611) (0.272) (0.328)
log patent -0.394 -0.072 0.391 -0.020
(0.193) (0.257) (0.136) (0.151)
CEO age × log patent -0.005 -0.071 -0.016 -0.037
(0.014) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011)
CEO age × log sales 0.024 0.079 0.009 0.044
(0.017) (0.021) (0.012) (0.011)
R2 0.67 0.55 0.31 0.77
N 7,111 7,111 5,803 6,232
Notes: Weighted firm-level panel regressions with annual observations for the unbalanced firm panel, 1992-2002, with number of
patents (in that year) as weights. The dependent variables are innovation quality, superstar fraction, tail innovation, and generality
(the last three are multiplied by 100 to ease legibility). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. All
regressions also include log employment, application year dummies and a full set of dummies for four-digit SIC industries. See
text and notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
Table 30: Stock of Knowledge, Opportunity Cost, and Creative Innovations
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Baseline Cross-Country Regressions
Innovation Quality Superstar Fraction Tail Innovation Generality
Panel A: Average Manager Age
manager age -0.484 -0.960 -0.225 -0.278
(0.225) (0.221) (0.058) (0.056)
log income per capita -0.491 -0.702 -0.136 0.211
(1.153) (1.066) (0.291) (0.468)
secondary years of schooling -1.000 -1.359 -0.291 -0.231
(1.481) (1.462) (0.396) (0.341)
log patent 2.232 2.331 0.591 1.072
(0.706) (0.695) (0.193) (0.222)
R2 0.74 0.82 0.80 0.80
N 37 37 37 37
Panel B: Individualism
individualism 4.965 9.929 2.369 3.420
(2.461) (2.393) (0.640) (0.487)
log income per capita -1.233 -2.130 -0.472 -0.252
(1.195) (1.270) (0.334) (0.373)
secondary years of schooling -0.467 -0.317 -0.056 -0.051
(1.229) (1.174) (0.323) (0.227)
log patents 1.622 1.125 0.308 0.725
(0.490) (0.472) (0.129) (0.164)
R2 0.73 0.81 0.79 0.83
N 50 50 50 50
Panel C: Uncertainty Avoidance
uncertainty avoidance -8.354 -13.528 -3.174 -4.242
(2.946) (2.715) (0.722) (0.798)
log income per capita -0.408 -0.657 -0.124 0.232
(0.957) (0.600) (0.177) (0.558)
secondary years of schooling -0.745 -0.346 -0.054 0.008
(1.149) (1.108) (0.307) (0.208)
log patent 1.708 1.257 0.339 0.765
(0.439) (0.424) (0.125) (0.189)
R2 0.80 0.86 0.84 0.84
N 50 50 50 50
Notes: Weighted cross-country regressions with total number of patents as weights. The dependent variables are innovation quality,
superstar fraction, tail innovation, and generality (the last three are multiplied by 100 to ease legibility). See text and notes to Table 1 for
variable definitions. Each country observation is the sample average between 1995-2000 as described in the text and the notes to Table 1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 31: Baseline Cross-Country Regressions
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Cross-Country Regressions (Alternative Measures)
Innovation Quality Superstar Fraction Tail Innovation Originality
(5 years) (Best Patent) (90/50)
Panel A: Average Manager Age
manager age -0.203 -0.005 -1.002 -0.713
(0.092) (0.004) (0.372) (0.083)
R2 0.75 0.80 0.70 0.88
N 37 37 37 37
Panel B: Individualism
individualism 2.039 0.052 9.966 8.015
(1.009) (0.045) (4.028) (0.653)
R2 0.74 0.80 0.68 0.91
N 50 50 50 50
Panel C: Uncertainty Avoidance
uncertainty avoidance -3.461 -0.106 -15.964 -9.084
(1.215) (0.057) (4.689) (1.336)
R2 0.81 0.83 0.78 0.87
N 50 50 50 50
Notes: Weighted cross-country regressions with total number of patents as weights. The dependent variables are alternative measures of innovation
quality (computed over the next five years), superstar fraction (with superstars defined according to the best patent), tail innovation (with fraction of
patents above the 90th percentile of the citation distribution in the numerator), and the originality index (the last three are multiplied by 100 to ease
legibility). Each regression also controls for log income per capita, average years of secondary schooling, and log total patents. See text and notes to Table
1 for variable definitions. Each country observation is the sample average between 1995-2000 as described in the text and the notes to Table 1. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 32: Cross-Country Regressions (Alternative Measures)
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Cross-Country Regressions (Controlling for R&D Intensity)
Innovation Quality Superstar Fraction Tail Innovation Generality
Panel A: Average Manager Age
manager age -0.636 -1.096 -0.257 -0.622
(0.255) (0.253) (0.066) (0.105)
R2 0.76 0.83 0.81 0.91
N 33 33 33 33
Panel B: Individualism
individualism 8.245 13.786 3.291 2.932
(2.821) (2.602) (0.725) (0.778)
R2 0.78 0.85 0.83 0.83
N 44 44 44 44
Panel C: Uncertainty Avoidance
uncertainty avoidance -9.589 -14.173 -3.305 -3.452
(2.747) (2.753) (0.754) (0.915)
R2 0.82 0.86 0.83 0.85
N 44 44 44 44
Notes: Weighted cross-country regressions with total number of patents as weights. The dependent variables are innovation quality, superstar fraction,
tail innovation, and generality (the last three are multiplied by 100 to ease legibility). Each regression also controls for log income per capita, average years
of secondary schooling, log total patents, and R&D intensity defined as total R&D expenditure divided by GDP. See text and notes to Table 1 for variable
definitions. Each country observation is the sample average between 1995-2000 as described in the text and the notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
Table 33: Cross-Country Regressions (Controlling for R&D Intensity)
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Average Annual Patent Counts by Country, 1995-2000
Country Abbreviation Patent Count Country Abbreviation Patent Count
Argentina AR 9.2 India IN 90.3
Austria AT 365.0 Italy IT 1439.8
Australia AU 744.0 Japan JP 33954.8
Belgium BE 522.8 South Korea KR 3581.5
Bulgaria BG 3.8 Luxemburg LU 62.8
Brazil BR 69.7 Malta MT 2.0
Canada CA 2433.2 Mexico MX 59.2
Switzerland CH 1588.7 Malaysia MY 14.5
Chile CL 8.8 Netherlands NL 1236.7
China CN 109.5 Norway NO 239.2
Colombia CO 2.0 New Zealand NZ 104.7
Czech Republic CZ 17.7 Poland PL 10.0
Germany DE 9257.0 Portugal PT 8.7
Denmark DK 448.5 Romania RO 2.7
Spain ES 193.8 Russia RU 88.2
Finland FI 910.3 Saudi Arabia SA 18.2
France FR 3877.5 Sweden SE 1691.3
Great Britain GB 2869.5 Singapore SG 191.2
Greece GR 15.7 Slovenia SI 13.7
Hong Kong HK 171.8 Slovakia SK 4.0
Croatia HR 7.7 Thailand TH 10.7
Hungary HU 33.3 Turkey TR 5.3
Indonesia ID 3.0 United States US 93722.5
Ireland IE 111.3 Venezuela VE 24.3
Israel IL 580.7 South Africa ZA 88.7
Notes: This table shows the average annual patent counts between 1995-2000, registered at the USPTO from that country.
Table 34: Average Annual Patent Counts by Country, 1995-2000
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Figure 11: Evolution of creative innovations for high-type firms.
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Figure 12: Evolution of CEO age for high-type firms.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Theory Appendix
C.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1:
The static profit maximization of a firm is stated as follows:
Π(z, Θ) = max
k,lu≥0
{zζkκ lλu − (r + δ)k − wulu} (C.1)
First order conditions imply l∗u =
λo∗
wu and k
∗ = κo
∗
r+δ , hence we have
o∗ = zζ
(
κo∗
r + δ
)κ (λo∗
wu
)λ
o∗ =
[(
κ
r + δ
)κ ( λ
wu
)λ]1/ζ
z (C.2)
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and the profits are simply equal to Π(z, Θ) = ζo∗. From the unskilled labor market
clearing condition, we get
Lu =
∫
l∗u(z)dZ(z)
Lu =
λ
wu
[(
κ
r + δ
)κ ( λ
wu
)λ]1/ζ ∫
zdZ(z)
(wu
λ
) λ+ζ
ζ
=
(
κ
r + δ
)κ/ζ z̄
Lu
wu = λ
(
κ
r + δ
) κ
λ+ζ
L
− ζλ+ζ
u z̄
ζ
λ+ζ (C.3)
where z̄ ≡
∫
zdZ(z). Note that since Lu is constant along the balanced growth path, the
unskilled wage rate grows with gross rate (1 + gz)ζ/(λ+ζ). Similarly, the capital market
clearing condition yields
K =
∫
k∗(z)dZ(z)
K =
κ
r + δ
[(
κ
r + δ
)κ ( λ
wu
)λ]1/ζ ∫
zdZ(z)
(
r + δ
κ
) κ+ζ
ζ
=
(
λ
wu
)λ/ζ z̄
K
r = κ
(
λ
wu
) λ
κ+ζ
K−
ζ
κ+ζ z̄
ζ
κ+ζ − δ (C.4)
This time since wu, K and z̄ grow over time at gross rates (1 + gz)ζ/(λ+ζ), (1 + gz)ζ/(λ+ζ),
and (1 + gz) respectively, the interest rate will be constant along the balanced growth
path. Define K̃ = K/z̄
ζ
λ+ζ as relative aggregate capital stock. Combining equations (C.3)
and (C.4) yields the simplified expressions:
wu = λK̃κ Lλ−1u z̄
ζ
λ+ζ
r + δ = κK̃κ−1Lλu
212
Plugging the expressions for the unskilled wage rate and the interest rate into the profits
yields
Π(z, Θ) = ζK̃κ Lλu
z
z̄λ/(λ+ζ)
≡ π z
z̄λ/(λ+ζ)
(C.5)
where π is a time invariant constant.
Define ẑ ≡ z/z̄λ/(λ+ζ), z̃ ≡ z̄ζ/(λ+ζ) and w̃s ≡ ws/z̃. The guess and verify method
will be used to solve the value function of the firm in the innovation decision problem.
Assume the value function of the firm has the form V(z, Θ) = v1ẑ + v2z̃ where v1 and v2
are scalars. Plugging the solution into the problem, we get:
V(z, Θ) = max
ls≥0
{
Π(z, Θ) +
χlξs
1 + r
V(z + γz̄, Θ′) +
(1 − χlξs )
1 + r
V(z, Θ′)− wsls
}
= πẑ +
v1ẑ
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)
+
v2(1 + gz)ζ/(λ+ζ)z̃
(1 + r)
+max
ls≥0
{
χlξs
1 + r
v1γ
(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)
− w̃sls
}
z̃
(C.6)
= πẑ +
v1ẑ
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)
+
v2(1 + gz)ζ/(λ+ζ)z̃
(1 + r)
+
(
ξ
w̃s
) ξ
1−ξ
[
χγv1
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)
] 1
1−ξ
(1 − ξ)z̃
= v1ẑ + v2z̃
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where
v1 =
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ) − 1
π (C.7)
v2 =
(1 + r)
(1 + r)− (1 + gz)ζ/(λ+ζ)
[(
ξ
w̃s
) ξ
1−ξ
[
χγv1
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)
] 1
1−ξ
(1 − ξ)
]
(C.8)
l∗s =
[
ξ
w̃s
χγv1
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)
] 1
1−ξ
It is required to verify that ws grows at gross rate (1 + gz)ζ/(λ+ζ). Without loss of gener-
ality, assume Λ = 1. Market clearing for skilled labor requires
Ls =
∫
l∗s dZ(z)
Ls =
[
ξ
ws
χγv1z̃
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)
] 1
1−ξ
ws =
ξχγv1z̃
(1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ)L
1−ξ
s
ws =
ξχγπz̃
((1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ) − 1)L1−ξs
(C.9)
proving the statement. Also notice that Ls = l∗s . The aggregate productivity evolves
according to
z̄′ = z̄ + γχLξs z̄
⇒ gz = ΓLξs (C.10)
where Γ ≡ γχ. This concludes the proof.
C.1.2 Computational algorithm
Given closed-form solutions for the firm’s maximization problem and the resulting
system of nonlinear equations in Theorem 1, the following computational algorithm is
used to solve for the BGP equilibrium of the model:
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1. Create grids for yo, h, b, yy, a.
2. Guess initial Vo(yo, h, a), W(b, h, a), Vy(yy, a).
3. Guess initial wu, ws, r, g, s̄.
4. Until convergence in value functions according to the sup-norm is achieved, do:
(a) Solve:
Vo(yo, hy, ay, Θ) = max
co ,b≥0
{
u(c0) + αW(b, hy, ay, Θ)
}
s.t.
co + b ≤ y0
Details: Single variable maximization where b ∈ [0, yo]. One dimensional in-
terpolation is required for evaluation.
(b) Solve:
W(b, hy, ay, Θ) = max
n≥0
{
E
[
Vy(yy, ay, Θ)|·
]}
s.t.
yy =
(
wjy +
w′jy
1 + r′
)
ly(hy, ay) + b − cn(n)
jy ∼ F(j; ly(hy, ay), n, Θ)
Details: Single variable maximization where n ∈ [o, n̄], where n̄ assures posi-
tive yy in the worst case scenario. One dimensional interpolation is required
for evaluation. Normal cumulative distribution function is required for calcu-
lations. Expectation is calculated over j realization.
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(c) Solve:
Vy(yy, ay, Θ) = max
cy,cc,h′y,s≥0
{u(cy) + αu(cc) +
βE[Vo(y′o, h
′
y, a
′
y, Θ
′)|·]} s.t.
yy ≥ cy + cc + ch(h′y) + s
y′o = (1 + r
′)s
a′y ∼ g(ay)
Θ′ = T(Θ)
Two variable maximization where s ∈ [0, yy], h ∈ [0, (yy/κh)1/xih ], and resulting
cy, cc must be positive. Two dimensional interpolation is required for evalua-
tion. Expectation is calculated over a′ realization.
5. Simulate to calculate capital, skilled and unskilled labor, and fraction of population
in each job. One uniform and one normal draw are required for each household
and period.
6. Update wu, ws, r, g, s̄ using simulation results, and go back to (4) up until they are
consistent with the market clearing equations and η.
C.1.3 Aggregate factor demand equations
For computational purposes, it is useful to characterize aggregate factor demands in
terms of only factor prices, and factor prices only in terms of aggregate factor demands.
This section derives these algebraically using the equations from Appendix C.1.
In a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate demand for skilled and unskilled labor, Ls
and Lu, and the capital rental rate r are constants. The aggregate demand for capital,
K, and the wage rates for skilled and unskilled labor, ws and wu, grow at the same
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rate as aggregate output, in proportion to z̃ = z̄ζ/(λ+ζ). Define normalized aggregate
capital stock, skilled and unskilled wage rates as K̃ = K/z̃, w̃s = ws/z̃ and w̃u = wu/z̃
respectively. First, notice that by only using the definition for w̃u and Equation C.2, the
following identity for π is obtained:
π = ζ
[(
κ
r + δ
)κ ( λ
w̃u
)λ]1/ζ
(C.11)
Then we have:
Lu =
(
κ
r + δ
)κ/ζ ( λ
w̃u
) λ+ζ
ζ
(C.12)
K̃ =
(
κ
r + δ
) κ+ζ
ζ
(
λ
w̃u
) λ
ζ
(C.13)
Ls =
[
ξ
w̃s
χγπ
((1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ) − 1)
] 1
1−ξ
(C.14)
Given these equations, it can be verified that:
π = ζK̃κ Lλu (C.15)
Then we have:
w̃u = λK̃κ Lλ−1u (C.16)
r + δ = κK̃κ−1Lλu (C.17)
w̃s =
ξχγπ
((1 + r)(1 + gz)λ/(ζ+λ) − 1)L1−ξs
(C.18)
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log total patents log total patents log total patents log total patents
(renewed once) (renewed twice) (top 5% only) (top 20% only)
(1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006)
log income (1930) .037∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.008) (.009)
log education (1930) .099∗∗∗ .099∗∗∗ .075∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Obs. 78,438 78,438 81,348 81,348
R2 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the
coefficients of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the
surname in the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000).
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 35: Intensive Margin Robustness - Alternative Measures II
C.2 Empirical Appendix
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relative representation (1975-2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
income (1930) .296∗∗∗ .304∗∗∗ .323∗∗∗ .223∗∗∗ .307∗∗∗ .293∗∗∗
(.014) (.014) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.013)
education (1930) .004 .008 −.003 .003 .021∗ .005
(.007) (.009) (.010) (.005) (.012) (.007)
pop. share(1930)/pop. share(1880) .053∗∗∗
(.032)
Obs. 64,308 48,282 48,289 32,168 32,159 64,308
R2 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.46 0.30 0.35
Notes: Column 1 repeats the last column of Table 9 for surnames which population share ratio
is not missing. Columns 2 and 3 repeat the same regression after dropping the top and bottom
25% of the sample according to population share ratio respectively. Columns 4 and 5 repeat the
same exercise for the top and bottom halves of the sample respectively. Column 6 repeats the same
regression with the whole sample while introducing the population share ratio linearly as a
regressor in addition to income and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant
race fixed effects are included the coefficients of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables
are normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Observations are
weighted by the share of the surname in the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial
census of population (2000). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 36: Immigration Robustness (1880-1930) - Extensive Margin
219
log quality wtd. total patents (1975-2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log income (1930) .022∗ .009 .045∗∗∗ .106∗∗∗ −.005 .022∗
(.012) (.012) (.014) (.019) (.017) (.012)
log education (1930) .142∗∗∗ .138∗∗∗ .141∗∗∗ .089∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗ .141∗∗∗
(.011) (.011) (.013) (.018) (.011) (.011)
pop. share(1930)/pop. share(1880) −.003
(.005)
Obs. 50,529 37,921 37,897 25,269 25,265 64,308
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.35
Notes: Column 1 repeats the last column of Table 10 for surnames which population share ratio
is not missing. Columns 2 and 3 repeat the same regression after dropping the top and bottom
25% of the sample according to population share ratio respectively. Columns 4 and 5 repeat the
same exercise for the top and bottom halves of the sample respectively. Column 6 repeats the same
regression with the whole sample while introducing the population share ratio linearly as a
regressor in addition to income and education. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant
race fixed effects are included the coefficients of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables
are normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Observations are
weighted by the share of the surname in the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial
census of population (2000). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 37: Immigration Robustness (1880-1930) - Intensive Margin
relative relative relative
representation representation representation
(1975-2008) (1975-2008) (1975-2008)
income (1930) .259∗∗∗ .259∗∗∗
(.008) (.008)
education (1930) .024∗∗∗ .000
(.004) (.003)
Obs. 107,613 107,613 107,613
R2 0.24 0.18 0.24
Notes: Data is obtained exclusively from the males in all samples. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the coefficients of which are suppressed
for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the surname in the general population ob-
tained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5
and 1% levels respectively.
Table 38: Extensive Margin - Male Only
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log quality wtd. log quality wtd. log quality wtd.
total patents total patents total patents
(1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006)
log income (1930) .072∗∗∗ .006
(.008) (.009)
log education (1930) .176∗∗∗ .173∗∗∗
(.009) (.010)
Obs. 76,265 76,265 76,265
R2 0.02 0.05 0.05
Notes: Data is obtained exclusively from the males in all samples. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the coefficients of which are suppressed
for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the surname in the general population ob-
tained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5
and 1% levels respectively.
Table 39: Intensive Margin - Male Only
relative relative relative
representation representation representation
(1975-2008) (1975-2008) (1975-2008)
income (1930) .075∗∗∗ .082∗∗∗
(.013) (.015)
education (1930) .024∗ −.015
(.013) (.014)
Obs. 67,240 67,240 67,240
R2 0.16 0.15 0.16
Notes: Data is obtained exclusively from the females in all samples. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the coefficients of which are suppressed
for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the surname in the general population ob-
tained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5
and 1% levels respectively.
Table 40: Extensive Margin - Female Only
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log quality wtd. log quality wtd. log quality wtd.
total patents total patents total patents
(1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006)
log income (1930) −.025 −.072∗∗∗
(.016) (.019)
log education (1930) .061∗∗∗ .103∗∗∗
(.016) (.019)
Obs. 16,117 16,117 16,117
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02
Notes: Data is obtained exclusively from the females in all samples. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the coefficients of which are suppressed
for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the surname in the general population ob-
tained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5
and 1% levels respectively.
Table 41: Intensive Margin - Female Only
relative relative relative relative
representation representation representation representation
(1975-2008) (1975-2008) (1975-2008) (1975-2008)
income (1930) .239∗∗∗ .230∗∗∗ .202∗∗∗ .179∗∗∗
(.010) (.011) (.010) (.011)
education (1930) .001 −.001 .012∗∗ .008
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
household size (1930) .012∗∗ .006
(.006) (.006)
literacy rate (1930) .049∗∗∗ .108∗∗∗
(.010) (.012)
non-native origin (1930) .246∗∗∗ .267∗∗∗
(.013) (.014)
Obs. 110,290 110,289 110,290 110,289
R2 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.32
Notes: Household size and literacy rates are averages at the surname level. Non-native origin
is the fraction of people with the surname whose parents (at least one) were of foreign origin.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the coefficients
of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting the mean and
dividing by the standard deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the surname in
the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000). *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 42: Additional Robustness Checks - Extensive Margin
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log quality wtd. log quality wtd. log quality wtd. log quality wtd.
total patents total patents total patents total patents
(1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006) (1975-2006)
log income (1930) .001 −.001 .013 .013
(.009) (.009) (.010) (.010)
log education (1930) .175∗∗∗ .174∗∗∗ .162∗∗∗ .162∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
household size (1930) −.008 −.007
(.006) (.006)
literacy rate (1930) .009 −.001
(.011) (.011)
non-native origin (1930) −.052∗∗∗ −.052∗∗∗
(.010) (.010)
Obs. 81,348 81,347 81,348 81,347
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Notes: Household size and literacy rates are averages at the surname level. Non-native origin
is the fraction of people with the surname whose parents (at least one) were of foreign origin.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the coefficients
of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting the mean and
dividing by the standard deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the surname in
the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000). *, ** and ***
denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 43: Additional Robustness Checks - Intensive Margin
relative relative relative
representation representation representation
(1975-2008) (1975-2008) (1975-2008)
income (1930) .269∗∗∗ .269∗∗∗
(.012) (.012)
education (1930) .030∗∗∗ −.003
(.007) (.006)
Obs. 81,348 81,348 81,348
R2 0.30 0.24 0.30
Notes: The regressions on Table 9 are replicated while restricting the sample of surnames to those
on Table 10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the
coefficients of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the
surname in the general population obtained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000).
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 44: Extensive Margin Regressions with Intensive Margin Subsample
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(unweighted) (without frequent surnames) (inverse standard dev. wtd.)
relative log quality wtd. relative log quality wtd. relative log quality wtd.
represent. total patents represent. log patents represent. total patents
income (1930) .072∗∗∗ .181∗∗∗ .080∗∗∗
(.004) (.006) (.006)
education (1930) .005 .000 .004
(.003) (.003) (.003)
log income (1930) .012∗∗∗ .049∗∗∗ .004
(.004) (.007) (.008)
log education (1930) .061∗∗∗ .118∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗
(.004) (.018) (.008)
Obs. 110,290 81,348 109,052 80,243 89,099 69,160
R2 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.01
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 repeat the regressions on the last columns of Tables 9 and 10 without
using any weights. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the same regressions in a reduced sample where sur-
names that are more frequent than the median surname are dropped. Columns 5 and 6 repeat the
same regressions where the inverse of the standard deviation in income and education (geometric
average) is used as weight. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects
are included the coefficients of which are suppressed for brevity. All variables are normalized by
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. *, ** and *** denote significance at
10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Table 45: Rare Surnames - Intensive and Extensive Margins
relative relative relative
representation representation representation
(1975-1995) (1975-1995) (1975-1995)
income (1930) .245∗∗∗ .245∗∗∗
(.008) (.008)
education (1930) .028∗∗∗ −.000
(.005) (.003)
Obs. 110,290 110,290 110,290
R2 0.21 0.16 0.21
Notes: Inventor data is obtained exclusively from the 1975-1995 period. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the coefficients of which are suppressed
for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the surname in the general population ob-
tained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5
and 1% levels respectively.
Table 46: Extensive Margin - 1975-1995 Only
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log quality wtd. log quality wtd. log quality wtd.
total patents total patents total patents
(1975-1995) (1975-1995) (1975-1995)
log income (1930) .060∗∗∗ .006
(.009) (.010)
log education (1930) .151∗∗∗ .149∗∗∗
(.009) (.009)
Obs. 70,032 70,032 70,032
R2 0.03 0.04 0.04
Notes: Inventor data is obtained exclusively from the 1975-1995 period. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Dominant race fixed effects are included the coefficients of which are suppressed
for brevity. All variables are normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Observations are weighted by the share of the surname in the general population ob-
tained from the U.S. decennial census of population (2000). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5
and 1% levels respectively.
Table 47: Intensive Margin - 1975-1995 Only
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C.3 Quantitative Appendix
C.3.1 Relaxing the scarce high quality tertiary education assumption
The fraction of high quality tertiary education available in the society η is assumed
to be exogenously fixed in the model. This means that only a fraction η of the population
can receive the education necessary to produce ideas and become inventors. As a result,
this assumption implies that the output growth rate of the economy can only be increased
by allocating more productive individuals as inventors rather than increasing the share
of inventors in the population. How would the counterfactual exercises look like if this
assumption was relaxed?
In order to answer this question, the opposite extreme will be considered. Recall that
the score threshold s̄t was chosen such that
η =
∫ ∞
s̄t
s̃dS̃t(s̃)
held. Consider setting the fraction η free and fixing s̄t instead. In this alternative spec-
ification s̄t denotes a fixed achievement rating in score. Individuals who go have scores
greater than this threshold get high quality tertiary education, and the rest do not. The
calibration of this alternative model is trivial: The parameter η which was externally
calibrated becomes an additional targeted moment, and s̄ becomes a parameter.
Table 48 presents the results of repeating the credentialing spending shut down ex-
periment executed in Section 3.5.2 under this alternative model specification. The changes
are quite significant: Now that η is freely chosen, its value increases from 11.6% to 44.9%.
This means nearly half of the population is now allocated to the innovation sector. As a
result, the skilled labor supply is quadrupled, and the output growth rate is nearly dou-
bled, increasing from 2.00% to 3.45%. As one would expect, the welfare gain from this
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Variable Baseline ν = 0 Change
Extensive margin, income effect 0.19 0.11 -42.1%
Extensive margin, education effect 0.07 0.09 28.6%
Intensive margin, income effect 0.08 0.16 100%
Intensive margin, education effect 0.22 0.13 -40.9%
Yearly GDP growth rate 2.00% 3.45% 72.3%
Education spending/GDP 8.55% 11.8% 37.9%
Aggregate skilled labor, Ls 0.48 2.09 332%
Aggregate unskilled labor, Lu 1.91 1.39 -27.3%
Mean innate ability of skilled workers, a 2.08 1.78 -14.5%
Mean early childhood education of skilled workers, h 2.27 3.45 51.9%
Mean parental wealth of skilled workers, yo 0.87 0.96 9.68%
Mean bequests received of skilled workers, b 0.49 0.46 -5.37%
Wage income Gini index 0.52 0.50 -4.91%
Log 90/10 ratio 1.17 1.82 55.5%
Log 90/50 ratio 0.52 1.17 125%
Log 50/10 ratio 0.65 0.65 -0.06%
Table 48: Shutting down the credentialing spending channel - Free η
increase is also calculated to be huge at 107%.
Naturally, these numbers are not to be taken seriously, since the specification does
not impose any additional cost on the society for quadrupling the amount of high qual-
ity tertiary education provided. Rather, these should be viewed as the extreme upper
bound on the growth and welfare numbers that could be achieved by relaxing the fixed
η assumption. This example also serves to illustrate the fact that exogenously fixing η
is a conservative assumption in terms of putting a discipline on the growth and welfare
numbers produced by the model in the counterfactual experiments.
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